Annex 1 to

Public Redacted Version of Annex 1 to "Corrected version of 'Prosecution Final Trial Brief pursuant to Rule 134(b) with Confidential Annex 1 and Public Annex 2'", filing F00459/COR/A01, dated 22 July 2022

Public

Prosecution Final Trial Brief

FINAL TRIAL BRIEF

Outline

Conte	nts	
I.	INTRODUCTION	
II.	GENERAL EVIDENTIARY CONSIDERATIONS Standard of Proof	
A.	Assessment of Evidence	
В.		
III. A.	THE CHARGES ARE PROVEN BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT Testifying Victims: Abduction, Detention, Mistreatment, and Identification of Salih Mustafa	
	other BIA members	
1	. W01679 was abducted, detained, mistreated, and tortured at the ZDC	.16
2	. W03593 was abducted, detained, mistreated, and tortured at the ZDC	.21
3	. W04669 was abducted, detained, and mistreated at the ZDC	.25
4	. W03594 was abducted, detained, and mistreated at the ZDC	28
5	. [REDACTED] were also detained and mistreated at the ZDC	.30
В.	Mistreatments and Inhumane Conditions of Detention	31
C.	Release of some of the Detainees	34
D.	Murder of [REDACTED]	35
E.	The Evidence from the Victims is Corroborated	42
1	. Corroboration by Salih MUSTAFA	42
2	. The accounts of the Victims corroborate one another	.54
3	. Corroboration by other witnesses	61
4	. Corroboration by other case records	66
F.	Defences	.71
1	. Alibi	.71
2	. Refutation of the Prosecution case	86
G.	Existence of an armed conflict at the times relevant to the charges	.95
1	. The KLA	.97
2	Protected status of the Victims	102
IV.	ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND EVIDENCE PROVING THE ELEMENTS	
A.	Count 1 - Arbitrary detention	
1	1 5	
2	. Absence of due process guarantees1	105

В.	Count 2 - Cruel treatment
1	. Detention conditions
2	Infliction of serious mental or physical suffering and attacks on the prisoners' dignity 106
C.	Count 3 - Torture
1	. Infliction of severe physical and psychological pain
2	Aimed at obtaining information, punishing, coercing or intimidating
D.	Count 4 - Murder
V.	INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING LIABILITY 111
А.	Joint Criminal Enterprise ('JCE')
1 F	. The charged crimes were part of a common criminal purpose shared by a plurality of persons, including Salih MUSTAFA
2	Salih MUSTAFA significantly contributed to the common criminal purpose
B.	Aiding and Abetting
C.	Physical commission
D.	Ordering and instigating
E.	Superior Responsibility119
VI. A.	SENTENCING
В.	The gravity of the crimes and the role of the Accused require a severe sentence
1	. The Accused's Crimes were Brutal and Devastating for the Victims
2	The Accused's participation in the crimes was direct, deliberate, and unequivocal
C.	Deterrence requires a severe sentence in this case
D.	There are multiple additional aggravating factors131
1	. The Accused abused his power or official capacity to committ the crimes
2 a	The Victims were particularly vulnerable or defenceless and caused them to experience fear nd intimidation
3	The crimes were committed with particular cruelty and against multiple victims
E.	There are no mitigating factors
F.	Requested sentence
VII.	CLASSIFICATION
VIII.	RELIEF SOUGHT 136

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In April 1999, during the war in Kosovo, Salih MUSTAFA, the Accused in this case, along with his associates and subordinates, all members of the *Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës*, known in English as the Kosovo Liberation Army ('KLA'), unlawfully detained and severely mistreated a number of Kosovo-Albanian civilians, and murdered one of them. Those civilians were unlawfully held in a makeshift detention center in harsh, deplorable conditions, unfit for humans, where they were repeatedly mistreated, abused, threatened, and severely beaten by their captors. Salih MUSTAFA actively participated in those mistreatments and abuses, and was in charge of the location where those crimes happened. The crimes were perpetrated between approximately 1 and 19 April 1999 in a compound controlled and staffed by BIA, the KLA unit commanded by Salih MUSTAFA. The compound was located in the small and remote village of Zllash/Zlaš, in the mountainous region of Gollak/Goljak, not far from Prishtinë/Priština.

2. As demonstrated throughout this brief, the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that Salih MUSTAFA is guilty of all the crimes charged in the Indictment.¹ The evidence adduced at trial, including Prosecution witnesses, certain Defence witnesses, documentary evidence, and statements of the Accused himself, is compelling and persuasive in supporting the Accused's guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. The sentence advocated by the Specialist Prosecutor's Office ('SPO') is appropriate to provide victims with the justice that they deserve, given the gravity of the offences.

¹ Indictment, KSC-BC-2020-05/F00011/A01, 19 June 2020, and Public Redacted Version: KSC-BC-2020-05-F00004 dated 18 March 2020 with public redacted Annex 1 and public Annex 2, 2 October 2020.

3. The Victims² and their personal tragedies are at the heart of this case. For the first time, after more than 22 years, this case has given them voice, has given them an opportunity to explain the pain and suffering they had to endure in April 1999, but also how the long shadow of those traumatic events still haunts them. In the words of W01679:

I feel like I'm just watching a movie. When I go to bed at night, I wake up during the night, I scream, I say things in my sleep, and my family tell me that. So, I wake up and scream and I get sweaty. [...] I remember the voices of the people. I have all those flashbacks. [...] The voices of the victims and the voices of the people who tortured us. So, at a certain moment I hear these voices, the shouts, the screams, the swearing.³

4. This case is also about the social stigma that the Victims, all Kosovo-Albanians, had to endure for years after those traumatic events. A stigma that was caused by the Accused's actions, and by those acting upon his orders, who labelled the Victims as "spies" or "collaborators" of the enemy during the war. A label unjustly attributed to them because they were either perceived as not sufficiently supportive of the KLA and its cause, or accused of displaying the 'wrong' political affiliations.

5. This case is also about accountability, affirming the rule of law, and the future. A future built on the justice that the Victims and their families have sought for so long, and on their freedom to live their lives as equal members of the Kosovan community. In the words of Victim 05:

[...] I hope one day we will all be free to speak out about what we've lived through. I hope for a future free from crime, murder, and fear. All I'm asking for is freedom. We love our country, Kosovo, and it has never been our intention to say anything bad about it. All I'm asking is to be free to speak out about what we went through without any fear. I hope that one day we will be able to.⁴

² The Victims in this brief are defined broadly, as those who suffered the consequences of the Accused's actions directly (all detainees held at the ZDC including testifying Prosecution witnesses W01679, W03593, W03594, and W04669), and indirectly [REDACTED].

³ W01679, 5 October 2021, T.940.

⁴ Victim 05, 21 March 2022, T.2551-2552.

6. In the following sections of this Final Trial Brief,⁵ the SPO sets out its position on general evidentiary considerations,⁶ demonstrates how the facts proven at trial⁷ fulfil all elements of the criminal offences under Counts 1 to 4,⁸ and provides its submissions on the appropriate sentencing.⁹

II. GENERAL EVIDENTIARY CONSIDERATIONS

7. The Law and Rules, in particular Article 21(3) and Rules 139 and 140, explicitly regulate the standard of proof the Panel is to apply, as well as a number of considerations in relation to the assessment of evidence for the purposes of the judgment. These provisions broadly reflect the jurisprudence of other courts or tribunals which, as appropriate, constitute a relevant source for the interpretation and application thereof.

A. STANDARD OF PROOF

8. The guilt of the Accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.¹⁰ When applicable, the existence of a reasonable doubt must be grounded in reason.¹¹ Accordingly:

The reasonable doubt standard in criminal law cannot consist in imaginary or frivolous doubt based on empathy or prejudice. It must be based on logic and common sense, and have a rational link to the evidence, lack of evidence, or inconsistencies in

⁵ Filed in accordance with Rule 134(b) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Before the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, KSC-BD-03/Rev3/2020, 2 June 2020 ('Rules'); Article 45 of the Registry Practice Direction on Files and Filings before the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, KSC-BD-15, 17 May 2019; Decision on the closing of evidentiary proceedings and related matters, KSC-BC-2020-05/F00439, 20 June 2022, Public, para.25(c). Unless otherwise indicated, any subsequent reference to 'Rule' or 'Rules' is in reference to the Rules. For 'Article' or 'Articles', unless otherwise indicated these are articles of Law No.05/L-053 on the Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office, 3 August 2015 ('Law'). ⁶ Section II.

⁷ Sections III and IV.

⁸ Sections IV and V.

⁹ Section VI.

¹⁰ See Article 21(3); and Rules 140(1) and 158(3).

¹¹ Ongwen TJ, ICC-02/04-01/15-1762-Red, para.228; Rule 140(2).

the evidence.¹²

9. The beyond reasonable doubt standard must be applied to the facts as a whole constituting the elements of the crime and the mode of liability of the Accused as charged as well as to other facts on which the conviction depends.¹³ The beyond reasonable doubt requirement shall not be applied to individual pieces of evidence.¹⁴

10. Circumstantial evidence can satisfy the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt when the inference is the only reasonable one that could be drawn from the evidence presented.¹⁵ Where a panel bases a conviction solely or to a decisive extent on circumstantial evidence, it shall be assessed with caution and reasoned findings shall be provided, in particular regarding the consistency and intrinsic coherence of such evidence.¹⁶

11. A conviction may not be based solely or to a decisive extent on: (a) the statement of a witness whom the Defence had no opportunity to examine; (b) the evidence of witnesses whose identity was not disclosed to the Defence; or (c) the evidence of a person under the age of 18 or a person whose judgment has been impaired who, in the opinion of a Panel, does not understand the meaning of the duty to speak the truth.¹⁷ However, subject to these three instances, a Panel shall not impose a legal requirement that corroboration is required in order to prove any crime or criminal conduct within the jurisdiction of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers ('KSC').¹⁸

¹² *Rutaganda* AJ, ICTR-96-3-A, para.488; *see also Ongwen* TJ, ICC-02/04-01/15-1762-Red, para.228; Rule 140(2).

¹³ Rule 140(2); *Ongwen* TJ, ICC-02/04-01/15-1762-Red, para.227; *Ntaganda* AJ, ICC-01/04-02/06-2666-Red, para.37.

¹⁴ Rule 140(2).

¹⁵ Rule 140(3); *Ngirabatware* TJ, ICTR-99-54-T, para.60.

¹⁶ Rule 139(5).

¹⁷ Rule 140(4).

¹⁸ Rule 139(3); Taylor AJ, SCSL-03-01-A, para.78.

B. ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE

12. For the purposes of the trial judgment, the Panel cannot consider evidence declared inadmissible.¹⁹ It must assess each piece of evidence in light of the entire body of evidence admitted before it at trial and carry out a holistic evaluation and weighing of all the evidence taken as a whole to establish whether or not the facts at issue have been established.²⁰

13. The means by which credibility is assessed differs according to the form and nature of the evidence before the trier of fact.²¹ In assessing the credibility of documentary evidence, the Panel may consider, *inter alia*, the source of the document, its authenticity, content, and purported use.²²

14. In determining the weight to be given to the testimony of a witness, a panel shall assess the credibility of the witness and the reliability of his or her testimony.²³ The assessment of the appropriate weight and credibility to be accorded to the testimony of a witness should be made on a case-by-case basis.²⁴ In undertaking such assessment, the Panel may consider, *inter alia*: (i) the plausibility, coherence, detail, and clarity of the witnesses' testimony; (ii) whether and to what extent the witness is, or is not, in a position to provide certain information as well as the basis of knowledge on which a particular statement is made; (iii) the individual circumstances of the witness, including his or her role in the events in question and any motivation to lie;

¹⁹ Rule 139(1).

²⁰ Rule 139(2). *See also Ongwen* TJ, ICC-02/04-01/15-1762-Red, para.227; *Al Jadeed* AJ, STL-14-05/A/AP, para.56; *Ngirabatware* TJ, ICTR-99-54-T, para.50.

²¹ See Al Jadeed AJ, STL-14-05/A/AP, fn.201; Musema TJ, ICTR-96-13-T, para.60.

²² See Musema TJ, ICTR-96-13-T, paras.59-60, 63-67, 70-72.

²³ Rule 139(4).

²⁴ Nyiramasuhuko et al. AJ, ICTR-98-42-A, para.2971.

and (iv) the witness's demeanour when testifying in court, willingness to respond to questions, spontaneity when responding, and responses during cross-examination.²⁵

15. Inconsistencies in a piece of evidence do not *per se* require a panel to reject it as unreliable; a panel may accept parts of a piece of evidence and reject others.²⁶ In accordance with Rule 139(6), minor discrepancies between the evidence of different witnesses, or between the testimony of a particular witness and his or her prior statement, should not be regarded as discrediting such evidence.²⁷ It is within the Panel's discretion to evaluate any such inconsistencies, to consider whether the evidence taken as a whole is reliable and credible, and to accept or reject the fundamental features of the evidence.²⁸

16. The credibility, reliability, and weight of evidence presented by an accused is to be assessed in the same manner as the evidence presented by the SPO.²⁹

17. Just as for any other evidence presented, it is for the Panel to assess the reliability and probative value of expert reports and testimony.³⁰

18. The Panel may rely on evidence that falls outside of the temporal scope of the charges in certain circumstances, including: (i) to clarify a given context; (ii) to establish by inference the elements, in particular the *mens rea*, of criminal conduct occurring during the material period; or (iii) to demonstrate a deliberate pattern of conduct.³¹

²⁵ See Ongwen TJ, ICC-02/04-01/15-1762-Red, paras.255-260; Ngirabatware TJ, ICTR-99-54-T, para.52; Nyiramasuhuko et al. AJ, ICTR-98-42-A, para.692; Stanišić and Simatović TJ, MICT-15-96-T, para.13.

 ²⁶ Rule 139(6); See also Ngirabatware TJ, ICTR-99-54-T, para.53; Popovic et al AJ, IT-05-88-A, paras.136-137.
 ²⁷ Gucati and Haradinaj TJ, KSC-BC-2020-07/F00611/RED, para.38.

²⁸ Ngirabatware TJ, ICTR-99-54-T, para.53.

²⁹ Ntaganda AJ, ICC-01/04-02/06-2666-Red, paras.13, 587.


³⁰ Nahimana et al. AJ, ICTR-99-52-A, para.199.

³¹ Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea TJ, 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, para.60; Taylor TJ, SCSL-03-01-T-1271, para.101.

III. THE CHARGES ARE PROVEN BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT

A. TESTIFYING VICTIMS: ABDUCTION, DETENTION, MISTREATMENT, AND IDENTIFICATION OF SALIH MUSTAFA AND OTHER BIA MEMBERS

19. The crimes charged in this case occurred in Zllash/Zlaš, a small, remote village, located in the mountainous region of Gollak/Goljak, around 20 kilometers by road, east of Prishtinë/Priština, the capital of Kosovo.



SPOE00238090-00238090, Map depicting the location of Zllash/Zlaš relative to Prishtinë/Priština

KSC-BC-2020-05

31 January 2023

20. In 1999, Zllash/Zlaš consisted of a few clusters of houses scattered over a wider hilly area,³² being connected to the main roads only via a small winding road.³³



SPOE00213476, Photo depicting part of the village of Zllash/Zlaš

21. The 'BIA' Unit of the KLA,³⁴ created on 20 May 1998,³⁵ had a base in Zllash/Zlaš from July/August 1998 until June 1999.³⁶ BIA soldiers who came to, and stayed in, Zllash/Zlaš, used a specific compound³⁷ owned by a local villager, Adem

³² 069404-TR-ET Part 3, pp.12, 20-21 (Salih MUSTAFA); Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2267-2268; Fatmir SOPI, 19 January 2022, T.2173.

 ³³ SPOE00213459-00213487, pp.SPOE00213476, SPOE00213479 (Aerial photos depicting Zllash/Zlaš).
 ³⁴ The acronym BIA stood for the names of KLA members who had died in the war: Bahri FAZLIU, Ilir KONUSHEFCI, and Agron RRAHMANI. See 069404-TR-ET Part 1, p.24 (Salih MUSTAFA); 7000650-7000660, p.4 (Records of Witness Hearing with Salih MUSTAFA, 12 March 2003); Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2045; Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2195.

 ³⁵ 069404-TR-ET Part 1, pp.26-27, and Part 3, p.25 (Salih MUSTAFA). *See also* Section III.E.1.(d) *below*.
 ³⁶ 069404-TR-ET Part 3, pp.17-18 (Salih MUSTAFA).

³⁷ 069404-TR-ET Part 3, p.18, Part 7, p.5, and Part 8, pp.2-4 (Salih MUSTAFA); 7000650-7000660, p.8 (Records of Witness Hearing with Salih MUSTAFA, 12 March 2003); Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March

KRASNIQI, who let the KLA use it as a contribution to the war effort.³⁸ Adem KRASNIQI's nephew, Selatin KRASNIQI, was himself a BIA member.³⁹ The location was known as "the Skifterat base or compound".⁴⁰ BIA was in fact also known as 'Skifterat'.⁴¹ BIA controlled the whole compound,⁴² using that location as its base,⁴³ and Salih MUSTAFA was in charge and in control of the compound.⁴⁴

22. It was in this location that, between approximately 1 and 19 April 1999, Salih MUSTAFA and other BIA members detained and mistreated at least seven local Kosovo-Albanian civilians, and murdered one of them. For ease of reference, this location will be referred to as the Zllash/Zlaš Detention Compound ('ZDC').

23. At least two buildings within the ZDC were used by Salih MUSTAFA and his BIA subordinates to detain, interrogate, and torture Kosovo-Albanian civilians. Victims described being held in a "cowshed", "stable", or a place used to keep animals, as well as in the basement of the building where they were taken for

^{2022,} T.2641-2643, 2650-2651; Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2045, 2048-2049; Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3874, 3961-3962; W04600, 23 September 2021, T.719-720.

³⁸ 069404-TR-ET Part 3, p.20 (Salih MUSTAFA); Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2048, 2088-2089; Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3877, 3952. *See also* Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2197.

³⁹ 069404-TR-ET Part 3, p.20 (Salih MUSTAFA); Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3953-3954.

⁴⁰ W04600, 23 September 2021, T.724, 727, and 27 September 2021, T.846-847.

⁴¹ See e.g. 069404-TR-ET Part 4, p.45 (Salih MUSTAFA); Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2045.

⁴² Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2045, 2049, 2054, 2089; W04600, 23 September 2021, T.722, and 24 September 2021, T.814.

⁴³ Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2054, and 19 January 2022, T.2172; Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2197; W04600, 24 September 2021, T.811-812. Sejdi VESELI and W04600 testified that Brigade 153 soldiers were not stationed at that base. *See* Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2198; W04600, 23 September 2021, T.722. Even Defence witnesses who claimed that other KLA soldiers, outside of BIA, also used that location, did not deny however that BIA used it as their base. *See e.g.* Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3886, 3959-3960, and 22 April 2022, T.4018, 4039; Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4164. *See also* Section III.F.2 below for an assessment of the credibility of these Defence witnesses. ⁴⁴ Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2198-2199; W04600, 27 September 2021, T.845-846.

interrogation and beatings in the upper floor.⁴⁵ They identified the buildings where they were detained, interrogated, and tortured in pictures shown to them at trial.⁴⁶

24. Victims were taken to the building next to the cowshed, located uphill from the cowshed and accessible from the ZDC's courtyard, for interrogation and beatings.⁴⁷ The internal layout of this building as described by W01679 matches exactly that provided by Selatin KRASNIQI when describing the building next to the cowshed: two rooms separated by a corridor.⁴⁸

25. The buildings identified by the Victims are the same as those showed to and marked by defence witness Selatin KRASNIQI, during his testimony, in the picture below.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.870, 903, 915-916, 919; W03593, 21 September 2021, T.512-517; W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1430, 1470-1472.

⁴⁶W01679, 4 October 2021, T.919-925; SPOE00128386-00128420, p.3 (UNMIK Photobook), p.3 (SPOE00128388), p.7 (SPOE00128392); 100801-100806 RED1, p.3 (100803), p.5 (100805), p.6 (10806); W03593, 21 September 2021, T.512-513.

⁴⁷ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.915-916; W03593, 21 September 2021, T.514-515.

⁴⁸ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.918; Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3896-3899; REG00-015 (Photograph marked in court by Selatin KRASNIQI).

⁴⁹ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3894-3898; REG00-015 (Photograph marked in court by Selatin KRASNIQI); DSM00031-DSM00031 RED (Photo attachment 8 to Defence Witness Statement).




REG00-015 – Victims were detained in building 4A and in the basement of the building next to it, marked with a red circle. On the upper floor of that building, the entrance to which is also marked in red, detainees were interrogated and tortured. *See* 100801-100806 RED1, at p.100803 (showing the same building identified as the detention location by W01679) and 100966-100969, at p.100968 (identified by W03593).

26. Selatin KRASNIQI stated that the building with red markings showed above in REG00-015 was used to treat the wounded, but specified that this was only from 20 April 1999.⁵⁰ This is consistent with the testimony of the Victims in this case, who stated they were detained in building 4A and in the building with red markings next to it until 19 April 1999.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3898-3899.

⁵¹ Section III.E.2.(c) below discusses the evidence of the Victims who identified the buildings in REG00-015 as the place where they were detained and mistreated. *See e.g.* 100801-100806 RED, at 100803, and W01679, 4 October 2021, T.921-922.

27. With regard to the position of these buildings within the ZDC, they correspond to buildings 11 and 12 in the aerial picture of the compound marked by Selatin KRASNIQI.⁵²



REG00-013 – The buildings used for detention, interrogation and mistreatments are marked with numbers 11 and 12 on the left side of the picture.

28. The ZDC was located at the highest point of the village and, due to its elevation, constituted a safe location, as well as a convenient vantage point, overlooking the area.⁵³ That location suited the BIA soldiers who would stay there recuperating after their missions, and could observe the area.⁵⁴

⁵² Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3874, 3882-3883; REG00-013. Buildings marked in REF00-13 with numbers 11 and 12 correspond to the buildings marked with 3, 4, and 4A in the sketch drawn by Selatin KRASNIQI during his 2nd interview, in evidence as REG00-016.

 ⁵³ 069404-TR-ET Part 3, p.16 (Salih MUSTAFA); Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2642; Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2045, and 19 January 2022, T.2172-2175; 069474-TR-ET, Part 2, p.20 (SPO statement of Fatmir SOPI); Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2197; W04600, 23 September 2021, T.719.
 ⁵⁴ 069404-TR-ET Part 3, p.16 (Salih MUSTAFA); Fatmir SOPI, 19 January 2022, T.2172.

29. Around 1-2 kilometers downhill from the ZDC⁵⁵ was the primary school 'Avni Rrustemi', the most prominent building in Zllash/Zlaš ('Zllash/Zlaš school').⁵⁶ Starting from the beginning of March 1999, the KLA used that school as a training facility for their new recruits.⁵⁷

30. Other KLA units were located in Zllash/Zlaš but at some distance from the ZDC. From February 1999, Zllash/Zlaš harboured the headquarters of the newly formed KLA Brigade 153,⁵⁸ which was distinct from BIA and whose command comprised of Adem SHEHU,⁵⁹ Sejdi VESELI,⁶⁰ and Fatmir SOPI.⁶¹ The headquarters of Brigade 153 changed location several times, and was always at some distance from the

⁵⁵ Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2197; Fatmir SOPI, 18 January, T.2047; W04600, 23 September 2021, T.719.

⁵⁶ SPOE00128386-00128420, p.SPOE00128412 (Photo depicting the building of the school in in Zllash/Zlaš); Fatmir SOPI, 18 January, T.2047, 2053; Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2197; W04600, 23 September 2021, T.719.

⁵⁷ 069404-TR-ET Part 3, p.14, Part 7, p.4, and Part 8, p.6 (Salih MUSTAFA); Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2044, 2053, 2067-2068; Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2195; Musli HALIMI, 20 April 2022, T.3721; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.863-865; W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1402.

⁵⁸ The Brigade operated in the area of Gollak region, encompassing the villages of Rimanishte, Sharban, Bardosh, Radashec, Koliq, Nishec, Prapashtice, Koliq, Grashtice, Dabishec, Mramor, Makovc, Viti e Marecit, Keqekolle, Ballaban, and Marec. *See* 069404-TR-ET Part 3, p.13, and Part 7, p.3 (Salih MUSTAFA); Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2035-2036, 2044; Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2192, 2247-2248.

⁵⁹ Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2037-2038.

⁶⁰ Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2036; Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2191.

⁶¹ Adem SHEHU, an Albanian army officer, was formally appointed as Brigade Commander in February 1999 and assumed this position later in March 1999. Sejdi VESELI was his deputy, whereas Fatmir SOPI was initially the Brigade's Assistant Commander for Civilian Protection and, from late April 1999, became the deputy of Adem SHEHU, replacing Sejdi VESELI. *See* 069404-TR-ET Part 3, pp.26-27 (Salih MUSTAFA); Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2036-2037; Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2191.

ZDC.⁶² Both Brigade 153 and BIA formed part of the KLA's Llap Operational Zone ('Llap OZ').⁶³

31. As the Zllash/Zlaš school was the main training centre of the area,⁶⁴ those wanting to join the KLA were told to report there for enlistment and training.⁶⁵

1. W01679 was abducted, detained, mistreated, and tortured at the ZDC

32. One person detained and mistreated at the ZDC was W01679, [REDACTED]⁶⁶ and [REDACTED].⁶⁷ Towards the end of March 1999, after the beginning of the NATO bombing,⁶⁸ W01679 "wanted to contribute to [his] country's liberation"⁶⁹ and went to Mramor to ask about how and where to join the KLA.⁷⁰ He was told to go to the village of Zllash/Zlaš.⁷¹ He reported to Brigade 153 Commanders Fatmir SOPI and Adem SHEHU at the Zllash/Zlaš school.⁷² For a period of about four to five days, together

⁶² Initially, the HQ of Brigade 153 was located in the house of Fatmir SOPI (2-3 kilometres from the ZDC), then it was moved to the house of Fatmir SOPI's uncle, located next to the Zllash/Zlaš school (1-2 kilometres from the ZDC), and finally, after the offensive of 18 April 1999, it was moved to the house of Shaban GASHI. *See* Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2043-2045, 2047, 2118; Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2192, 2195, 2226.

⁶³ The Llap OZ covered the geographical area that encompassed Prishtinë/Priština and Podujevo in the northeast of Kosovo, including the village of Zllash/Zlaš. Throughout the Indictment period, Rrustem MUSTAFA (aka 'Remi') was the Commander of the Llap OZ, Kadri KASTRATI (aka 'Daja') was the Deputy Commander of the Llap OZ, Nuredin IBISHI (aka 'Leka') was the Chief of Staff of the Llap OZ, and Latif GASHI (aka 'Lata') was the head of intelligence within the Llap OZ Command Staff. Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2036, 2059, 2074; Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2192. *See also* Section III.G.1(a) *below*.

⁶⁴ Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2195; Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2044; Musli HALIMI, 20 April 2022, T.3721.

⁶⁵ Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2068; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.863-864; W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1394.

⁶⁶ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.861.

⁶⁷ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.862; see also 7000687-7000691 RED3, p.7000687 [REDACTED].

⁶⁸ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.863.

⁶⁹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.862.

⁷⁰ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.863.

⁷¹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.863; see also 7000687-7000691 RED3, p.7000687 [REDACTED].

⁷² W01679, 4 October 2021, T.864, 926; *see also* SPOE00128386-00128420 (UNMIK Photobook), p.SPOE00128412; SPOE00287803-00287803 (recent photo of the Zllash/Zlaš school).

with other new recruits,⁷³ W01679 underwent some basic military training, led by Adem SHEHU and 'Triumf'.⁷⁴ The training included physical and military exercises and guard duties.⁷⁵

33. On the fifth day of his training at the school, four armed soldiers dressed in black uniforms and wearing caps came to the school and took W01679 away.⁷⁶ W01679 was not shown any documents that justified his arrest, but was told he had to go with the soldiers.⁷⁷ "We are the special unit, Skifterat, and you have to come with us", "The commander needs to ask you something", they told W01679.⁷⁸

34. W01679 felt he had no choice but to go with them and was told only that he was being taken to the headquarters and to their commander.⁷⁹ These soldiers were Afrim, 'Dardan', 'Bimi', and Fatmir.⁸⁰ They belonged to BIA,⁸¹ the unit commanded by Salih MUSTAFA and also known as 'Skifterat'.⁸²

35. Escorted by the soldiers, W01679 walked along the road until arriving at some buildings that he had never seen before,⁸³ about a 20 minute walk from the Zllash/Zlaš school.⁸⁴ As they were arriving, they told W01679 to lower his head.⁸⁵ When they got

⁷³ W01679 remembers that there were a lot of other people training, "[p]erhaps 40, 50 people. Young men" participating in the training with him (W01679, 4 October 2021, T.865), and that they would go out and train in groups of 17-18 people (W01679, 5 October 2021, T.969).

⁷⁴ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.864-865, and 5 October 2021, T.972.

⁷⁵ W01679, 5 October 2021, T.969, 974-975. On training, see also Section III.A.3. below.

⁷⁶ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.865, and 5 October 2021, T.976, 978; *see also* 7000687-7000691 RED3, p.7000687 [REDACTED].

⁷⁷ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.866.

⁷⁸ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.866, and 5 October 2021, T.980.

⁷⁹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.866.

⁸⁰ W01679, 5 October 2021, T.977, 978, 1012, and 1 June 2022, T.4445, 4465, 4475.

⁸¹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.865; *see also* 7000687-7000691 RED3, p.7000687 [REDACTED]; W04600, 24 September 2021, T.763-764; Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2662, 2705-2706, 2712, 2714-2715; Ahmet ADEMI, 28 March 2022, T.2815; 069404-TR-ET Part 8, p.9 (Salih MUSTAFA).

⁸² 069404-TR-ET Part 4, p.45. See e.g. Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2045.

⁸³ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.867.

⁸⁴ W01679, 5 October 2021, T.980.

⁸⁵ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.867, and 5 October 2021, T.980.

closer to the buildings, they put a black sack on his head and took him into one of the buildings.⁸⁶ Once inside the building, they removed the sack from his head⁸⁷ and W01679 saw a person who introduced himself as "Commander Cali".⁸⁸ This person, who was also called 'Cali' by the other soldiers,⁸⁹ was Salih MUSTAFA, the Accused in this case.⁹⁰ W01679 also recognised 'Cali' in two photographs shown to him by the Trial Panel.⁹¹

36. The Accused started questioning W01679 about who he was and why he was there, while the other soldiers remained in the room.⁹² W01679 understood that the Accused was the commander also because the soldiers had told W01679 that "the commander" needed to ask him something, and – once in the room – the soldiers told the Accused: "Here you are, here's the person".⁹³

37. To the Accused's questions, W01679 replied that he came to join the army to make his contribution.⁹⁴ The Accused then asked, "[w]hy are you lying?",⁹⁵ "You're here for other purposes",⁹⁶ and started to shout and curse, and then slapped and beat W01679.⁹⁷ After he began beating him, the other soldiers all joined in and started beating W01679 too.⁹⁸ The Accused then ordered the other soldiers to "finish him".⁹⁹

⁸⁶ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.867, and 5 October 2021, T.980.

⁸⁷ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.868, and 5 October 2021, T.980.

⁸⁸ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.872-873, 875-876; 060698-TR-ET Part 2 Revised RED3, pp.11-12 (W01679 SPO interview), and 7000687-7000691 RED3, p.7000687 [REDACTED], where W01679 refers to 'Cali' (wrongly recorded as 'Cala').

⁸⁹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.873, 877.

⁹⁰ W01679, 5 October 2021, T.980.

⁹¹ W01679, 5 October 2021, T.1005; SPOE00222559-00222559 and REG00-008; SPOE00222547-00222547 and REG00-009.

⁹² W01679, 4 October 2021, T.867, and 5 October 2021, T.981.

⁹³ W01679, 5 October 2021, T.980-981.

⁹⁴ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.867, and 5 October 2021, T.981.

⁹⁵ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.867, and 5 October 2021, T.981.

⁹⁶ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.868.

⁹⁷ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.867, 869, and 5 October 2021, T.981.

⁹⁸ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.867, 869, and 5 October 2021, T.981.

⁹⁹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.869, and 5 October 2021, T.981.

The soldiers obeyed, and continued to punch, kick, and beat W01679, including with a baseball stick and the handle of a hatchet, until he lost consciousness.¹⁰⁰

38. The beating stopped only after W01679 fainted.¹⁰¹ The soldiers dragged him outside, covered in blood, and then brought him to a barn, a cowshed,¹⁰² where there were also other people.¹⁰³ W01679 was held in that barn for 18 days.¹⁰⁴

39. During his detention, W01679 was beaten almost every day.¹⁰⁵ The beatings occurred both downstairs in the stable and upstairs in the other building,¹⁰⁶ whenever the soldiers felt like it, day or night.¹⁰⁷ W01679 testified that: "whoever opened that door would kick you or slap you. They wouldn't leave without doing something to you."¹⁰⁸ Every day he felt like he was waiting for death – waiting to be killed.¹⁰⁹

40. The upstairs beatings were particularly brutal.¹¹⁰ When W01679 was taken upstairs, the perpetrators would kick and beat him with handles of hatchets and police batons made of iron.¹¹¹ They would sit him on a chair, light a candle, and put it near his back so that the drops would fall on his skin and burn him.¹¹² They also used an electricity box to torture him.¹¹³ They would fold his trousers up, attach wires to the flesh on both his legs and feet, and turn the box on.¹¹⁴ The electric shock would make

¹⁰⁷ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.891.

¹⁰⁰ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.870, 875; 7000687-7000691 RED3, p.7000687 [REDACTED].

¹⁰¹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.870, 882.

¹⁰² W01679, 4 October 2021, T.870, 882, and 5 October 2021, T.982.

¹⁰³ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.883.

¹⁰⁴ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.883.

¹⁰⁵ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.883, 885, and 5 October 2021, T.983.

¹⁰⁶ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.883-884, 886.

¹⁰⁸ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.885.

¹⁰⁹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.903.

¹¹⁰ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.886.

¹¹¹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.884.

¹¹² W01679, 4 October 2021, T.884, 886.

¹¹³ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.884, 886.

¹¹⁴ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.884, and 5 October 2021, T.986-987.

W01679 shake.¹¹⁵ In this regard, it is worth recalling that the BIA unit had access to electricity at the ZDC: defence witness Ibadete CANOLLI-KACIU confirmed that car batteries were used at the ZDC when she was there in April 1999 to provide lighting inside the buildings.¹¹⁶ Defence witness Teuta HADRI said that a functioning TV set was available at the ZDC.¹¹⁷

41. W01679 named 'Tabuti', Ilmi VELA, Afrim, 'Dardan', 'Fatmir', and 'Bimi' as those who tortured him.¹¹⁸ The torture with the electricity box was usually done by 'Dardan' and Afrim.¹¹⁹ They were all subordinates of Salih MUSTAFA.¹²⁰ As a confirmation of the witness's ability to identify his perpetrators, [REDACTED].¹²¹

42. W01679 was also subjected to degrading treatment during his detention. One time, while he was in the basement and asked for water, two soldiers arrived, beat him, and urinated on him, saying: "Here's water for you."¹²² W01679 remembered this happened twice.¹²³

43. In the barn, W01679 met W03594, W03593, [REDACTED], and [REDACTED].¹²⁴ He also recognized W04669, who was brought to the ZDC after W01679's arrival and whom W01679 knew from before.¹²⁵

¹¹⁵ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.884, and 5 October 2021, T.986.

¹¹⁶ Ibadete CANOLLI-KACIU, 12 May 2022, T.4334, 4394.

¹¹⁷ Teuta HADRI, 11 May 2022, T.4269-4271, and 12 May 2022, T.4292; DSM00242-DSM00246-ET, p.DSM00245.

¹¹⁸ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.887, and 1 June 2022, T.4445, 4465, 4466.

¹¹⁹ W01679, 5 October 2021, T.987.

¹²⁰ 069404-TR-ET Part 4, pp.3, 26, and Part 8, pp.9-13 (Salih MUSTAFA); Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2665-2666, 2706, 2712-2713; Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4103-4104.

¹²¹ See Section III.E.2(e) below. [REDACTED]. See 105373-105375 RED, pp.2-3.

¹²² W01679, 4 October 2021, T.884-885.

¹²³ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.885.

¹²⁴ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.889. See also Section III.E.2.(b) below.

¹²⁵ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.889, 896. See also Section III.E.2.(b) below.

44. W01679's evidence was clear, focused, detailed, and credible. W01679 provided many details, even though the events in question occurred 23 years ago. W01679's evidence was consistent throughout his in-court testimony,¹²⁶ and was also consistent on the major points with prior statements.¹²⁷ Finally, he did not embellish his evidence. He testified that "Commander Cali" personally participated in beating him one time, which is when W01679 was first taken to the ZDC,¹²⁸ was not present on other occasions,¹²⁹ and was an observer at other times during beatings.¹³⁰

2. W03593 was abducted, detained, mistreated, and tortured at the ZDC

45. W03593 was arrested at the beginning of April 1999 in the village [REDACTED] by armed KLA military police.¹³¹ He was visiting people at the school [REDACTED] when two individuals arrived and told W03593 that they were military police and that he had to go with them.¹³² The two men were both wearing KLA uniforms and were armed with automatic weapons.¹³³ They told W03593, "We are going to Zllash to talk",¹³⁴ but did not provide him with any documentation.¹³⁵ W03593 felt he had no choice but to go with them, and that he would have been killed if he did not comply.¹³⁶

¹²⁶ See evidence given during 4 and 5 October 2021, in direct, cross-examination, and during questions posed by the Victims' Counsel and the Trial Panel; as well as during rebuttal on 1 June 2022.

¹²⁷ See 7000687-7000691 RED3; 7000680-7000686 RED; 060698-TR-ET Parts 1-3.

¹²⁸ W01679, 5 October 2021, T.1004-1005.

¹²⁹ W01679, 5 October 2021, T.984.

¹³⁰ W01679, 5 October 2021, T.1005.

¹³¹ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.395-400, and 21 September 2021, T.556.

¹³² W03593, 20 September 2021, T.395, and 21 September 2021, T.556.

¹³³ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.396-397, and 21 September 2021, T.556.

¹³⁴ W03593, 21 September 2021, T.557.

¹³⁵ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.397.

¹³⁶ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.397.

46. After walking about half way to Zllash/Zlaš,¹³⁷ two more people in uniforms arrived in a black vehicle that resembled a jeep.¹³⁸ W03593 was put in the middle back seat of the car.¹³⁹ The two people who had arrested him sat on either side of him in the back.¹⁴⁰ In the car, the soldiers forced W03593 to take a chocolate and, as he was about to eat it, they punched him and he started bleeding.¹⁴¹ The soldiers then put a sack over W03593's head.¹⁴² The journey in the car to Zllash/Zlaš lasted [REDACTED].¹⁴³

47. Once he arrived at the ZDC, W03593, with the bag still over his head, was grabbed by two people, pushed into a barn, kicked, and brought to his knees.¹⁴⁴ Once he was inside the barn, the sack was removed from his head.¹⁴⁵ There was only one other person in the barn who was lying down and not moving.¹⁴⁶ At first, W03593 did not recognize the other person but then he realized that he knew him from before.¹⁴⁷ That person called W03593 by name.¹⁴⁸ He was [REDACTED].¹⁴⁹ [REDACTED] told W03593, "they will kill you."¹⁵⁰ [REDACTED] could hardly speak and appeared to have been beaten.¹⁵¹

¹³⁷ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.397-398, and 21 September 2021, T.556.

¹³⁸ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.398.

¹³⁹ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.399, and 21 September 2021, T.558-559.

¹⁴⁰ W03593, 21 September 2021, T.558-559.

¹⁴¹ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.395, 399, and 21 September 2021, T.558.

¹⁴² W03593, 20 September 2021, T.395, 399, and 21 September 2021, T.558.

¹⁴³ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.401, and 21 September 2021, T.558.

¹⁴⁴ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.395, 401-402.

¹⁴⁵ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.403, and 21 September 2021, T.558.

¹⁴⁶ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.395, 403, and 21 September 2021, T.560-562.

¹⁴⁷ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.403.

¹⁴⁸ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.403.

¹⁴⁹ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.403-404, 473: This person, whom W03593 recognised from before, was [REDACTED]. *See* Section III.D. *below*.

¹⁵⁰ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.404.

¹⁵¹ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.404.

48. W03593 spent about an hour to an hour and a half in the barn.¹⁵² Then, three to five people came to get him.¹⁵³ They again put a sack over his head, took him outside, and started to beat him.¹⁵⁴ One of them was called 'Tabut/Tabuti' by the others.¹⁵⁵ W03593 was dragged into a second place, where he was also beaten.¹⁵⁶ W03593 fainted two or three times.¹⁵⁷ Those beating him were swearing at him and accusing him of being "a collaborator with the Serbs".¹⁵⁸ The beating, which lasted for a long time,¹⁵⁹ ended when a man with a "red hat" took a revolver, put it to W03593's head, and pulled the trigger.¹⁶⁰ The gun clicked but did not fire, and the man in the red hat said, "let him be, he is lucky."¹⁶¹

49. After about six or seven days, W03593 was taken to a room upstairs where the same person with the red hat, in military uniform and wearing KLA insignia, asked him questions about thieves and beat him with a baseball bat.¹⁶² When the beating ended, the person wearing the red hat ordered two others to take W03593 back to the barn.¹⁶³ W03593 was released about 7 or 8 days later.¹⁶⁴

50. The person in the red hat who interrogated and beat W03593, who used the gun against him during the first beating, and who was giving orders to the others was

¹⁵² W03593, 20 September 2021, T.402, and 21 September 2021, T.563.

¹⁵³ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.407, 409, 414.

¹⁵⁴ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.407.

¹⁵⁵ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.430-431, and 22 September 2021, T.583.

¹⁵⁶ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.408.

¹⁵⁷ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.409, 411.

¹⁵⁸ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.409-410, and 23 September 2021, T.689.

¹⁵⁹ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.411, 414-415, and 21 September 2021, T.563.

¹⁶⁰ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.411-413; 061015-TR-ET Part 2 Revised RED3, pp.7-9.

¹⁶¹ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.411-412; 061015-TR-ET Part 2 Revised RED3, p.9.

¹⁶² W03593, 20 September 2021, T.419-421, 425-426, 428, 438; 061015-TR-ET Part 2 Revised RED3, pp.26-28.

¹⁶³ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.438-439, and 21 September 2021, T.510-511.

¹⁶⁴ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.439.

the Accused, Salih MUSTAFA.¹⁶⁵ W03593 testified that he heard one of the perpetrators call this man, the Accused, "Cali".¹⁶⁶ He also heard someone referring to the Accused as "commander".¹⁶⁷ About a month after his release, KLA soldiers from the region confirmed to W03593 that Cali was the commander in Zllash/Zlaš.¹⁶⁸ Later, a KLA member known to the witness also told him that 'Cali' was the commander in Zllash/Zlaš.¹⁶⁹

51. In Zllash/Zlaš, W03593 observed that the other detainees who were being taken out of the second barn and then brought back appeared to have been beaten because they had marks and bruising on their faces.¹⁷⁰ He heard them being beaten on the floor above the stable and he testified that such beatings were taking place almost every night.¹⁷¹ W03593 learned from other detainees that electricity was used as a form of mistreatment.¹⁷² Every night, two to five KLA soldiers would enter the barn to slap and kick the detainees.¹⁷³

52. W03593's evidence was detailed, specific, and consistent on key points. The Panel will want to consider what factors may have made W03593 so reluctant in his testimony to identify the Accused by name or nickname.¹⁷⁴ Significantly, shortly before his in-court testimony, W03593 [REDACTED],¹⁷⁵ [REDACTED].¹⁷⁶ As a consequence, W03593 had decided not to go to The Hague to testify, and only changed

¹⁶⁵ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.412, 420-421, 429, 432, 437-438, and 22 September 2021, T.584; 061015-TR-ET Part 2 Revised RED3, pp.7-8.

¹⁶⁶ W03593, 22 September 2021, T.652-654; 061015-TR-ET Part 2 Revised RED3, pp.28-29.

¹⁶⁷ W03593, 22 September 2021, T.657.

¹⁶⁸ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.428, and 23 September 2021, T.679.

¹⁶⁹ W03593, 22 September 2021, T.658-659.

¹⁷⁰ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.439-440, and 22 September 2021, T.576.

¹⁷¹ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.476-477.

¹⁷² W03593, 20 September 2021, T.474.

¹⁷³ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.441-442, and 22 September 2021, T.575-577.

¹⁷⁴ See e.g. W03593, 20 September 2021, T.434, and 21 September 2021, T.520-522, 531-532.

¹⁷⁵ See W03593, 22 September 2021, T.619.

¹⁷⁶ W03593, 21 September 2021, T.532.

his mind after receiving further reassurance.¹⁷⁷ Notably, [REDACTED].¹⁷⁸ [REDACTED].¹⁷⁹

3. W04669 was abducted, detained, and mistreated at the ZDC

53. The experience of W04669 in March/April 1999 matched that of the others. Motivated by "[his] will to defend [his] country", W04669 decided to join the KLA.¹⁸⁰ He voluntarily reported to a KLA base in Konjuh village,¹⁸¹ but was instructed to join in Zllash/Zlaš.¹⁸² Consequently, he travelled to Zllash/Zlaš and reported to the Zllash/Zlaš school.¹⁸³

54. Upon his arrival, W04669 met with Mesuesi aka 'the Teacher', Fatmir SOPI, and Sejdi VESELI.¹⁸⁴ While at the Zllash/Zlaš school, W04669 was trained by Musli HALIMI, Emin BOROVCI aka 'Commander Triumfi', and 'Commander Bihi' on how to use various military weapons.¹⁸⁵ W04669 recalled that his training occurred

¹⁷⁷ W03593, 21 September 2021, T.532.

¹⁷⁸ W03593, 22 September 2021, T.621.

¹⁷⁹ W03593, 22 September 2021, T.622, 658-659.

¹⁸⁰ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1391.

¹⁸¹ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1392.

¹⁸² W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1394.

¹⁸³ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1395, 1402-1403.

¹⁸⁴ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1395.

¹⁸⁵ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1400-1401. Defence witness Musli HALIMI, called by the Defence to discredit W01679 and W04669, actually corroborated many aspects of their evidence. Firstly, he confirmed the description of the training process and daily routine at the Zllash/Zlaš school, mirroring the accounts of W04669 and W01679: *Cf* Musli HALIMI, 20 April 2022, T.3726, 3740-3741, 3748, 3791; W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1399-1403, 11 November 2021, T.1512-1517; and W01679, 4 October 2021, T.864; 5 October 2021, T.956, 968. All three testified that in the course of the training, recruits would be required to participate in guard duty (Musli HALIMI, 20 April 2022, T.3744; W04669, 11 November 2021, T.1516-1517; W01679, 5 October 2021, T.975). Secondly, HALIMI confirmed the names of KLA trainers including Emin BOROVCI aka 'Triumfi' and 'Mesuesi' ('the Teacher'): *see* 20 April 2022, T.3738, 3792. Both Musli HALIMI and W04699 testified that 'Triumfi' was training the recruits on how to deal with weapons: *see* W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1401; and Musli HALIMI, 20 April 2022, T.3739, 3741-3742. Thirdly, W04699 testified that Musli HALIMI, known as 'Commander Llapi' was in charge of the training centre, and Musli HALIMI confirmed that 'Llapi' was indeed his nickname: *see* W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1400, and Musli HALIMI, 20 April 2022, T.3729. W04669 further indicated that Musli HALIMI was responsible for tactical exercises as well as physical training, as he allegedly had a black

[REDACTED].¹⁸⁶ After his training, he was instructed to go home and wait until more weapons arrived.¹⁸⁷ W04669 returned to Zllash/Zlaš several times to check upon the arrival of weapons and the possibility to join the unit.¹⁸⁸

55. While heading towards Zllash/Zlaš to check again in March/April 1999, he was stopped at a KLA check point [REDACTED].¹⁸⁹ The guards reported his presence¹⁹⁰ and a car arrived to pick him up.¹⁹¹ The man driving the car was wearing a military uniform and had a "Kalashinkov-type" weapon.¹⁹²

56. W04669 was not told where he was being driven¹⁹³ but he was taken to the ZDC.¹⁹⁴ Upon arrival, W04669 was stripped of his belongings,¹⁹⁵ including his belt, laces, [REDACTED].¹⁹⁶ Men in military uniforms placed him inside a "place where the

belt in Karate (W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1400-1401). Musli HALIMI acknowledged that he indeed was responsible for these elements of the training, including self-defence, and that he was trained in martial arts (Musli HALIMI, 20 April 2022, T.3739, 3792). And finally, Musli HALIMI acknowledged that he could not possibly know all the recruits, as he came from a different region and was not familiar with local names (20 April 2022, T.3756, 3731), and that even if there was a logbook/list where their names were registered, that document had been destroyed (20 April 2022, T.3790). Also Fatmir SOPI confirmed the testimonies of W01679 and W04669 testifying that: the training at Zllash/Zlaš school involved physical and theoretical components, including handling weapons; it was organized both indoors and outdoors; and two of the instructors were Musli HALIMI and Emin BOROVCI aka 'Triumfi': *cf* Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2068-2072, 2081.

¹⁸⁶ W04669, 11 November 2021, T.1536.

¹⁸⁷ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1407.

¹⁸⁸ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1410.

¹⁸⁹ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1410, 1414, and 11 November 2021, T.1534, 1536 (for the time-period).

¹⁹⁰ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1410.

¹⁹¹ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1411.

¹⁹² W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1411.

¹⁹³ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1414.

¹⁹⁴ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1415.

¹⁹⁵ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1416.

¹⁹⁶ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1416.

animals would stay"¹⁹⁷ and closed the door.¹⁹⁸ There were two other men inside the barn.¹⁹⁹ The man who arrested him was [REDACTED].²⁰⁰

57. W04669 was escorted blindfolded²⁰¹ to a nearby room for interrogation.²⁰² Two younger men questioned him, while two older men stood close by.²⁰³ He was told, "you're not telling the truth. You're a spy. You're spying."²⁰⁴ The guards demanded him to remove his shirt and bend down.²⁰⁵ W04669 was hit 10 to 12 times with a rubber stick, a baton used by the militia,²⁰⁶ [REDACTED] resulting in severe bruising²⁰⁷ all over his back.²⁰⁸

58. W04669 was released after approximately one week.²⁰⁹ He was never given any documentation as a basis for his arrest or any release papers.²¹⁰ W04669 believes he was interrogated and beaten [REDACTED].²¹¹

59. W04669's evidence was clear, focused, and detailed. His account was consistent with his prior statements on all key points.²¹² The Panel should also take into account [REDACTED].²¹³

¹⁹⁷ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1411.

¹⁹⁸ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1411-1412.

¹⁹⁹ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1415.

²⁰⁰ W04669 stated that the man who arrested him was [REDACTED].

²⁰¹ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1443.

²⁰² W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1443.

²⁰³ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1446.

²⁰⁴ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1444.

²⁰⁵ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1444.

²⁰⁶ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1444-1445.

²⁰⁷ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1468.

²⁰⁸ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1470.

²⁰⁹ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1449.

²¹⁰ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1456.

²¹¹ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1446, 1448.

²¹² Cf 082023-TR-ET Parts 1-4 RED1 (SPO interview).

²¹³ The following are both examples of the general climate of intimidation which is still pervasive in Kosovo. [REDACTED].

4. W03594 was abducted, detained, and mistreated at the ZDC

60. W03594 was a [REDACTED].²¹⁴ He moved from [REDACTED] after the NATO bombing started, around 28 March 1999, and [REDACTED].²¹⁵

61. On or about 4 April 1999, three KLA soldiers arrived [REDACTED] looking for W03594 at the house where he was staying.²¹⁶ They told him, "Baci is looking for you", and took him away.²¹⁷ Baci was a nickname used for Sejdi VESELI.²¹⁸ W03594 did not know where they were going, and did not ask anything, thinking that he was [REDACTED].²¹⁹ Instead, he was taken to Zllash/Zlaš.²²⁰ Upon arrival at the ZDC, two people wearing masks and uniforms with KLA insignia brought W03594 into a barn without explanation.²²¹ When he entered, there were four other people in the barn.²²² W03594 remained in this barn from approximately 4 to 18 or 19 April 1999.²²³

62. The other detainees in Zllash/Zlaš told W03594 that they had been seriously mistreated²²⁴ and W03594 saw that two or three of them had scars and marks on their bodies.²²⁵ They said that they had been beaten so badly that they thought death would have been a better option.²²⁶ W03594 saw them being beaten on their hands with a rubber stick, being pushed, threatened, and humiliated.²²⁷

²¹⁴ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1032.

²¹⁵ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1034-1035.

²¹⁶ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1035-1036.

²¹⁷ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1036.

²¹⁸ Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2196.

²¹⁹ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1036.

²²⁰ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1037-1038.

²²¹ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1037-1038.

²²² W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1040.

²²³ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1040.

²²⁴ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1058-1062, 1076; 061016-TR-ET Part 3 RED1, p.7.

²²⁵ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1059, 1062-1065, and 13 October 2021, T.1189; 061016-TR-ET Part 3 RED1, p.7.

²²⁶ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1063; 061016-TR-ET Part 3 RED1, p.7.

²²⁷ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1068-1072; 061016-TR-ET Part 4 RED1, pp.2, 6-7.

63. W03594 himself was mistreated while in detention,²²⁸ including by being beaten with a stick on his hands.²²⁹ He testified that he "felt as if I were an animal and no longer a human being" and feared for his life.²³⁰ In the words of W03594, "the conditions were inhuman."²³¹ He considered the whole experience humiliating and "spiritually devastating", and his detention was like a "second death" to him.²³² W03594 too was taken 'upstairs' and, according to W01679, when he returned he was in a terrible state.²³³ W03594 was next to W01679 when W01679 was urinated on by the guards.²³⁴

64. W03594 says that he was treated more favourably relative to the other detainees, and he believed this was because "people from the outside knew me."²³⁵ According to him, when the guards came in, other detainees would move closer to W03594 in hopes of being protected.²³⁶ Notably, [REDACTED].²³⁷

65. W03594's demeanour during testimony appears to have been affected by his evident reluctance and fear to be a witness during these proceedings.²³⁸ [REDACTED].²³⁹ The pressure that W03594 clearly felt, heightened by the fact that [REDACTED],²⁴⁰ shows how much strength it required of other witnesses to testify in this case and state that they were victims of crimes perpetrated by a KLA commander.

²²⁸ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1067-1068; 061016-TR-ET Part 4 RED1, p.2. *See also* W03593, 20 September 2021, T.453, and 22 September 2021, T.576; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.894.

²²⁹ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1067-1070

²³⁰ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1066.

²³¹ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1040.

²³² W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1067, 1076.

²³³ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.894.

²³⁴ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.898.

²³⁵ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1163.

²³⁶ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1079.

²³⁷ W03594, 13 October 2021, T.1210, and 14 October 2021, T.1239-1240.

²³⁸ See e.g. W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1061-1063, 1067-1070.

²³⁹ W03594, 13 October 2021, T.1118.

²⁴⁰ W03594, 13 October 2021, T.1210, and 14 October 2021, T.1239-1240.

5. [REDACTED] were also detained and mistreated at the ZDC

66. [REDACTED] was already in detention at the ZDC when W01679 was taken there.²⁴¹ He was detained because he was accused of being a spy.²⁴²

67. [REDACTED] was beaten up both in the cowshed in front of the others and upstairs.²⁴³ He was also in a very bad state when he returned from upstairs. "He was so tired and exhausted that he could not stand."²⁴⁴

68. Another person who was detained at the ZDC was a young man known to the other detainees as '[REDACTED]'.²⁴⁵ He was from [REDACTED] at the time.²⁴⁶ An entry on the List of Prisoners names a [REDACTED], as having been arrested on 6 April 1999.²⁴⁷

69. According to W01679, he was too afraid to speak to anyone,²⁴⁸ and he appeared withdrawn because he was traumatized and shaking.²⁴⁹ [REDACTED] was frequently taken upstairs and beaten.²⁵⁰ He was also severely beaten downstairs in the stable.²⁵¹ [REDACTED] were the two detainees who were mistreated the most.²⁵²

²⁴⁹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.900.

²⁴¹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.889.

²⁴² W01679, 4 October 2021, T.895.

²⁴³ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.895.

²⁴⁴ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.895.

²⁴⁵ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.889-890, 899-900; W03593, 20 September 2021, T.444-451; SPOE00127751-00127769 RED4, pp.9-10; W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1052; 061016-TR-ET Part 3 RED1, p.11.

²⁴⁶ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.900-901; W03593, 20 September 2021, T.445.

²⁴⁷ U001-0310-U001-0325, p.1. W03593 had in [REDACTED] as one of the detainees at the ZDC, *see* W03593, 20 September 2021, T.444-451; SPOE00127751-00127769 RED4, pp.9-10.

²⁴⁸ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.889-890, 900; see also W03594, 061016-TR-ET Part 3 RED1, pp.11-12.

²⁵⁰ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.901.

²⁵¹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.901; W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1052-1053, 1058; 061016-TR-ET Part 3 RED1, pp.10-11. *See also* W03593, 20 September 2021, T.444-445.

²⁵² W03593, 20 September 2021, T.445.

B. MISTREATMENTS AND INHUMANE CONDITIONS OF DETENTION

70. At the ZDC, detainees were beaten almost every day.²⁵³ Every time the soldiers entered the stable, they would kick, punch, or slap those detained there.²⁵⁴ Detainees were also taken upstairs individually, where they were brutally beaten.²⁵⁵ The downstairs mistreatments took place in front of the other detainees, while upstairs the detainees were taken one at the time.²⁵⁶

71. W04669 testified that two persons who were detained with him were interrogated outside and were slapped in their faces by their interrogators.²⁵⁷ W04669 also heard them scream when they were being mistreated outside the stable.²⁵⁸

72. Detainees could hear from the stable the screams of those being beaten upstairs.²⁵⁹ W01679 explained, "I could hear all sorts of voices. And it's there where I learned that somebody's voice can change because of what he's undergoing."²⁶⁰ W01679 heard "people screaming, howling like dogs, making sounds like cats, screaming cats, because of the torture and the pain."²⁶¹ Also W03593 testified that: "We could hear people screaming, and we could hear hard sounds. And we simply couldn't sleep because we were scared that at any time they would come down and bring us upstairs as well."²⁶² He further explained: "These were sounds of people being beaten and their screams."²⁶³

²⁶⁰ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.890.

²⁵³ See e.g. W01679, 4 October 2021, T.885, 890; W03593, 20 September 2021, T.440-441, 476.

²⁵⁴ See e.g. W01679, 4 October 2021, T.885, 890; W03593, 20 September 2021, T.441.

²⁵⁵ See W01679, 4 October 2021, T.885-887; W03593, 20 September 2021, T.475-476.

²⁵⁶ See W01679, 4 October 2021, T.886, 901.

²⁵⁷ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1426.

²⁵⁸ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1463-1464.

²⁵⁹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.890; W03593, 20 September 2021, T.476.

²⁶¹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.890.

²⁶² W03593, 20 September 2021, T.476.

²⁶³ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.476.

73. Those taken upstairs would be brought back down after they lost consciousness.²⁶⁴ W01679 and the others would try to help them when they got back down by covering them with a blanket or doing anything else they could.²⁶⁵ The signs of mistreatment were obvious: they were all covered in blood,²⁶⁶ they were bruised and hit on their faces.²⁶⁷ As W01679 testified: "We were all in a very terrible state. You can see whether blood is coming out of your face or not. It was obvious."²⁶⁸ He added: "You were just waiting for death, when it will come. Today, tomorrow. You were waiting for you to be killed."²⁶⁹ Similarly, W03593 testified that, when hearing the voices and screams of the people being beaten: "We felt very badly, because we were thinking about ourselves and we were thinking that we would have the same chance as them."²⁷⁰

74. In addition to the Accused, BIA soldiers that participated in the mistreatments and torture included those known as Brahim MEHMETAJ aka 'Bimi', Fatmir, Afrim, 'Dardan', Ilmi VELA, 'Tabuti', Bujar, and Avni.²⁷¹ BIA soldiers -namely 'Tabuti' and Ilmi VELA- urinated on W01679, and W03594 was next to him when that happened.²⁷² Some of these BIA soldiers were also known to local KLA commanders.²⁷³

75. The detainees were also psychologically abused, including by soldiers entering the stable and displaying to them the severely beaten [REDACTED].²⁷⁴

²⁷⁰ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.477.

²⁶⁴ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.891.

²⁶⁵ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.891.

²⁶⁶ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.896.

²⁶⁷ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.440.

²⁶⁸ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.896.

²⁶⁹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.903.

²⁷¹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.887, 893; W03593, 20 September 2021, T.430-431, and 22 September 2021, T.583.

²⁷² W01679, 4 October 2021, T.884, 897-899; 060698-TR-ET, Part 3 Revised RED3, p.6.

²⁷³ W04484, 25 January 2022, T.2199-2202. See also W04600, 24 September 2021, T.764.

²⁷⁴ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1441.

76. During their detention, the detainees were kept in a barn for animals,²⁷⁵ the door of which was kept locked²⁷⁶ and guarded.²⁷⁷ The barn was in very poor condition, with hay on the ground, no proper windows, and no light or air coming in from the outside.²⁷⁸ Food and water were insufficient.²⁷⁹ The barn was very cold and wet²⁸⁰ and the detainees slept on the ground.²⁸¹ They were not able to wash themselves or change clothes.²⁸² They had to relieve themselves inside the barn by using a common bucket in front of one other,²⁸³ or they were accompanied outside by armed guards at the door.²⁸⁴ Nobody was provided with medical attention.²⁸⁵ No family contacts or visits were allowed.²⁸⁶ Guards told the detainees that they would be killed if they talked to one another.²⁸⁷

KSC-BC-2020-05

²⁷⁵ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.417.

²⁷⁶ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1415, 1430, 1468; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.919; W03594, 13 October 2021, T.1175.

²⁷⁷ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.417; W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1456, 1468; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.919; W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1040.

²⁷⁸ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.417, and 21 September 2021, T.562, and 22 September 2021, T.577; W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1430.

²⁷⁹ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.477-478, and 21 September 2021, T.539, 563; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.902.

²⁸⁰ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.417, and 21 September 2021, T.564.

²⁸¹ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.417, 478; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.902; W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1042.

²⁸² W03593, 20 September 2021, T.478-479; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.902-903.

²⁸³ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.903; W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1042.

²⁸⁴ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.479-480; W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1441-1442.

 ²⁸⁵ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.480; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.903; W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1467.

²⁸⁶ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.480-481; W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1467; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.903.

²⁸⁷ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.418.

C. Release of some of the Detainees

77. On or about 18 or 19 April 1999, Serbian forces launched an offensive towards the Gollak/Goljak area, shelled Zllash/Zlaš,²⁸⁸ and caused BIA to leave the ZDC.²⁸⁹

78. The detainees, who were in the custody of Salih MUSTAFA and his soldiers, were released with the exception of two. W01679, W03594, and [REDACTED] were released together,²⁹⁰ followed by W03593.²⁹¹ They were not given any release papers.²⁹²

79. W01679 recalls that Fatmir and 'Bimi' were those who released them.²⁹³ They opened the door and said, without forewarning, "You, you, you, go out." – "Go wherever you want."²⁹⁴ The suddenness of their release is confirmed by W03593 and W03594.²⁹⁵ W01679 explained that he remembered Brahim MEHMETAJ aka 'Bimi' because of the comments he made about [REDACTED].²⁹⁶ When W01679 asked him why he was kept there, Brahim MEHMETAJ aka 'Bimi' replied, [REDACTED].²⁹⁷

80. [REDACTED] were not released together with the others.²⁹⁸ The soldiers did not say why they were not releasing [REDACTED].²⁹⁹ When the others were released, [REDACTED] was "in a terrible state", "he could not even stand",³⁰⁰ or walk, he "was

 ²⁸⁸ See e.g. W03593, 21 September 2021, T.552-553; W04600, 24 September 2021, T.801, 819; Fatmir SOPI,
 18 January 2022, T.2077-2079, and 19 January 2022, T.2176.

²⁸⁹ Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2078-2079.

²⁹⁰ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.905; W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1040, and 13 October 2021, T.1144.

²⁹¹ W03593, 21 September 2021, T.562.

²⁹² W01679, 4 October 2021, T.904.

²⁹³ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.904, and 1 June 2022, T.4445, 4466.

²⁹⁴ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.904.

²⁹⁵ W03593, 21 September 2021, T.515; W03594, 13 October 2021, T.1144.

²⁹⁶ W01679, 1 June 2022, T.4466, 4478.

²⁹⁷ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.904, and 1 June 2022, T.4466, 4478.

²⁹⁸ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.484-485; W03593, 22 September 2021, T.613; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.905-906; W03594, 13 October 2021, T.1145. *See also* W04648, SPOE00128333-00128343 RED1, T.1.

²⁹⁹ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.485-486; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.905-906.

³⁰⁰ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.906.

lying on the ground, all the time."³⁰¹ Similarly, [REDACTED]was "in a bad state" by the time the others were released.³⁰²

81. Upon their release, W01679, W03593, W03594, [REDACTED]³⁰³ and told [REDACTED] about their detention by the KLA in Zllash/Zlaš. [REDACTED] confirmed that the detainees told [REDACTED] that they "came from the prison at Zllash/Zlaš village and they had been in that prison together with [REDACTED]",³⁰⁴ and that "they were all released from the prison except [REDACTED]".³⁰⁵ W04674 confirmed, as he had told [REDACTED], that the detainees said "that they had been prisoners of UCK soldiers, specifically Skifterat, a group within UCK".³⁰⁶

82. Further, [REDACTED] described the detainees as being in a "horrific" condition, exhausted, with marks on their faces and bodies from beatings and ill-treatment, and hungry, unshaven, with dirty, unwashed clothes and very long nails.³⁰⁷ W04391 added that those people said [REDACTED] was not released "because his arms and his legs had been broken".³⁰⁸

D. MURDER OF [REDACTED]

83. On or shortly after 19 April 1999, following exceptionally harsh detention, mistreatment, and torture, [REDACTED] was murdered by members of the BIA unit

³⁰¹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.928.

³⁰² W01679, 4 October 2021, T.907.

³⁰³ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.487, and 22 September 2021, T.614-615; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.910-911.

³⁰⁴ W04391, 22 November 2021, T.1743. See also W04674, 13 December 2021, T.1936.

³⁰⁵ W04391, 22 November 2021, T.1744.

³⁰⁶ W04674, 13 December 2021, T.1938-1939; and SPOE00128189-00128201 RED2, p.1. *See also* 076509-TR-ET Part 2 RED1, p.26.

³⁰⁷ W04391, 22 November 2021, T.1744; W04390, 24 November 2021, T.1869-1870; W04674, 13 December 2021, T.1940.

³⁰⁸ W04391, 22 November 2021, T.1745. *See also* W04390, 24 November 2021, T.1897; W04674, 14 December 2021, T.2015.

who had him in custody, and he was subsequently buried in the immediate vicinity of the KLA Zllash/Zlaš Detention Compound. Salih MUSTAFA is responsible for [REDACTED]'s death.³⁰⁹

84. [REDACTED] was arrested on 1 April 1999 in the village of [REDACTED],³¹⁰ and taken to Zllash/Zlaš by [REDACTED], upon the orders of [REDACTED].³¹¹ [REDACTED].³¹² Salih MUSTAFA was present when [REDACTED] was brought into the ZDC, and he greeted [REDACTED] from a balcony of one of the buildings, at a distance of about 20-30 metres.³¹³ [REDACTED] was escorted inside by the guard.³¹⁴ [REDACTED] remained there just for the time that [REDACTED] was taken inside, and then left by car.³¹⁵

85. [REDACTED] was accused of being a spy, a Serb collaborator, and a thief.³¹⁶ He was detained from 1 April until at least 19 April 1999 when W01679, W03594, [REDACTED], and W03593 were released while he was not.³¹⁷

86. [REDACTED] "was one of the persons who was beaten the most, injured the most. He was brutally mistreated."³¹⁸ He was the only one who was restrained in the

³⁰⁹ See Section V. below.

³¹⁰ See W04391, 22 November 2021, T.1733-1734, 1736; W04390, 24 November 2021, T.1861-1862, 1865, and SPOE00127967-00127974 RED1, p.1; W04674, 13 December 2021, T.1933-1934; W04648, SPOE00128061-00128064 RED1, p.2; SPOE00128158-00128162 RED1, p.1; and SPOE00130685-00130687 RED1, p.1; U001-0310-U001-0325, p.1.

³¹¹ W04600, 23 September 2021, T.723-727, and 24 September 2021, T.801-803; W04603, 2 November 2021, T.1302-1304. *See also* W04390, 24 November 2021, T.1862. On the existence of an order to arrest [REDACTED], *see also* W04391, 22 November 2021, T.1737.

³¹² [REDACTED].

³¹³ W04600, 23 September 2021, T.728-733. *See also* 072908-072914 RED1, pp.2-3; REG00-004, and REG00-005, and Section III.E.1.(b).

³¹⁴ W04600, 23 September 2021, T.729.

³¹⁵ W04600, 23 September 2021, T.730, 733.

³¹⁶ W04674, 14 December 2021, T.2018; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.892-893; W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1438, and 11 November 2021, T.1564.

³¹⁷ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.484-485, and 22 September 2021, T.613; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.905-906; W03594, 13 October 2021, T.1145.

³¹⁸ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.891.

barn and had his hands tied all the time,³¹⁹ because – in the assessment of the other detainees – [REDACTED].³²⁰ [REDACTED], "they were afraid [...] to remove his handcuffs."³²¹ [REDACTED].³²²

87. When [REDACTED] was brought back to the barn after being taken out, he looked destroyed from the beatings.³²³ He had bruises and marks on his face and body, was burnt with an iron and stabbed with a knife.³²⁴ He could not stand up because of the injuries,³²⁵ "because they beat the hell out of me",³²⁶ as he managed to say to W03593. In the words of W01679, "It was a catastrophe. His body had all these marks. It was terrible. Everyone of us was beaten, but he was beaten the most and he was massacred."³²⁷

88. According to W04669, [REDACTED] "was black from the beatings", "everything on his face, his eyes, nose, everything was black", "he was bruised, black, on all visible parts of his body", he could barely open his eyes.³²⁸

89. W04669 added that, when [REDACTED] was brought to the stable badly mistreated, all the detainees were in fear and understood that the situation was critical as the same could happen to them.³²⁹ Every time [REDACTED] was brought to the barn, W04669 and his co-detainees were forced to say: "Death to the traitors, death to

³¹⁹ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1432; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.892; W03593, 20 September 2021, T.454-455.

³²⁰ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.892.

³²¹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.892.

³²² W01679, 4 October 2021, T.893.

³²³ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.454.

³²⁴ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.892; W03593, 20 September 2021, T.454, 474.

³²⁵ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.404.

³²⁶ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.404-405.

³²⁷ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.892.

³²⁸ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1432-1433.

³²⁹ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1441.

the thieves, death to the thugs and glory to the KLA!".³³⁰ W04669 saw five or six people beat [REDACTED] with "everything they had in their hands."³³¹

90. The last time W04669 saw [REDACTED], "he was almost dead", "was lying down and was even more swollen", "his nose was bleeding, he was unable to speak and was just crying out of pain".³³² [REDACTED] was in such a bad shape that the soldiers "had to hold him, all the weight of his body, and they placed him lying on the ground because he [could not] stand on his feet".³³³ In the words of W01679, "You cannot even describe his state in words. His body, his injuries. The smell, the smell of flesh that we could sense. It was terrible. In my opinion, it's a massacre."³³⁴

91. While [REDACTED] was held at the ZDC, [REDACTED].³³⁵ In this regard, W04600 testified that he learned around 23 or 24 April 1999 from another KLA member that [REDACTED] had died.³³⁶

92. [REDACTED].³³⁷ He finally found it, in July 1999, based on the directions received from two local villagers.³³⁸ [REDACTED] body was discovered on or about 4 July 1999 in a shallow grave [REDACTED].³³⁹ A sketch drawn by W04648 shows the

³³⁰ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1434.

³³¹ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1434.

³³² W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1434.

³³³ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1438.

³³⁴ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.907.

³³⁵ W04674, 13 December 2021, T.1995, 1934; 076509-TR-ET Part 2 RED, pp.2, 6 (SPO Interview); W04391, 22 November 2021, T.1736-1741; 060723-TR-ET Part 1 Revised RED, pp.15-17, and Part 2 Revised RED, p.12 (SPO Interview); W04714, 077816-TR-ET Part 1 RED, pp.11-14, 22 (SPO Interview); W04648, SPOE00128061-00128064 RED, p.3; SPOE00128158-00128162 RED, p.1; SPOE00128333-00128343 RED, p.1; SPOE00128344-00128345 RED; SPOE00130685-00130687 RED. *See also* W04390, 060674-060680 RED, pp.2-3.

³³⁶ W04600, 23 September 2021, T.766-767.

³³⁷ [REDACTED]; W04648, SPOE00128158-00128162 RED, p.1; SPOE00128333-00128343 RED, p.1. *See also* [REDACTED].

 ³³⁸ [REDACTED]; W04648, SPOE00128333-00128343 RED, p.1; SPOE00128069-00128086 RED, p.2.
 ³³⁹ [REDACTED].

position of the grave [REDACTED].³⁴⁰ The grave was [REDACTED].³⁴¹ These estimates are consistent with an UNMIK aerial reconnaissance report which described the grave [REDACTED].³⁴²

93. When in early July 1999, [REDACTED], they found documents at the compound including medical records belonging to [REDACTED].³⁴³ This discovery further confirmed his detention at the ZDC.

94. [REDACTED] exhumed his body on 7 July 1999. His face was decomposed and he was identified, *inter alia*, by his clothes and a damaged tooth.³⁴⁴ The corpse showed what appeared to be a gunshot wound to the torso. His legs appeared broken.³⁴⁵ A number of photographs were taken of the body during the exhumation.³⁴⁶ Another unidentified person was found in that grave.³⁴⁷ Shortly after the exhumation, [REDACTED]'s body was taken to the village of [REDACTED].³⁴⁸

95. A multitude of factors taken together establish the Accused's responsibility for the murder of [REDACTED], namely:

a) Salih MUSTAFA's awareneness of the arrest and detention of [REDACTED], who was delivered to a BIA guard at the ZDC in his presence;³⁴⁹

³⁴⁰ W04648, SPOE00128158-00128162 RED, p.4. See also [REDACTED].

³⁴¹ [REDACTED]; W04648, SPOE00128158-00128162 RED, p.1. See also [REDACTED].

³⁴² See SPOE00128266-00128273 RED, p.6. See also SITF00318201-00318202 RED, p.2; SPOE00130596-00130596 RED.

³⁴³ [REDACTED].

³⁴⁴ [REDACTED]; W04648, SPOE00128061-00128064 RED, p.3; SPOE00128069-00128086 RED, p.4; SPOE00128333-00128343 RED, p.1.

³⁴⁵ [REDACTED].

³⁴⁶ [REDACTED].

³⁴⁷ [REDACTED].

³⁴⁸ [REDACTED]; W04648, SPOE00128333-00128343 RED, p.1. [REDACTED].

³⁴⁹ [REDACTED].

- b) The exceptional severity of the mistreatment of [REDACTED] by subordinates of the Accused;³⁵⁰
- c) The fact that [REDACTED] was not freed by the Accused and his subordinates when the other detainees were suddenly released, on or about 19 April 1999,³⁵¹
- d) [REDACTED]'s near-death condition when he was last seen at the ZDC;³⁵²
- e) The [REDACTED] was found in early July 1999 by W04674 and W04648;³⁵³
- f) The state of [REDACTED]'s body when [REDACTED];³⁵⁴ and
- g) The presence of a second body in the grave,³⁵⁵ noting that a second person, [REDACTED], was not released, along with [REDACTED], when all the other detainees were freed.³⁵⁶

96. W01679, W03593, W03594, and [REDACTED] were abruptly released on 19 April 1999 because of the Serbian offensive.³⁵⁷ After days in detention, they were released without any forewarning and simply told to go. It was done particularly hastily as the KLA in Zllash/Zlaš, and the BIA unit at the ZDC, were making preparations to evacuate the village, including civilians and the wounded. In the words of W03593 "[...] it was the offensive on the 18th, and there was no way out. They had to release us on the 18th." While W03593's memory may have been off by one day,

KSC-BC-2020-05

³⁵⁰ *See above* paras.87-90.

³⁵¹ See evidence of W03593, W01679 and W03594 cited above: para.80.

³⁵² See evidence cited above: para.90.

³⁵³ See [REDACTED]; W04648, SPOE00128333-00128343 RED1, p.1; SPOE00128069-00128086 RED1, pp.2-3. See also [REDACTED].

³⁵⁴ [REDACTED]; W04648, SPOE00128333-00128343 RED1, p.2; [REDACTED].

^{355 [}REDACTED].

³⁵⁶ See para.94.

³⁵⁷ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.904; W03593, 21 September 2021, T.515, and 20 September 2021, T.419; W03594, 13 October 2021, T.1144.

his testimony is another indicator that their release was not planned, but dictated by an unexpected change in circumstances.

97. Against this backdrop, there is no reasonable explanation as to why the Accused and his BIA subordinates would keep two detainees in their custody, at least one of whom could not walk and was near death, an undeniably cumbersome presence as they prepared to evacuate the ZDC. The only reasonable explanation is that the Accused, and other members of BIA, never meant to release these last two detainees.

98. Finally, there is no evidence supporting a claim that [REDACTED] was killed by Serbian forces. While the ZDC was shelled from a distance, there is no credible evidence that Serbian troops ever entered the compound. The evidence establishes that the detainees were released on or shortly after 19 April 1999, which was at the beginning of the offensive, and no witnesses say that there were Serbian troops present or nearby at that time. The detainees who were released did not see any Serbian forces on their way out of the compound. In fact, they eventually made it safely to Prishtinë/Priština and other locations.³⁵⁸

99. The circumstances of [REDACTED]'s detention, the brutality of his mistreatment, his separation from the group upon release, and the discovery of his body [REDACTED] establish beyond all reasonable doubt that he was murdered by his captors. There is no other cogent explanation that accounts for the evidence in this case.

³⁵⁸ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.911; W03594, 13 October 2021, T.1160; W03593, 21 September 2021, T.553.

E. THE EVIDENCE FROM THE VICTIMS IS CORROBORATED

1. Corroboration by Salih MUSTAFA³⁵⁹

100. The accounts of the Victims, compelling and persuasive as they are on their own, are corroborated in key ways by the Accused's own words, in particular regarding the Accused's presence in the ZDC, his role as the commander over BIA and the ZDC, the identity of other members of BIA, and the Accused's distinctive red beret.

101. The Accused made these admissions, and others, in his SPO interview on 19 and 20 November 2019. At the interview, he was represented by counsel³⁶⁰ and fully informed of his rights, and he clearly indicated that he understood those rights.³⁶¹ He answered all of the questions voluntarily and was given a full opportunity to explain or add to his answers.³⁶² At the end of the interview, he indicated that he had no objections to the manner or process by which his statement was taken.³⁶³

³⁵⁹ Salih MUSTAFA aka 'Cali', Kosovo-Albanian, was born on 1 January 1972 in Prishtinë/Priština. Before the war, he was a member of the People's Movement of the Republic of Kosovo ('LPRK') and of the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo ('LKCK'). In August 1993, he was arrested and sentenced to four years in prison, and then released in August 1997. From 1997, he became commander of the 'Pristina Guerillas'. From 20 May 1998 to mid-June 1999, he was the Commander of the BIA unit. For the duration of the Kosovo conflict, he remained in Kosovo, operating mainly on the territory of the KLA Llap OZ. From late June 1999, he became a member of the KLA's military intelligence service of Zone 5, and subsequently of the Kosovo Protection Corps ('TMK'). From 2008/2009, he served in the Kosovo Security Force ('KSF') and later, until his arrest by the Specialist Chambers on 24 September 2020, he operated as senior officer with the Intelligence Department of the Kosovo Ministry of Defence. *See* 069404-TR-ET Part 1, pp.4,5,9,17, 25-27; Part 7, p.30, Part 8, pp.25-27,30,33. *See also* Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2036, 2061; Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2196; Fatmir HUMOLLI, 1 February 2022, T.2296-2297, 2303; and SPOE00055799-SPOE00055868-ET, p.69 [Skender ZHITIA's Book].

³⁶⁰ 069404-TR-ET Part 1, p.1.

³⁶¹ 069404-TR-ET Part 1, pp.2-4.

³⁶² 069404-TR-ET Part 8, pp.31-32.

³⁶³ 069404-TR-ET Part 8, p.32.

(a) Presence of the Accused in the ZDC

102. In his interview, the Accused admitted that he was regularly present at Zllash/Zlaš and the ZDC, including during the Indictment period. He admitted that in 1999 he stayed in the village on many occasions,³⁶⁴ albeit not constantly,³⁶⁵ as he was engaged in providing Brigade 153 with intelligence, weapons, ammunition, medical supplies, and assistance.³⁶⁶

103. The Accused stated that, when in Zllash/Zlaš, he slept on the first floor of a building within the ZDC.³⁶⁷ While it is likely that the Accused already minimized in his interview the time he spent at the ZDC, as he knew that the alleged crimes occurred there, he nonetheless acknowledged that between 25 March and 22 April 1999, he slept in the ZDC overnight two to three times, for a couple of nights.³⁶⁸ One such time was "perhaps 15 days or 20 days before the offensive" that the Accused states commenced on or about 16 April 1999.³⁶⁹ This specific admission is significant, as it is consistent with W01679 and W03593's evidence about when the Accused participated in interrogations and beatings of them at the ZDC, and with the evidence of [REDACTED] about when [REDACTED] was taken to the ZDC.³⁷⁰ If all of these witnesses were fabricating their accounts, as the Accused claims, it is impossible to imagine that they would coincidentally claim that they met the Accused at the ZDC at precisely the time that the Accused, unbeknownst to those witnesses, himself admitted to being there.

³⁶⁴ 069404-TR-ET Part 7, p.16.

³⁶⁵ 069404-TR-ET Part 7, p.16.

³⁶⁶ 069404-TR-ET Part 3, pp.19-20.

³⁶⁷ 069404-TR-ET Part 7, p.16.

³⁶⁸ 069404-TR-ET Part 7, p.10.

³⁶⁹ 069404-TR-ET Part 7, pp.12, 16.

³⁷⁰ See Section III.D. above.

104. The Accused also admitted that he left Zllash/Zlaš at some point between 12 and 14 April, further confirming that he was present at the ZDC before this date, when crimes alleged in the Indictment occurred.³⁷¹

(b) The Accused's sketch of the location

105. The Accused's interview also corroborates aspects of [REDACTED]'s testimony that the Accused was present when [REDACTED] to BIA member [REDACTED] who was guarding the ZDC's gate on that date.³⁷²

106. [REDACTED] testified that the Accused was standing on the balcony of a building about 20 or 30 meters from the ZDC's entrance.³⁷³ [REDACTED] recalled that this building, which was on the right-hand side when entering the compound,³⁷⁴ had three or four rooms, all of which had access to the balcony where the Accused was standing.³⁷⁵

[REDACTED]

REG00-005 – [REDACTED] placed number '3' with a blue marker on the balcony where the Accused appeared. The other blue marking, on the right side of the sketch, indicates the entrance to the ZDC.

107. In describing the building where he and his soldiers slept at the ZDC, the Accused stated that there were "three doors", and "some sort of terrace".³⁷⁶ The Accused also sketched a drawing of this building, showing a number of rooms that all had access to the balcony, as testified by [REDACTED].³⁷⁷ It was on this balcony that the Accused was standing when [REDACTED] to the compound.

³⁷¹ 069404-TR-ET Part 7, p.22.

³⁷² 069404-TR-ET Part 7, pp.10-12; [REDACTED].

³⁷³ [REDACTED].

³⁷⁴ REG00-004.

³⁷⁵ REG00-005; [REDACTED].

³⁷⁶ 069404-TR-ET Part 8, pp.3-4.


³⁷⁷ 069404-TR-ET Part 8, p.4; 069401-069404 RED, at 069403.



069401-069404 RED, at 069403 (Sketch of BIA's sleeping quarters drawn by the Accused)

108. This evidence is further corroborated by Defence witness Selatin KRASNIQI, the son of the ZDC's owners and a BIA member himself. Selatin KRASNIQI described the rooms marked as 2, 3, 4, and 5 on the aerial photo of the remains of the ZDC as being all part of the same building back in 1999. He stated that in 1999, this building was used as living quarters by himself and the other soldiers.³⁷⁸ As the aerial picture below shows, the building that hosted BIA's sleeping quarters (numbers 2, 3, 4, and 5) is on the right-hand side of the compound, exactly where [REDACTED].³⁷⁹

³⁷⁸ DSM00018-00035, at p.DSM00026; Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3876-3879. ³⁷⁹ REG00-013.



REG00-013 - Aerial picture of the ZDC, taken in 2006, and marked by Selatin KRASNIQI

(c) Command of the Accused over the ZDC

109. The Accused also admitted that BIA was based at the ZDC during the time of the charges in the Indictment. He admitted to BIA's command over the building discussed above,³⁸⁰ where [REDACTED] to the ZDC. The Accused acknowledged that he participated in the negotiation leading to the handover of the ZDC from Adem KRASNIQI's family to the KLA,³⁸¹ and the evidence establishes that BIA, with the Accused in command, was in control of the entire compound.

 ³⁸⁰ 069404-TR-ET Part 7, p.5; 069401-069404 RED, at p.069403.
 ³⁸¹ 069404-TR-ET Part 3, pp.17-18.

(*d*) Command of the Accused over the BIA unit

110. "I was the headquarters."³⁸² This statement from the Accused fully encapsulates his position of ultimate control over BIA during the war. It corroborates the role that W01679 and W03593, as well as others, testified that he had. Salih MUSTAFA admitted that he was the only commander of the BIA unit³⁸³ from its very inception on 20 May 1998³⁸⁴ until 12-14 June 1999, when the unit was disbanded.³⁸⁵ He was appointed to the position by the then commander of the KLA's Llap OZ, Rrustem MUSTAFA aka 'Remi'.³⁸⁶

111. BIA was organised into sectors³⁸⁷ and sub-units,³⁸⁸ having a well-defined area of operations covering Prishtinë/Priština, Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, and Obiliq/Obilić,³⁸⁹ and having a presence in Butovc, Rimanishte/Rimanište and Zllash/Zlaš within the Gollak/Goljak region.³⁹⁰

³⁸² 069404-TR-ET Part 1, p.31.

³⁸³ Records of Witness Hearing with Salih MUSTAFA, 12 March 2003, 7000650-7000660, pp.2, 7. *See also*: Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T. 2060; Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2195-2196; W04600, 23 September 2021, T. 718; Gani SOPI, 4 April 2022, T.3143-3144; Nuredin IBISHI, 12 April 2022, T.3550, 3611; Fatmir HUMOLLI, 1 February 2022, T.2303; SPOE00055799-SPOE00055868-ET, pp.7,69 (Skender ZHITIA's Book).

³⁸⁴ 069404-TR-ET Part 1, pp.26-27. See also Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2618.

³⁸⁵ 069404-TR-ET Part 7, pp.24-26; Records of Witness Hearing with Salih MUSTAFA, 12 March 2003, 7000650-7000660, pp.4, 9.

³⁸⁶ 069404-TR-ET Part 1, pp.24-25; Part 2, pp.22-23; Records of Witness Hearing with Salih MUSTAFA, 12 March 2003, 7000650-7000660, pp.2, 8.

³⁸⁷ There were four sectors in BIA: Intelligence (led by Salih MUSTAFA), Logistics (led by Agron ZEQIRI), Health (led by Flora BROVINA) and Morale and Politics (led by Brahim MEHMETAJ aka 'Bimi'). *See* 069404-TR-ET Part 1, p.32; Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2618-2621, 2666-2667; Records of Witness Hearing with Salih MUSTAFA, 12 March, 20037000650-7000660, p.4; Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2036, 2063-2064.

³⁸⁸ 069404-TR-ET Part 1, pp.28-30.

³⁸⁹ 069404-TR-ET Part 2, pp.4,8; SPOE00055705-SPOE00055708-ET, p.4.

³⁹⁰ 069404-TR-ET Part 3, pp.12-16.

112. The Accused reported to, and took orders directly from, the Llap OZ command.³⁹¹ He, in turn, had the ability to issue orders to his BIA subordinates,³⁹² and such orders were duly followed. Examples of his commanding powers over BIA include his orders to subordinates that required co-ordination and planning: the unit's attack on a Serbian fuel deposit conducted in March 1999,³⁹³ the dispatch of BIA's members to other KLA Operational Zones with medical supplies,³⁹⁴ and the preparation of the report on the Serbian military barracks in Prishtinë/Priština.³⁹⁵ He specifically admitted giving orders to BIA member Agron ZEQIRI.³⁹⁶

113. The Accused had deputy commanders/first assistants in BIA³⁹⁷ who were under his command.³⁹⁸ Initially, it was Brahim MEHMETAJ aka 'Bimi'³⁹⁹ and then, from February 1999 to 21 April 1999, it was Isa KASTRATI, followed by Bahri GASHI aka 'Bafta'.⁴⁰⁰ The Accused also directly commanded his subordinates in charge of the respective BIA sectors of health, logistics, and morale/politics.⁴⁰¹

114. The Accused also had the exclusive power to make appointments within BIA, including his deputy commanders/first assistants.⁴⁰²

³⁹¹ 069404-TR-ET Part 1, p.24 ; Part 2, pp.12-20, and Part 3, p.3. *See also*: Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2656-2657, 2665, 2668-2670; Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2059; Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2196.

 ³⁹² Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2621,2665, 2668; Ibadete CANOLLI-KACIU, 12 May 2022, T.4356; Bislim NRECI, 5 April 2022, T.3238-3239, 3245; DSM00056-00067, p.5 (Bislim NRECI statement).
 ³⁹³ 069404-TR-ET Part 2, pp.3-4.

³⁹⁴ 069404-TR-ET Part 2, p.8.

³⁹⁵ Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2621, and 24 March 2022, T.2741.

³⁹⁶ Records of Witness Hearing with Salih MUSTAFA, 12 March 2003, 7000650-7000660, pp.2-3.

³⁹⁷ 069404-TR-ET Part 1, p.31.

³⁹⁸ 069404-TR-ET Part 1, p.31. See also: Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2666.

³⁹⁹ Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2618, 2665.

⁴⁰⁰ Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2657, 2713-2714.

⁴⁰¹ 069404-TR-ET Part 1, pp.31-32.

⁴⁰² Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2666.

115. Many BIA soldiers, including Salih MUSTAFA and his deputies, wore uniforms with KLA badges and were armed.⁴⁰³ However, many of them wore civilian clothing and operated unarmed, because of the clandestine nature of their work.⁴⁰⁴ They also had a communication system, including through mobile phones, satellite telephones, and radio communication devices.⁴⁰⁵ BIA members were issued identifying documents with the KLA logo, their names, and the signature of the Accused as the commander, indicating his position over all of the soldiers within the unit.⁴⁰⁶

116. No one other than the Accused had the ability to exercise control over the BIA unit,⁴⁰⁷ including commanders of KLA brigades operating within the Llap OZ,⁴⁰⁸ such as the Brigade 153 headquartered in Zllash/Zlaš that was separate from BIA.⁴⁰⁹ The Accused was the only conduit between the Llap OZ command and the soldiers within BIA: all information gathered by BIA was reported to the Accused,⁴¹⁰ who would then pass it on in the form of reports to the Llap OZ command;⁴¹¹ in turn, all communications distributed to the BIA unit would come through the Accused.⁴¹²

117. The power to discipline BIA soldiers, including dismissal from duty, also rested with Salih MUSTAFA.⁴¹³ By the Accused's own admission, all of his soldiers

⁴⁰³ 069404-TR-ET Part 3, pp.25-27, and Part 4, p.2. *See also* Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2622; W04600, 24 September 2021, T.765.

⁴⁰⁴ 069404-TR-ET Part 3, pp.25-27, and Part 4, p.2. *See also* Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2622. ⁴⁰⁵ Brahim MEHMETAJ, 24 March 2022, T.2742.

⁴⁰⁶ 069404-TR-ET Part 4, p.2.

⁴⁰⁷ 069404-TR-ET Part 1, pp.29, 31; and Part 2, pp.14-15. *See also* Fatmir HUMOLLI, 2 February 2022, T.2418.

^{408 069404-}TR-ET Part 2, p.14.

⁴⁰⁹ 069404-TR-ET Part 3, pp.21-24. *See also* Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2196, 2263; W04600, 24 September 2021, T.762; Fatmir HUMOLLI, 2 February 2022, T.2418.

⁴¹⁰ 069404-TR-ET Part 6, p.12. *See also* Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2668-2669; Fatmir HUMOLLI, 2 February 2022, T.2443.

⁴¹¹ 069404-TR-ET Part 6, pp.13-14.

⁴¹² 069404-TR-ET Part 4, pp.12-13.

⁴¹³ 069404-TR-ET Part 6, pp.3, 6, 19.

understood the importance of hierarchy and discipline,⁴¹⁴ and those disobeying orders were disciplined and, in some cases, demobilised.⁴¹⁵ The Accused was to be informed about every infringement committed by BIA members.⁴¹⁶ In sum, the admissions of the Accused with respect to his command over BIA corroborate the Victims and further establish his responsibility for the crimes alleged in the Indictment.

(e) People were held at the ZDC

118. By the Accused's own admission, one room underneath the building where he stayed at the ZDC was used to detain soldiers who had violated rules.⁴¹⁷ Further, in an apparent attempt to admit as many facts about the ZDC without admitting responsibility, the Accused stated that when he was there in late March/earlyApril 1999,⁴¹⁸ "there were rumours that civilians were being detained [...]". "I'd heard that there were civilians that were being detained".⁴¹⁹ He stated that he heard about that from soldiers and civilians, and that it was not a secret.⁴²⁰ The Accused added that there were also rumours of some detained civilians having been released during the evacuation of Zllash/Zlaš around 20 April 1999, but maintained that he did not see them himself. He specified that there were rumours that "thieves" had been detained in Zllash/Zlaš, and that they had been released.⁴²¹ Notably, as reviewed above,

⁴¹⁴ 069404-TR-ET Part 5, pp.21-23. The importance of following the chain of command and following orders was indicated in Chapter V of the 'KLA Provisional Regulations for the Organisation of the Army's Internal Life': IT-05-87 P02449-E. Salih MUSTAFA was the one who received this material from the Llap OZ Command, and distributed it within BIA.

⁴¹⁵ 069404-TR-ET Part 5, p.22.

⁴¹⁶ 069404-TR-ET Part 6, p.2.

⁴¹⁷ 069404-TR-ET Part 7, pp.4-6, and Part 8, pp.4, 6.

⁴¹⁸ 069404-TR-ET Part 7, pp.16-17.

⁴¹⁹ 069404-TR-ET Part 7, p.15.

⁴²⁰ 069404-TR-ET Part 7, p.18. Brahim MEHMETAJ aka 'Bimi' also admitted that he heard that there were people held at the ZDC (072957-TR-ET Part 4, pp.5-6, *see also* pp.7-9), although he tried to deny it when testifying in court (*cf.* 23 March 2022, T.2677.) ⁴²¹ 069404-TR-ET Part 7, pp.23-24.

KSC-BC-2020-05

[REDACTED] had been detained on accusation, *inter alia*, [REDACTED], but he was not in fact released with the other detainees.

(f) Identification by the Accused of BIA members

119. Salih MUSTAFA also confirmed the identity of several members of the BIA unit identified as co-perpatrators of the Accused by Victims W01679 and W03593. Again, if the accounts of these Victims were fabricated, it is wholly improbable that they would be able to testify to the presence of specific BIA members that the Accused would later confirm were, in fact, members of BIA.

120. In particular, the Accused acknowledged as a member of BIA one of the Victims' chief tormentors, nicknamed 'Tabuti', with the real name of Nazif.⁴²²

121. The Accused also admitted that Ilmi VELA, aka 'Vdekija' ('Death'), was a member of BIA,⁴²³ though the Accused sought to distance himself from VELA, describing him as a "problematic person" who acted "like a criminal around town", and who had been suspected of being involved in a killing, a theft in a market, and the beating of his accomplice in the theft.⁴²⁴ As a consequence of his involvement in these crimes, the Accused claimed that, "we demobilized him," and his weapon was taken from him.⁴²⁵

122. The Accused also confirmed that Brahim MEHMETAJ, whom W01679 identified as 'Bimi', was in fact one of the Accused's deputy commanders/first assistants in BIA in 1999.⁴²⁶ Asked whether 'Bimi' could be in Zllash/Zlaš in April 1999,

KSC-BC-2020-05

⁴²² 069404-TR-ET Part 8, pp.9-10. Fatmir SOPI testified that 'Tabuti''s real name was Nazif MUSLIU, see Fatmir SOPI, 19 January 2022, T.2133.

^{423 069404-}TR-ET Part 8, p.10.

⁴²⁴ 069404-TR-ET Part 8, pp.10-12.

⁴²⁵ 069404-TR-ET Part 8, pp.10-12.

⁴²⁶ 069404-TR-ET Part 4, p.3.

the Accused again appeared to try to admit as little as possible, claiming that he never stayed in the village, but he *'might have visited for an hour or two'*.⁴²⁷

123. The Accused knew that there was no way to deny he was the commander of BIA or that he was at the ZDC, so he admitted those facts during his SPO The Accused additionally knew that the SPO investigation would interview. undoubtably reveal that people like Brahim MEHMETAJ 'Bimi' and Ilma VELA 'Death' were members of BIA, so he admitted those facts as well. But the Accused also knew that those very same subordinates tortured prisoners while under his command, a fact which he clearly could not admit, so he devised very transparent and self-serving solutions like claiming VELA was "demobilized" and that MEHMETAJ may only have been in Zlash an hour or two in April 1999. No credible evidence supports these assertions. Instead, these are subtle, yet quite deliberate attempts by the Accused to distance himself from the worst torturers.⁴²⁸ As he sat for his SPO interview, the Accused knew what the investigation would ultimately show: in April of 1999 these soldiers under his direct command were brutally torturing prisoners. As a result, he vainly attempted to distance himself from his comrades to protect himself from liability.

(g) The red beret of the Accused

124. The evidence of victims W01679 and W03593 that the Accused wore a red hat is also corroborated by the Accused's own admissions. When confronted with the information that the person called 'Commander Cali' wearing a red beret was present

⁴²⁷ 069404-TR-ET Part 8, p.9.

⁴²⁸ For the role of VELA and Brahim MEHMETAJ in the torture and humiliation of the detainees, *see e.g.* W01679, 4 October 2021, T.884, 887, 897-899 and 1 June 2022, T.4445, 4465, 4466; 060698-TR-ET, Part 3 Revised RED3, p.6.

upstairs in the old two-storey building in Zllash/Zlaš (within the ZDC), the Accused said: "I'm not denying this."⁴²⁹

125. Asked whether there was anyone else he knew in Zllash/Zlaš who was referred to as Commander Cali and was wearing a red beret, the Accused admitted: "No, I wouldn't have thought so, or I never met them."⁴³⁰

126. Indeed, by his own admission, for a period of time⁴³¹ Salih MUSTAFA wore a red beret⁴³² that was not part of the standard BIA uniform.⁴³³ The Accused admitted that to his knowledge he was the only member of the unit that had a red beret.⁴³⁴

127. [REDACTED], when speaking of the Accused's outfit during the war, confirmed that, "most of the time he wore a uniform and a red hat."⁴³⁵

128. When the Accused was arrested in this case, more than twenty years after the crimes alleged in the Indictment, he was carrying in his wallet a photograph of himself from the war wearing a red beret.⁴³⁶ He also had on his person USB pen-drives which contained numerous photos, including several of him wearing a red beret during the war.⁴³⁷ Apart from those of the Accused in the red beret, the USB pen-drives also

- ⁴³³ 069404-TR-ET Part 4, p.3.
- ⁴³⁴ 069404-TR-ET Part 4, p.3.

⁴²⁹ 069404-TR-ET Part 8, p.7.

⁴³⁰ 069404-TR-ET Part 8, p.8.

⁴³¹ 069404-TR-ET Part 3, p.27.

⁴³² The Accused indicated he would occasionally wear also a black beret and an American hat with visor: 069404-TR-ET Part 3, p.27.

⁴³⁵ [REDACTED].

⁴³⁶ 082249-082258, p.8.

⁴³⁷ SPOE00222549-00222549; SPOE00222550-00222550; SPOE00222551-00222551; SPOE00222552-00222552; SPOE00222554-00222554; SPOE00222556-00222556; SPOE00222557-00222557; SPOE00222563-00222563; SPOE00222565-00222565; SPOE00222567-00222567; SPOE00222568-00222568; SPOE00222569-00222569; SPOE00222570-00222570; SPOE00222572-00222572; SPOE00222582-00222582; SPOE00222585-00222585; SPOE00222589-00222589; SPOE00222600-00222600; SPOE00222602-00222602; SPOE00222619-00222619; SPOE00222639-00222639; SPOE00222682-00222682; SPOE00222688-00222688; SPOE00222695-00222695.

included photos of the Accused with other BIA members, including Kujtim QERIMI aka 'Dardan'⁴³⁸ and Muhamet AJETI aka 'Shyti'.⁴³⁹ Some other photos, which are more contemporaneous, depict the Accused in the company of Brahim MEHMETAJ aka 'Bimi', indicating that they continue to have a relationship to this day.⁴⁴⁰

2. The accounts of the Victims corroborate one another

129. In addition to being compelling on their own, and confirmed by significant admissions of the Accused, the Victims corroborate one another in their testimonies. They all recognized the same location as the ZDC where they were held, they named some of the same perpetrators, they mutually corroborated one another with regard to their presence in detention, and they described suffering similar abuses. Their stories are further corroborated by documentary evidence and forensic medical reports.

(a) Similar stories concerning arrest

130. The Victims provided very similar stories concerning the way they themselves, as well as the other detainees whom they met at the ZDC, were arrested and taken there.

131. For example, W01679 said that W03594 had come [REDACTED] when they detained him.⁴⁴¹ This matches W03593's testimony.⁴⁴²

 ⁴³⁸ SPOE00222549-00222549; SPOE00222563-00222563; SPOE00222568-00222568; SPOE00222585;
 ⁴³⁸ SPOE00222589-00222589; SPOE00222600-00222600; SPOE00222602-00222602;
 ⁴³⁸ SPOE00222614-00222614; SPOE00222639-002226039.

⁴³⁹ SPOE00222575-00222575; SPOE00222559-00222559; SPOE00222587-00222587; SPOE00222628-00222628.

 ⁴⁴⁰ SPOE00222566-00222566;
 SPOE00222574-00222574;
 SPOE00222588-00222588;
 SPOE00222592-00222592;

 00222592;
 SPOE00222593-00222593;
 SPOE00222613-00222613;
 SPOE00222622-00222622;

 SPOE00222624-00222624;
 SPOE00222632-00222632.
 SPOE00222624;
 SPOE00222632-00222632.

⁴⁴¹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.893.

⁴⁴² See W03593, 22 September 2021, T.575. See also W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1032, 1034-1035, 1075.

132. W01679 and W04669 provided similar information about [REDACTED]. W01679 learned from [REDACTED] that he had come to join the army [REDACTED]; they took those away from him and tortured him, telling him he was a spy.⁴⁴³ This was similar to the story recounted by W04669.⁴⁴⁴

133. W01679 testified that the man called [REDACTED] was held because he [REDACTED].⁴⁴⁵ He was beaten downstairs with the others in the cowshed and upstairs.⁴⁴⁶ Similarly, W03594 testified that [REDACTED].⁴⁴⁷ This matches W03593's evidence.⁴⁴⁸

134. W03594 remembered that a fellow detainee [REDACTED] used to [REDACTED].⁴⁴⁹ This matches W01679's evidence.⁴⁵⁰

(b) Victims saw one another

135. The Victims held at the ZDC corroborated one another about their respective detentions and presence at the ZDC.

136. When W01679 was taken to the barn after his first beating, in which Salih MUSTAFA participated, he found there [REDACTED], W03594, W03593, and [REDACTED].⁴⁵¹ He did not know these people from before but met them there for the first time, and learned their names in the barn.⁴⁵² During his detention, W01679 also saw W04669, who was brought after W01679's arrival and [REDACTED],⁴⁵³ and

⁴⁴³ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.894-895.

⁴⁴⁴ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1417-1418.

⁴⁴⁵ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.895-896.

⁴⁴⁶ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.896.

⁴⁴⁷ W03594, 13 October 2021, T.1137; 12 October 2021, T.1049.

⁴⁴⁸ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.410.

⁴⁴⁹ W03594, 13 October 2021, T.1141.

⁴⁵⁰ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.875.

⁴⁵¹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.889.

⁴⁵² W01679, 4 October 2021, T.889.

⁴⁵³ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.889, 896.

a young man named [REDACTED].⁴⁵⁴ The detainees were afraid to speak, but when they did manage to speak, they told W01679 their names.⁴⁵⁵

137. W01679 [REDACTED] learned his last name when they were held there together.⁴⁵⁶ [REDACTED].⁴⁵⁷

138. W03593 identified [REDACTED], as reiterated by W01679 and W03594.⁴⁵⁸ W03593 said he shared a blanket with W03594 in the barn.⁴⁵⁹ W03594 corroborated this when he identified W03593 as a fellow detainee [REDACTED].⁴⁶⁰

139. When W03594 was brought to the barn, he saw four other people there,⁴⁶¹ [REDACTED].⁴⁶² W03594 recalled that [REDACTED] was brought to the barn about seven or eight days after him.⁴⁶³

(c) Matching identification and description of the place of detention

140. The Victims consistently recognized the ZDC in photos shown to them during their in-court testimonies. W01679 was able to describe where he was held and the "upstairs part" where he was interrogated,⁴⁶⁴ and recognised the location on photographs shown to him during his in-court testimony.⁴⁶⁵ He described how, to go from the cowshed to the upstairs part of the building, where detainees were taken for

⁴⁵⁴ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.889.

⁴⁵⁵ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.889.

⁴⁵⁶ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.896-897.

⁴⁵⁷ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1436-1437.

⁴⁵⁸ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.471; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.900; W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1052.

⁴⁵⁹ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.452-453.

⁴⁶⁰ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1048; see also W03593, 20 September 2021, T.393 [REDACTED].

⁴⁶¹ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1040.

⁴⁶² W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1046.

⁴⁶³ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1052.

⁴⁶⁴ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.915-916, 918-919.

⁴⁶⁵ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.919-925; SPOE00128386-00128420 (UNMIK Photobook), pp.3 (SPOE00128388), 7 (SPOE00128392); 100801-100806 RED1, pp.3 (100803), 5 (100805), 6 (10806); DSM00031-DSM00031 RED.

interrogations and beatings, one would need to take an external stair comprised of a few steps, in front of the entrance.⁴⁶⁶ W04669 recognised the place of his detention on the photographs shown to him in court.⁴⁶⁷ He stated that it was a place used to keep animals, which is consistent with what Selatin KRASNIQI stated when he explained that it was used to keep oxen.⁴⁶⁸ W03593 also recognised the same photographs as the place where he was held.⁴⁶⁹

141. The building recognized by the Victims as the place where they were detained is exactly the building that Selatin KRASNIQI, BIA member and son of the owners of the ZDC, "forgot" to include in the sketch of the ZDC during his first interview with the Defence, despite having spent hours working on that drawing and having meticulously described every other building in the compound.⁴⁷⁰

142. During his second interview with the Defence, asked what the building he had omitted in the first interview was used for, Selatin KRASNIQI claimed that it "was impossible to inhabit"⁴⁷¹ and that "it was a complete rubble from inside", but then he was unable to substantiate, or even explain, that statement when confronted with it at trial.⁴⁷² Eventually, Selatin KRASNIQI stated that the problem with the building was that it was leaking from the roof.⁴⁷³ However, he was unable to explain why, amidst a refugee crisis and lack of shelter, the KLA did not use the barn/stable marked with 4A in the picture below to house some of the refugees.⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁶⁶ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.915-916.

⁴⁶⁷ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1471-1472; 082020-082023.

⁴⁶⁸ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3940; DSM00018-00035, at DSM00020.

⁴⁶⁹ W03593, 21 September 2021, T.512-517; SPOE00128388; 100966-100969; SITF00072231; 061012-061015.
⁴⁷⁰ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3930-3938; DSM0001-00017, at p.DSM00017; DSM00018-00035, at p.DSM00035.

⁴⁷¹ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3938-3939; DSM00018-00035, at DSM00020 and DSM00028.

⁴⁷² Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3940-3943.

⁴⁷³ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3941.

⁴⁷⁴ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3947-3949. Building 5 was made of twigs while building 4A had solid walls.



143. Moreover, Selatin KRASNIQI's testimony that the roof of building 4A was leaking water corroborates the testimony of W03593, who testified that the barn where they were kept was wet with water, which was all over the floor.⁴⁷⁵

(d) Indication of the same treatment and abuse

144. The Victims also corroborated one another's physical conditions. W01679 saw signs of mistreatment on W03593, W03594, [REDACTED].⁴⁷⁶ W03594 and W03593 witnessed [REDACTED]'s injuries when he returned to the barn and "could hardly stand up".⁴⁷⁷

145. W03593 could hear screams from the others when they were brought upstairs for beatings.⁴⁷⁸ When presented with his previous statement, W04669 recalled stating

⁴⁷⁵ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.411, 417, 478.

⁴⁷⁶ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.891-892, 894, 896.

⁴⁷⁷ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1058; W03593, 20 September 2021, T.444-445.

⁴⁷⁸ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.476.

that he heard the others say "ow" as they were hit.⁴⁷⁹ W01679 also heard people screaming when they were taken upstairs.⁴⁸⁰ W04669 could hear the sound of beatings when [REDACTED] was taken outside the barn.⁴⁸¹

146. W03593 and W01679 testified about having a black sack/bag placed over their head while being escorted by guards.⁴⁸²

147. The witnesses testified to similar tools of abuse. Both W03593 and W01679 were beaten with a baseball bat.⁴⁸³ W04669 and W01679 both refer to beatings with militia/police batons.⁴⁸⁴ W01679 was burned with a hot iron⁴⁸⁵ and W03593 witnessed burn marks on [REDACTED] that seemed to be from an iron rod.⁴⁸⁶

148. The witnesses were consistent about the type and nature of the mistreatments and torture received by [REDACTED] and the condition he was in as a result .⁴⁸⁷

(e) Victims identified similar BIA soldiers present

149. Apart from the Accused whom both W03593 and W01679 identified as present at the ZDC and participating to their beatings, both W01679 and W03593 identified, as one of their captors and torturers, a person nicknamed 'Tabuti'. During his first beating, W03593 heard other perpetrators calling one of them 'Tabut', or 'Tabuti'.

⁴⁷⁹ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1463.

⁴⁸⁰ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.890.

⁴⁸¹ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1427-1429.

⁴⁸² W03593, 20 September 2021, T.476; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.867.

⁴⁸³ W03593, 22 September 2021, T.657; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.875.

⁴⁸⁴ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.884; W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1444.

⁴⁸⁵ W01679, 5 October 2021, T.985.

⁴⁸⁶ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.454.

⁴⁸⁷ See Section III.D. above.

Whenever somebody was saying: "Hit him!", 'Tabuti' would immediately follow.⁴⁸⁸ W01679 indicated that 'Tabuti' was one of the persons who tortured him.⁴⁸⁹

150. Further, at the ZDC, W01679 heard the names of Afrim, 'Dardan', 'Bimi', and Fatmir.⁴⁹⁰ These were all BIA members, as confirmed by a number of witnesses,⁴⁹¹ including the Accused.⁴⁹² [REDACTED].⁴⁹³ [REDACTED].⁴⁹⁴ [REDACTED].⁴⁹⁵

(f) Victims provided the same description of release

151. W01679, W03593, and W03594 provided almost identical descriptions of their release from the ZDC on or about 18 or 19 April 1999. They all confirmed that W01679, W03594, and [REDACTED] were released together,⁴⁹⁶ followed by W03593.⁴⁹⁷ They were released by KLA soldiers who, without warning, opened the door and let them go.⁴⁹⁸

152. They all independently indicated that [REDACTED] stayed behind.⁴⁹⁹ The soldiers did not say why they were not releasing [REDACTED].⁵⁰⁰

⁴⁸⁸ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.430-431, and 22 September 2021, T.583.

⁴⁸⁹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.887.

⁴⁹⁰ W01679, 5 October 2021, T.977, 978, and 1 June 2022, T.4445, 4465.

⁴⁹¹ W04600, 24 September 2021, T.763-764; Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2662, 2705-2706, 2712, 2714-2715; Ahmet ADEMI, 28 March 2022, T.2815.

⁴⁹² 069404-TR-ET Part 8, p.9.

⁴⁹³ [REDACTED].

⁴⁹⁴ [REDACTED].

⁴⁹⁵ [REDACTED].

 ⁴⁹⁶ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.905; W03593, 20 September 2021, T.484, W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1144.
 ⁴⁹⁷ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.905; W03593, 20 September 2021, T.482, 484.

⁴⁹⁸ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.904; W03593, 20 September 2021, T.481-482; W03594, 13 October 2021, T.1144.

⁴⁹⁹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.905-906; W03593, 20 September 2021, T.484-485; 22 September 2021, T.613; W03594, 13 October 2021, T.1145, 1153.

⁵⁰⁰ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.905-906; W03593, 20 September 2021, T.485-486.

153. The Victims all testified that they were not given any reason for being released⁵⁰¹ or any release papers.⁵⁰² Upon their release, W01679, W03593, and W03594 said they went to [REDACTED]⁵⁰³ and [REDACTED] about their detention by the KLA in Zllash/Zlaš and that [REDACTED].⁵⁰⁴ [REDACTED].⁵⁰⁵

154. In sum, the Victims corroborate one another regarding many significant details in their accounts. To believe that their accounts were fabricated requires believing not just that each of them invented the story that they testified to under oath, but that they somehow collaborated to make up the details of their stories before they were even interviewed during the investigations of this case. There is absolutely no evidence that such a fantastical conspiracy ever occurred.

3. Corroboration by other witnesses

(a) Other witnesses who put the Accused at the ZDC

155. Salih MUSTAFA's presence in Zllash/Zlaš during the Indictment period was also confirmed by various other non-victim witnesses.

156. As noted above, [REDACTED] testified about seeing the Accused at the ZDC when [REDACTED].⁵⁰⁶ [REDACTED]'s testimony was consistent with his prior

⁵⁰² W01679, 4 October 2021, T.904; W03593, 20 September 2021, T.485.

⁵⁰¹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.904; W03593, 20 September 2021, T.485.

⁵⁰³ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.910-911; W03593, 20 September 2021, T.487-488; 22 September 2021, T.613-615; W03594, 13 October 2021, T.1153; 061016-TR-ET Part 5, p.13.

⁵⁰⁴ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.910-911; W03593, 20 September 2021, T.487; 22 September 2021, T.614-615; W03594, 13 October 2021, T.1153, 1156.

⁵⁰⁵ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.910; W03593, 20 September 2021, T.487; 22 September 2021, T.614; W03594, 13 October 2021, T.1153.

⁵⁰⁶ [REDACTED].

statement, and was strongly corroborated by other witnesses, including [REDACTED], on key points.⁵⁰⁷

157. Sejdi VESELI acknowledged that the Accused was often in Zllash/Zlaš in April 1999.⁵⁰⁸ Fatmir SOPI saw the Acused in the village many times, as they had routine, in-person meetings.⁵⁰⁹ Once in Zllash/Zlaš, the Accused would usually stay at the ZDC⁵¹⁰ for two to five nights.⁵¹¹

158. Selatin KRASNIQI confirmed that he saw the Accused at the ZDC a few days before the offensive in April 1999, when the latter stayed there for one night, and then on the 21 April 1999, when he was dealing with the transportation of the wounded from Zllash/Zlaš to Koliq.⁵¹²

159. There is also evidence that the Accused was at other locations during the Indictment period, such as Prishtinë/Priština, Butovc, Mramor, and Barilevë/Bariljevo. However, all of these locations are accessible from Zllash/Zlaš within less than a day.⁵¹³ There is no evidence that the Accused was not in Zllash/Zlaš during critical moments during the Indictment period, or that he could not have committed the crimes charged in the Indictment. Moving throughout the area in April 1999 was at times challenging, because of the occasional presence of Serbian forces, and the topographical characteristics of the terrain. However, the evidence clearly shows that

⁵¹² Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3922-3923.

⁵⁰⁷ Such key points include: the identity of the arrestee, and of [REDACTED], place and month of his arrest, the circumstances of the arrest, the fact that the KLA soldiers were armed, and that [REDACTED] was taken by car driven by [REDACTED], and the make of that car; *see* [REDACTED].

⁵⁰⁸ Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2233.

⁵⁰⁹ Fatmir SOPI, 19 January 2022, T.2155.

⁵¹⁰ Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2233.

⁵¹¹ 069404-TR-ET Part 3, p.20 (Salih MUSTAFA); Fatmir SOPI, 19 January 2022, T.2156.

⁵¹³ Prishtinë/Priština is 22 kilometres away from Zllash/Zlaš (40 mins by car); Butovc 32 kilometres (about 50 mins by car); Mramor 19 kilometres (about 25 mins by car); and Barilevë/Bariljevo 31 kilometres (about 30 mins by car).

the Accused had access to vehicles that he could use, and in fact used, to move around.⁵¹⁴ He was also able to quickly traverse the area on foot.⁵¹⁵

(b) Other witnesses confirm the identity of BIA members mentioned by W01679 and W03593

160. Several witnesses further confirmed the existence of BIA members mentioned by W01679 and W03593, as well as by the Accused.

161. Fatmir SOPI acknowledged that a person nicknamed 'Tabuti' was one of the BIA soldiers,⁵¹⁶ and that his name was Nazif MUSLIU.⁵¹⁷

162. Sejdi VESELI confirmed that Nazif MUSLIU aka 'Tabuti' was a BIA member, and heard that he was a repeat offender.⁵¹⁸

163. Brahim MEHMETAJ aka 'Bimi' confirmed membership in BIA of several coperpetrators named by W01679, including Nazif ('Tabuti'),⁵¹⁹ Ilmi VELA ('Vdekja'),⁵²⁰ and 'Dardan'.⁵²¹ He indicated that Avni and Afrim could also be members of BIA.⁵²²

⁵¹⁴ For example, a VW GOLF II, four-wheel drive, mentioned by Bislim NRECI: 5 April 2022, T.3207, 3222-3223, 3274, and by Avni GASHI: 6 April 2022, T.3307, 3359-3362. *See also* Nazmi VERBOVCI, DSM00076-00089, p.8; 069404-TR-ET Part 2, pp.21, 27; 069404-TR-ET Part 7, pp.22-23 (Salih MUSTAFA); Fatmir HUMOLLI, 1 February 2022, T.2328. Considering the Accused's co-operation with Brigade 153, it is likely he could also use their cars, if needed: *see* Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2117. On the presence of cars and other means of transportation in Zllash/Zlaš, *see also*: Teuta HADRI, 11 May 2022, T.4187, and 12 May 2022, T.4293; 069404-TR-ET Part 7, pp.22-23 (Salih MUSTAFA).

⁵¹⁵ The Accused knew the area particularly well, as he routinely delivered supplies to various KLA locations, was engaged in safely escorting KLA officials and the wounded within the zone. *See* 069404-TR-ET Part 2, pp.21, 27; 069404-TR-ET Part 7, pp.22-23.

⁵¹⁶ Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2077, and 19 January 2022, T.2133.

⁵¹⁷ Fatmir SOPI, 19 January 2022, T.2133.

⁵¹⁸ Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2201-2202.

⁵¹⁹ Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2712-2713.

⁵²⁰ Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2705-2706 (where B.MEHMETAJ also clarified that 'Vdekja' means 'death', and that Ilmi VELA called himself that), 2711.

⁵²¹ Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2654, 2715.

⁵²² Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2654, 2715.

164. Also, Defence witness Muhamet AJETI aka 'Shyti', himself a BIA member, testified that Nazif MUSLIU aka 'Tabuti',⁵²³ and Kujtim QERIMI aka 'Dardan'⁵²⁴ were both in BIA. He also recognised Kujtim QERIMI aka 'Dardan' on the photo taken in Zllash/Zlaš in one of the buildings located within the ZDC.⁵²⁵

165. [REDACTED] confirmed that members of BIA included 'Dardani'⁵²⁶ and Nazif MUSLIU aka 'Tabuti'.⁵²⁷ When describing the [REDACTED] also indicated that the person who stood guard at the ZDC, and took [REDACTED] over from him, was a BIA soldier [REDACTED].⁵²⁸

166. Defence witness, Muhamet AJETI aka 'Shyti' confirmed that he was a BIA member in 1999,⁵²⁹ was in Zllash/Zlaš in April 1999⁵³⁰, and that people indeed called him 'Shyti'.⁵³¹ The Accused called Muhamet AJETI 'Shyti', ⁵³² and had him saved in his phone directory as 'Shyti AAK'.⁵³³

(c) Other witnesses who confirmed that the Accused/BIA were in command of the ZDC

167. Evidence of Salih MUSTAFA's command over the ZDC was further corroborated by Fatmir SOPI and Sejdi VESELI, who both independently testified that

- ⁵²⁴ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4108-4109, 4111-4112.
- 525 Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4111-4112; SPOE00325840-00325840.
- ⁵²⁶ [REDACTED].
- 527 [REDACTED].
- ⁵²⁸ [REDACTED].
- ⁵²⁹ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4086-4087, 4096.

⁵²³ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4107.

⁵³⁰ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4063-4064.

⁵³¹ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022. T.4114.

⁵³² Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4116.

⁵³³ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4119; SPOE00325853-00325864.

it was Salih MUSTAFA who had the authority over the ZDC.⁵³⁴ According to Famir SOPI, BIA occupied the whole compound, which was locally regarded as their base.⁵³⁵

168. W04600 also indicated that Salih MUSTAFA was in control/in charge of the BIA base in Zllash/Zlaš.⁵³⁶ He added that every KLA soldier knew that the ZDC was a BIA base, and that it was under their control, was "led by BIA".⁵³⁷ Referring to the notion of a "BIA base", the witness clarified that he meant the entire compound.⁵³⁸

169. The ZDC was organized as a military establishment,⁵³⁹ partly fenced,⁵⁴⁰ and guarded by BIA soldiers,⁵⁴¹ rotating every eight hours.⁵⁴² Those entering had to identify themselves, "like in every military base".⁵⁴³

170. Witnesses also corroborated that Brigade 153 was a distinct unit. Fatmir SOPI testified that he had no knowledge of any soldiers of Brigade 153 who would stay at the ZDC.⁵⁴⁴ Sejdi VESELI indicated that there were none, as 153 Brigade and BIA were separate units.⁵⁴⁵ W04600 confirmed there were no brigade soldiers stationed there.⁵⁴⁶

⁵³⁴ Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2198, 2199; Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2049, 2054, 2089.

⁵³⁵ Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2049, 2054, 2089.

⁵³⁶ W04600, 27 September 2021, T.845-846.

⁵³⁷ W04600, 24 September 2021, T.811-812.

⁵³⁸ W04600, 24 September 2021, T.814.

⁵³⁹ Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2049.

⁵⁴⁰ Fatmir SOPI, 29 October 2003, 7000593-7000609 RED, p.10; Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3889; W04600, 24 September 2021, T.749-750.

⁵⁴¹ W04600, 23 September 2021, T.721, 728-729; Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2049.

⁵⁴² Fatmir SOPI, 19 January 2022, T.2132.

⁵⁴³ Fatmir SOPI, 19 January 2022, T.2130-2132.

⁵⁴⁴ Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2049, 2054, 2090.

⁵⁴⁵ Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2198, 2263.

⁵⁴⁶ W04600, 23 September 2021, T.721, 796.

4. Corroboration by other case records

(a) List of prisoners⁵⁴⁷

171. The testimony of the Victims is also significantly corroborated by the content of the List of Prisoners⁵⁴⁸ provided by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ('ICTY'). The original document in Albanian⁵⁴⁹ lists a number of people as having been detained in Zllash/Zlaš in the month of April 1999, including [REDACTED],⁵⁵⁰ W03593,⁵⁵¹ [REDACTED],⁵⁵² W03594,⁵⁵³ and W01679.⁵⁵⁴ The document indicates the dates of their arrest consistent with those stated by the Victims, including the date of 1 April 1999 for [REDACTED]arrest, and also some other personal details including names of fathers, dates/places of births, as well as the place of residence.

172. The List of Prisoners corroborates other aspects of the evidence heard from witnesses in this case. For instance, it contains what appears to be notes taken during the interrogation of prisoners. Some of these notes concern the interrogation of W03594.⁵⁵⁵ W03594 testified that, [REDACTED], he went to [REDACTED] where he had met some people [REDACTED].⁵⁵⁶ The witness also stated that when he was taken

⁵⁴⁷ The List of Prisoners was part of a large collection of documents seized by Serb forces from a number of KLA bases around Kosovo, and then handed over to the ICTY who subsequently passed it on to the Special Investigative Task Force ('SITF'), the precursor of the SPO. The Document was part of a binder containing materials pertaining to the territory of the KLA Llap Operational Zone. *See* Prosecution notice of disclosure pursuant to Rule 102(4), KSC-BC-2020-05/F00279, 7 December 2021, Public with confidential Annex.

⁵⁴⁸ U001-0310-U001-0325 and U001-0310-U001-0322-ET, pp.1-2.

⁵⁴⁹ The last few pages of the document are in Serbian, containing various words that do not appear to be directly related to the list of prisoners or interrogation notes.

^{550 [}REDACTED].

⁵⁵¹ [REDACTED].

^{552 [}REDACTED].

^{553 [}REDACTED].

⁵⁵⁴ [REDACTED].

⁵⁵⁵ U001-0310-U001-0322-ET, at p.U001-0313.

⁵⁵⁶ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1034-1035.

out of the barn and brought upstairs for interrogation, he was asked about his role [REDACTED].⁵⁵⁷ According to the notes in the List of Prisoners, during his interrogation W03594 was asked about [REDACTED], and W03594 answered: "I was [REDACTED]". This entry corroborates W03594's testimony that he was asked about [REDACTED] during his interrogation.

173. Furthermore, the List of Prisoners contains the names of 19 detainees. As set forth in this brief, the SPO has proven that at least seven people were detained at the ZDC. This was the number of people for whose detention the SPO could offer direct, irrefutable evidence to the Panel. It is clear, however, that others were detained at the ZDC as well. For example, W03593 testified that "they were bringing people every night. We have been up to 17 people in that same room."⁵⁵⁸

174. Finally, a page of notes within the document contains the annotation "For Cali", ⁵⁵⁹ further indicating the connection between the Accused and the detainees.

175. The List of Prisoners thus offers a striking level of corroboration to the evidence presented by the witnesses in this case, and its authenticity is proven by the aggregate details of its very contents, which could have only been accumulated by those who imprisoned the Victims.

(b) The Accused's Conduct during the Investigation

176. The conduct of the Accused during the investigation of this case further corroborates and establishes his responsibility for the crimes alleged in the Indictment.

⁵⁵⁷ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1075.

⁵⁵⁸ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.419.

⁵⁵⁹ U001-0310-U001-0322-ET, at p.U001-0321.

177. The Accused received a summons to appear before the SPO in the capacity of a suspect [REDACTED].⁵⁶⁰ [REDACTED].⁵⁶¹ [REDACTED].⁵⁶²

178. The only connection between [REDACTED] and the Accused was [REDACTED] imprisonment and torture at the ZDC in April 1999.⁵⁶³ This witness never had any contact with the Accused after the war.⁵⁶⁴ If [REDACTED] fabricated his evidence, as the Accused now claims, there is no reasonable explanation for [REDACTED]. [REDACTED].

179. Therefore, the Accused's interest in [REDACTED] further corroborates that this witness was a detainee at ZDC. The Accused had no way to know that the SPO had interviewed [REDACTED] at that point, and thus his interest in [REDACTED] could only stem from the fact that he independently knew this witness, and that the latter was a prisoner at ZDC who could give evidence against him.

180. [REDACTED].⁵⁶⁵

181. In addition, there is evidence that the Accused actively tracked investigations of him, including by the SPO, and interfered with those investigations, indicating a consciousness of guilt.

182. [REDACTED], he had a conversation with Salih MUSTAFA.⁵⁶⁶ When [REDACTED], the Accused replied: "Even if the court has summonsed you, there will be no case. There will be no trial [...]",⁵⁶⁷ and "For as long as I am here, this case will

⁵⁶⁰ [REDACTED].

⁵⁶¹ [REDACTED].

⁵⁶² See 061015-TR-ET Part 1 Revised RED3.

⁵⁶³ See Section III.A.2. above.

^{564 [}REDACTED].

⁵⁶⁵ See [REDACTED].

⁵⁶⁶ [REDACTED].

⁵⁶⁷ [REDACTED].

not go ahead".⁵⁶⁸ In fact, as the Accused predicted, no case was initiated.⁵⁶⁹ Salih MUSTAFA was at that time [REDACTED].⁵⁷⁰

183. The Accused also tracked and sought to influence and interfere with the SPO's investigation. In the course of the investigation, [REDACTED] ⁵⁷¹ about developments in the case, including the [REDACTED].⁵⁷² [REDACTED].⁵⁷³

184. In this conversation, Salih MUSTAFA [REDACTED].⁵⁷⁴ [REDACTED].⁵⁷⁵ This exchange indicates that the Accused [REDACTED].

185. [REDACTED].⁵⁷⁶ [REDACTED].⁵⁷⁷

(c) Medical records

186. There are three types of medical records corroborating the accounts of the Victims: documents found in 1999 in Zllash/Zlaš by [REDACTED], and forensic reports concerning [REDACTED].

187. In early July 1999, [REDACTED]⁵⁷⁸ at the ZDC, in the upper part ("upstairs") of the building with a basement.⁵⁷⁹ The fact that those documents were found at the ZDC confirms that [REDACTED] was indeed detained in the compound, as testified to by W01679, W04669, W03593, and W03594.

⁵⁶⁸ [REDACTED]; 072914-TR-ET, Part 3, p.26 (SPO statement).

^{569 [}REDACTED].

⁵⁷⁰ 069404-TR-ET Part 8, p.30 (Salih MUSTAFA).

^{571 [}REDACTED].

⁵⁷² [REDACTED].

^{573 [}REDACTED].

⁵⁷⁴ See [REDACTED].

^{575 [}REDACTED].

⁵⁷⁶ [REDACTED].

⁵⁷⁷ [REDACTED].

⁵⁷⁸ 076276-076281-ET RED3 (076276-076281 RED3).

⁵⁷⁹ See [REDACTED]. See also SPOE00128189-00128201 RED2, p.8.

188. [REDACTED].⁵⁸⁰

189. Finally, the evidence of [REDACTED], particularly with regard to the injuries sustained, is corroborated by their respective forensic medical examinations.⁵⁸¹

190. The forensic medical examination [REDACTED] revealed symptoms of PTSD and despondency that "could be related to the alleged violence inflicted on the subject during the period in the shed".⁵⁸² The PTSD symptoms started after his release "from the shed".⁵⁸³ His physical examination revealed [REDACTED].⁵⁸⁴ With regard to the overall assessment of [REDACTED], the forensic expert concluded that the totality of the medical symptoms was "typical of the alleged violence in the shed", that the physical examination supported the psychological examination, and that the totality of the medical symptoms was "typical of the alleged events recounted by the subject".⁵⁸⁵

191. The forensic medical examination of [REDACTED] revealed symptoms of PTSD and depression.⁵⁸⁶ His physical examination confirmed the presence of [REDACTED].⁵⁸⁷ Several other physical symptoms consistent with the alleged violence and attributable to "the acts of torture" were also observed, including [REDACTED].⁵⁸⁸ [REDACTED].⁵⁸⁹ The forensic expert concluded that all the medical

^{580 [}REDACTED].

⁵⁸¹ Annex 1 and 2 to Victim's Counsel's Submission of medical reports pertaining to Victims 08/05 and 09/05, Forensic medical examination, KSC-BC-2020-05/F00417/A01 ('Forensic Medical Examination on [REDACTED]') and KSC-BC-2020-05/F00417/A02 ('Forensic Medical Examination on [REDACTED]'), [REDACTED].

⁵⁸² Forensic Medical Examination on [REDACTED], p.18. See also pp.1, 16, 20.

⁵⁸³ Forensic Medical Examination on [REDACTED], p.16.

⁵⁸⁴ Forensic Medical Examination on [REDACTED], p.18; see also p.21.

⁵⁸⁵ Forensic Medical Examination on [REDACTED], pp.19-21.

⁵⁸⁶ Forensic Medical Examination on [REDACTED], pp.18, 24-25.

⁵⁸⁷ Forensic Medical Examination on [REDACTED], pp.12-13, 20-25.

⁵⁸⁸ Forensic Medical Examination on [REDACTED], pp.22-25.

⁵⁸⁹ Forensic Medical Examination on [REDACTED], pp.1-2, 25.

findings corresponded to the alleged experiences of violence in 1999, and that the totality of the medical symptoms "are assessed as typical of the story recounted by the subject".⁵⁹⁰

F. DEFENCES

192. None of the defences put forward by the Defence cast doubt on the Accused's responsibility for the crimes charged in the Indictment.

1. Alibi

193. In order to convict the Accused of the charges in the Indictment, it is not necessary to find that he was at the ZDC at all times during the Indictment period. The evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt that BIA was based at and controlled the ZDC, that the Accused was in charge of BIA, and that he was present at the ZDC at specific times, including: i) on 1 April 1999, when [REDACTED] was delivered to BIA; ii) on at least two occasions during the first week of April 1999, when the Accused interrogated and mistreated W01679 and W03593.

194. Evidence suggesting that the Accused may have at times been at other locations during the Indictment period, including Prishtinë/Priština, Barilevë/Bariljevo, Butovc, Rimanishtë/Rimanište, or Bellopoje, all just a few hours traveling distance from Zllash/Zlaš,⁵⁹¹ provide no defence to the charges in the Indictment.

⁵⁹⁰ Forensic Medical Examination on [REDACTED], p.25.

⁵⁹¹ See para.159 above.

195. To support the defence of alibi, several witnesses, mostly former members of the KLA,⁵⁹² including BIA,⁵⁹³ were called to testify, some claiming to have had interactions with the Accused in the first days of April 1999.⁵⁹⁴ However, as demonstrated below, none of these witnesses provide a complete alibi for the Accused, most of them showed strong bias towards him⁵⁹⁵ and against the Specialist Chambers,⁵⁹⁶ and two were proven to have agreed on their respective testimonies.⁵⁹⁷

(a) Presence of the Accused in Priština

(i) Fatmir HUMOLLI

196. Fatmir HUMOLLI claimed being with Salih MUSTAFA in Prishtinë/Priština for one day around 1 April 1999.⁵⁹⁸ According to this witness, they both left the city on 1 April 1999 early in the morning.⁵⁹⁹ They then reached the village of Barilevë/Bariljevo where they parted ways at some point in the afternoon.⁶⁰⁰

197. Fatmir HUMOLLI's testimony showed that he was uncertain about the dates of the aforementioned events.⁶⁰¹ That uncertainty was clearly evidenced when he indicated different dates during his in-court testimony,⁶⁰² as well as in the pre-trial

⁵⁹² Bislim NRECI, Nazmi VRBOVCI, Fatmir HUMOLLI, Kapllan PARDUZI, Nuredin IBISHI, Sheqir RRAHIMI, and Musli HALIMI.

⁵⁹³ Jakup ISMAILI, Hazir BOROVCI, Gani SOPI, Selatin KRASNIQI, and Muhamet AJETI.

⁵⁹⁴ Fatmir HUMOLLI, Ahmet ADEMI, Nazmi VERBOVCI, Gani SOPI, Hazir BOROVCI.

⁵⁹⁵ Fatmir HUMOLLI, Ahmet ADEMI, Jakup ISMAILI, Hazir BOROVCI, Gani SOPI, Bislim NRECI, Nazmi VRBOVCI, Kapllan PARDUZI, and Selatin KRASNIQI.

⁵⁹⁶ Fatmir HUMOLLI and Kapllan PARDUZI.

⁵⁹⁷ Bislim NRECI and Nazmi VRBOVCI.

⁵⁹⁸ Fatmir HUMOLLI, 1 February 2022, T.2306.

⁵⁹⁹ Fatmir HUMOLLI, 1 February 2022, T.2306, 2308.

⁶⁰⁰ Fatmir HUMOLLI, 1 February 2022, T.2310-2311.

⁶⁰¹ The witness visibly struggled especially with indicating the date of entering Prishtinë/Priština together with the Accused.

⁶⁰² In his in-court testimony the witness claimed that it was "at the end of March 1999. Probably 30 March or early morning of 31 March" (Fatmir HUMOLLI, 1 February 2022, T.2304) and "I remember that it was the beginning of April or the end of March." (Fatmir HUMOLLI, 1 February 2022, T.2335).

statements he gave to the SPO⁶⁰³ and the Defence.⁶⁰⁴ By his own admission, this witness was not able to recall the exact dates due to the passage of time.⁶⁰⁵ He also admitted that during the war he prepared himself to "forget those events".⁶⁰⁶ Asked about other meetings with Salih MUSTAFA in January and February 1999, he was not able to provide any concrete dates whatsover.⁶⁰⁷ In view of the above, Fatmir HUMOLLI's evidence did not establish that the Accused was not in Zllash/Zlaš on 1 April 1999.

198. Moreover, the main signpost for the timing of Fatmir HUMOLLI's interaction with the Accused was the exodus of the population to Macedonia passing through Prishtinë/Priština that, according to this witness, happened on 1 April 1999.⁶⁰⁸ However, various documents tendered at trial⁶⁰⁹ and admitted by the Panel,⁶¹⁰ including reports of international organisations,⁶¹¹ media outlets,⁶¹² and a book,⁶¹³ show that refugees began leaving Prishtinë/Priština shortly after the NATO bombing campaign started on 24 March 1999, and their exodus continued at least until 6 April

⁶⁰³ To the SPO, the witness pointed out that "the dates could be either 31 March or 1 April. I am not sure about them" (100954-TR-ET Part 2, 4 June 2021, p.28).

⁶⁰⁴ In his Defence statement, the witness indicated that he entered the city "sometime on 28 March 1999" (DSM00119-00133, p.5.)

⁶⁰⁵ Fatmir HUMOLLI, 1 February 2022, T.2305, 2335, 2348-2349.

⁶⁰⁶ Fatmir HUMOLLI, 1 February 2022, T.2346-2347; 100954-TR-ET Part 2, pp.24-25 (SPO interview).

⁶⁰⁷ Fatmir HUMOLLI, 1 February 2022, T.2345-2346.

⁶⁰⁸ Fatmir HUMOLLI, 1 February 2022, T.2306-2307, 2309, 2336.

⁶⁰⁹ Prosecution Request for the Admission of Documentary Evidence in Rebuttal, KSC-BC-2020-05/F00426, 1 June 2022, public, with confidential Annex 1

⁶¹⁰ Public Readacted Version of Decision on items used with Witnesses WDSM 600 to 1100, 1300 to 1700 and [REDACTED] during their in-court testimonies, on the Specialist Prosecutor's request for the admission of documentary evidence in rebuttal, and on the Defence request to present evidence in rejoinder, with one confidential annex, KSC-BC-2020-05/F00436/RED, 20 June 2022, para.26(d).

⁶¹¹ See supra Section III.G. below for reference to reports published by: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Kosovo Verification Mission ('OSCE'), United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights ('UNHCR'), Human Rights Watch ('HRW'), and European Commission Monitoring Mission ('ECMM').

⁶¹² Associated Press ('AP'); State Informative Agency 'Kosova Press', Radio Free Kosovo ('RFK').

⁶¹³ "The Kosovo Years, 1998-1999"/"Vitet e Kosovës, 1998-1999", by Blerim SHALA, published by Zëri in Prishtinë/Priština in 2003, SPOE00058041-00058445.

1999.⁶¹⁴ Therefore, the alleged meeting with the Accused could have occurred at any time between these dates and not, as Fatmir HUMOLLI seemed to claim, only on 31 March/1 April 1999.⁶¹⁵

199. Fatmir HUMOLLI's evidence, and in particular his attempt to focus on 1 April 1999 in his in-court testimony, must be considered in light of his evident bias in favour of the accused and against the court. The witness considers himself a friend of Salih MUSTAFA, as they were long-term comrades in the LKCK and KLA.⁶¹⁶ He also published Facebook posts in support of the Accused.⁶¹⁷ Fatmir HUMOLLI also displayed a strong, negative bias towards the Specialist Chambers.⁶¹⁸

(ii) Ahmet ADEMI

200. Defence witness Ahmet ADEMI was called to testify about meeting the Accused and Fatmir HUMOLLI in Prishtinë/Priština for one day at the end of March/beginning of April 1999.⁶¹⁹ ADEMI's evidence does not provide an alibi for the

⁶¹⁴ OSCE Activity Report, 29 of March 1999, SPOE00061256-00061258, p.SPOE00061257; OSCE Activity Report of 1 April 1999, covering the period of 31 March 1999, SPOE00061259-00061261, p.SPOE00061260; OSCE Activity Report of 6 April 1999, covering the Period of 2-5 April 1999, SPOE00061262-00061265, pp.SPOE00061263, SPOE00061264; "The Kosovo Years, 1998-1999"/"Vitet e Kosovës, 1998-1999", by Blerim SHALA, published by Zëri in Prishtinë/Priština in 2003, SPOE00058374-SPOE00058374-ET, UNHCR, Kosovo Crisis Update Report of 30 March 1999, 106475-106478; UNHCR, Kosovo Crisis Update Report of 2 April 1999, 106471-106474; UNHCR Albanian Relief Web Situation Report Kosovo Crisis Update, of 2 April 1999, 106465-106470, pp.106465-106466; State Informative Agency "Kosovapress": The War Archive - Second volume (1st of March- 10th of April 1999), Prishtinë/Priština, 2016, SPOE00054089-00054655, p.SPOE00054543.

⁶¹⁵ Also witness Fatmir SOPI indicated that the population started leaving Prishtinë/Priština in big numbers after the commencement of the NATO strikes, moving in large numbers to the Gollak region to seek shelter: Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2093, and 19 January 2022, T.2146. Sejdi VESELI claimed that some population movements in the area had started even before the NATO strikes: Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2210.

⁶¹⁶ Fatmir HUMOLLI, 2 February 2022, T.2394-2395; 100954-TR-ET, Part 2, pp.21-22 (SPO interview).

⁶¹⁷ Fatmir HUMOLLI, 2 February 2022, T.2396-2398.

⁶¹⁸ Fatmir HUMOLLI, 2 February 2022, T. 2384, 2387, 2389, 2394, 104790, 104793, 104803-104804.

⁶¹⁹ Ahmet ADEMI, 28 March 2022, T.2809-2810, 2811-2812.

Accused for 1 April 1999, and further underscores the uncertainty of HUMOLLI's evidence as well.

201. Ahmet ADEMI was not sure about the date of the meeting with the Accused, indicating that it occurred at the "end of March, beginning of April. I don't know whether it was the 30th of March or 2,3, 4 April. I don't remember. So it is between the 30th of March and 2,3,4 April. All I know it was end of March, beginning of April."⁶²⁰

202. Referring to the timeframe of a particular incident concerning his family, that immediately preceded the alleged encounter with the Accused, the witness admitted that due to the lapse of time "it is possible that I don't recall very well what happened. (...) I am not completely sure. I have forgotten."⁶²¹

203. Further, ADEMI's evidence will need to be assessed in light of his reluctance to admit his membership in the KLA⁶²² as well as his expressions of support for the Accused.⁶²³

(b) Presence of the Accused in BARILEVË/BARILJEVO

(i) Nazmi VRBOVCI

204. Nazmi VRBOVCI was yet another witness called by the Defence to support the claim of alibi for the first days of April 1999. This KLA member⁶²⁴ was providing

⁶²² Ahmet ADEMI, 28 March 2022, T.2824, 2829-2830, 2839, 2842; 105296-105317, 105296-105296-ET (KLA Veterans List for Llap Operational Zone, 151 Brigade "Zahir Pajaziti").

⁶²⁰ Ahmet ADEMI, 28 March 2022, T.2810.

⁶²¹ Ahmet ADEMI, 28 March 2022, T.2802-2803.

⁶²³ Ahmet ADEMI, 28 March 2022, T.2839, 2845, 2847-2850; SPOE00325261SPOE00325261-ET (Facebook post from profile of Brahim MEHMETAJ BIMI, 18 November 2019); SPOE00325274-SPOE00325274-ET (Facebook comment by Ahmet ADEMI); SPOE00325284-SPOE00325284-ET (Facebook post from profile of Brahim MEHMETAJ BIMI, 18 December 2019); SPOE00325318-SPOE00325318-ET (Facebook comment by Ahmet ADEMI); 105322-105322 (Facebook post from profile of Brahim MEHMETAJ BIMI (re-posted by Ahmet ADEMI), 20 February 2020).

⁶²⁴ Nazmi VRBOVCI, 6 April 2022, T.3381-3382.

both the KLA and the civilian population with a safe stopping point in Barilevë/Bariljevo as they travelled to and from the Llap OZ.⁶²⁵ When passing through the area, KLA soldiers, including Salih MUSTAFA, allegedly used his house in Barilevë/Bariljevo to rest.⁶²⁶ The account of this witness does not conflict with the Prosecution case.

205. In his in-court testimony, Nazmi VRBOVCI testified that he saw the Accused in Barilevë/Bariljevo on 1 or 2 April 1999, and then on 20 or 21 April of the same year.⁶²⁷ During his first visit, Salih MUSTAFA allegedly stayed in the village from one to three hours.⁶²⁸ Bearing in mind this short timespan when Nazmi VRBOVCI claims he saw the Accused, his evidence does not establish that Salih MUSTAFA was not at the ZDC when [REDACTED] was delivered to BIA.⁶²⁹

206. The evidence of this witness demonstrably changed over time, and he was not able to convincingly explain that change. In his Defence statement, he never mentioned the 1st of April, claiming instead that he met the Accused either on 2 or 3 April 1999.⁶³⁰ Asked about this discrepancy, Nazmi VRBOVCI said: "Then I wasn't under oath. Today I speak under oath. I stand by the 1st and the 2nd of April. Under oath."⁶³¹ When asked in court about the reason why he suddenly remembered the dates with such precision despite the lapse of 23 years, Nazmi VRBOVCI vaguely

⁶²⁵ Nazmi VRBOVCI, 6 April 2022, T.3286-3288, 3292, 3295-3296, 3399; Bislim NRECI, 5 April 2022, T.3184-3186, 3201-3202, 3255.

⁶²⁶ Nazmi VRBOVCI, 6 April 2022, T.3297-3298.

⁶²⁷ Nazmi VRBOVCI, 6 April 2022, T.3305, T.3328.

⁶²⁸ Nazmi VRBOVCI, 6 April 2022, T.3297-3298, 3328, 3353.

⁶²⁹ Barilevë/Bariljevo is about 31 kilometres away from Zllash/Zlaš. This distance was easily traversable, especially bearing in mind the Accused's access to the vehicle of Jusuf SHALAKU. *See* Nazmi VRBOVCI, 6 April 2022, T.3307, 3359-3362; DSM00076-00089, p.8 (Defence statement of Nazmi VRBOVCI).

⁶³⁰ Nazmi VRBOVCI, 6 April 2022, T.3330, 3335; DSM00076-00089, p.9 (Defence statement of Nazmi VRBOVCI).

⁶³¹ Nazmi VRBOVCI, 6 April 2022, T.3353.

indicated that: "A man can remember something and cannot remember something else. But I do remember these dates".⁶³² He then hinted that the day in question was April Fool's Day,⁶³³ before acknowledging that "there wasn't any specific occurance on that day. Before 15 April and March—March, there wasn't any event that one can remember."⁶³⁴

207. Furthermore, the account of Nazmi VRBOVCI was not given independently. This witness eventually admitted discussing the dates of his encounters with Salih MUSTAFA with his brother, Daut VRBOVCI, as well as with Ismajl NRECAJ⁶³⁵ and Defence witness Bislim NRECI.⁶³⁶ They all suggested to the witness the 1st and 2nd of April 1999 as the days of the meetings with the Accused.⁶³⁷ These discussions took place shortly after Nazmi VRBOVCI had given his Defence statement.⁶³⁸ Asked why he consulted those men, the witness indicated: "I don't remember things very well and I was afraid that I might have given the incorrect dates. You don't – you remember the events but the dates – it's true that we didn't have television then. (...) You would easily mix up the days of the week, let alone dates."⁶³⁹ By the witness's own admission, Daut VERBOVCI, Ismajl NRECAJ, and Bislim NRECI - who apparently suggested the revised dates to VRBOVCI - were not even present in Barilevë/Bariljevo when the Accused allegedly went there at the beginning of April 1999.⁶⁴⁰

208. In relation to Bislim NRECI, Nazmi VRBOVCI specifically indicated that he discussed with him not only the date when he met the Accused,⁶⁴¹ but also other

⁶³² Nazmi VRBOVCI, 6 April 2022, T.3305.

⁶³³ Nazmi VRBOVCI, 6 April 2022, T.3329.

⁶³⁴ Nazmi VRBOVCI, 6 April 2022, T.3340, 3343, 3353.

⁶³⁵ Nazmi VRBOVCI, 6 April 2022, T.3335-3336, 3375.

⁶³⁶ Nazmi VRBOVCI, 6 April 2022, T.3373, 3375.

⁶³⁷ Nazmi VRBOVCI, 6 April 2022, T.3335-3336, 3343, 3375.

⁶³⁸ Nazmi VRBOVCI, 6 April 2022, T.3336, 3373-3374.

⁶³⁹ Nazmi VRBOVCI, 6 April 2022, T.3336-3337.

⁶⁴⁰ Nazmi VRBOVCI, 6 April 2022, T.3337.

⁶⁴¹ Nazmi VRBOVCI, 6 April 2022, T.3373-3375.

circumstances surrounding the events that took place in Barilevë/Bariljevo in April 1999.⁶⁴² Nazmi VRBOVCI admitted knowing Bislim NRECI since childhood,⁶⁴³ and that they meet "very often as friends, as brothers, as neighbours."⁶⁴⁴

(ii) Bislim NRECI

209. The account of Bislim NRECI is also not in contradiction with the Prosecution case. He testified about meeting Salih MUSTAFA in Barilevë/Bariljevo twice: first in February/March, and alternatively in mid-April, "or a bit further from mid-April" 1999,⁶⁴⁵ or between 12 and 22 April 1999.⁶⁴⁶ He confirmed that the Accused arrived by car together with Jusuf SHALAKU,⁶⁴⁷ and that from Barilevë/Bariljevo they both drove to Zllash/Zlaš, as Salih MUSTAFA received a call on a satellite phone, "because there were many wounded persons in their area, so he left towards there in a hurry."⁶⁴⁸

210. The witness was uncertain about the date of his encounter with the Accused.⁶⁴⁹ Moreover, whenever it might have occurred in mid-April 1999, the alleged meeting is not inconsistent with the charges in the Indictment or the proof of those charges offered by the Prosecution.

211. In assessing this witness's evidence, furthermore, the Panel will want to consider his bias⁶⁵⁰ and his interactions with other defence witnesses.⁶⁵¹ Regarding the

⁶⁴² Nazmi VRBOVCI, 6 April 2022, T.3376-3377.

⁶⁴³ Nazmi VRBOVCI, 6 April 2022, T.3325.

⁶⁴⁴ Nazmi VRBOVCI, 6 April 2022, T.3378.

⁶⁴⁵ Bislim NRECI, 5 April 2022, T.3214, 3234.

⁶⁴⁶ Bislim NRECI, 5 April 2022, T.3234.

⁶⁴⁷ Bislim NRECI, 5 April 2022, T.3207, 3222-3223, 3234.

⁶⁴⁸ Bislim NRECI, 5 April 2022, T.3216-3218, 3234-3235; DSM00056-00067, p.6 (Defence statement of Bislim NRECI).

⁶⁴⁹ Bislim NRECI, 5 April 2022, T.3214-3216, 3231-3233, 3236-3237.

⁶⁵⁰ Bislim NRECI, 5 April 2022, T.3251; SPOE00325341-SPOE00325341-ET (Facebook post from Profile in the name of Brahim MEHMETAJ aka 'Bimi', 26 September 2020); SPOE00325348-SPOE00325348-ET (Facebook the comment of Bislim NRECI).

⁶⁵¹ Nazmi VRBOVCI, 6 April 2022, T. 3335-3336, 3373-3377.

latter aspect, and in particular in light of the collusion with Nazim VBROVCI discussed above, it bears recalling that Bislim NRECI was examined in court before Nazmi VRBOVCI, and therefore the former was not questioned about the influence he exerted over VRBOVCI's testimony.

(c) Presence of the Accused in BUTOVC

212. Gani SOPI, Hazir BOROVCI, and Jakup ISMAILI were all called by the Defence to confirm the Accused's alibi for a few days at the beginning of April 1999. According to these witnesses, Salih MUSTAFA allegedly spent those days in the village of lower Butovc, located around 13 kilometres from Zllash/Zlaš.⁶⁵² All three witnesses belonged to the same KLA unit in Butovc, that at some point formed part of BIA.⁶⁵³ They were also friends during the war and have remained friends today.⁶⁵⁴

(i) Gani SOPI

213. According to Gani SOPI, Salih MUSTAFA came to Butovc to meet the witness's brother, Mustaf SOPI, to assist the civilian population,⁶⁵⁵ and to monitor the movements of the Serbian Police and Army, who were stationed nearby.⁶⁵⁶

214. Asked about dates, Gani SOPI initially testified that he saw the Accused "at the beginning of April, in the first weeks of April".⁶⁵⁷ He subsequently clarified that

⁶⁵² Gani SOPI, 4 April 2022, T.3081-3082.

⁶⁵³ Gani SOPI, 4 April 2022, T.3137-3142, 3168; Jakup ISMAILI, 29 March 2022, T.2907; Hazir BOROVCI, 30 March 2022, T.2985-2986, 2990-2991; SPOE00325565-00325565 (Facebook post (photograph) from Profile in the name of Hazir BOROVCI, 9 October 2013).

⁶⁵⁴ Gani SOPI, 4 April 2022, T.3149-3151,3153-3155; Hazir BOROVCI, 30 March 2022, T. 2988; SPOE00325566-00325566-ET (Facebook post from profile of Hazir BOROVCI, 9 October 2013); SPOE00325583-00325583 (Facebook post from profile of Gani SOPI, 23 November 2019).

⁶⁵⁵ Gani SOPI, 4 April 2022, T.3090.

⁶⁵⁶ Gani SOPI, 4 April 2022, T.3091-3093.

⁶⁵⁷ Gani SOPI, 4 April 2022, T.3089.

the Accused arrived in the village on 30 or 31 March 1999,658 and stayed there during the first and second week of April 1999.659

215. The main signpost for the timing of Gani SOPI's first interaction with the Accused was the Muslim celebration of Eid al-Adha, or 'Small Bajram', that, according to this witness, commenced on 31 March 1999.⁶⁶⁰ In fact, the date of Eid al-Adha was 28 March 1999.⁶⁶¹ Gani SOPI conceded that he could not in fact remember on which day of the 'Small Bajram' the Accused went to Butovc, speculating that it could be the third, fourth or fifth day.⁶⁶² He added that he would rather not refer to dates "because of the time that has passed and I might have forgotten after 23 years."⁶⁶³

216. In his interview with the SPO, Gani SOPI gave a different account concerning the dates of the Accused's time in Butovc, claiming that it was "towards the end of the first week of April",⁶⁶⁴ and that he stayed there "sometime until the end of the second week".⁶⁶⁵ When confronted with his SPO statement, Gani SOPI conceded that "it was around that time."⁶⁶⁶

217. The Accused's possible presence in Butovc at some point in early April 1999 is not inconsistent with the proof offered by the Prosecution. Moreover, he could move between Butovc and Zllash/Zlaš on a daily basis. By the witness's admission, the

⁶⁵⁸ Gani SOPI, 4 April 2022, T.3096.

⁶⁵⁹ Gani SOPI, 4 April 2022, T.3090.

⁶⁶⁰ Gani SOPI, 4 April 2022, T.3096, 3098-3099.

⁶⁶¹ Gani SOPI, 4 April 2022, T.3115-3116; SPOE00325819-00325819 (Table with Eid Al-Adha dates); SPOE00325820-00325820, SPOE00325821-00325821.

⁶⁶² Gani SOPI, 4 April 2022, T.3166.

⁶⁶³ Gani SOPI, 4 April 2022, T.3090, 3114-3115. The witness admitted also having memory problems, which he linked to his severe mistreatment he was subjected to in the past. *See* Gani SOPI, 4 April 2022, T.3122-3124; 104551-TR-ET Part 1, p.17.

⁶⁶⁴ Gani SOPI, 4 April 2022, T.3117, 104551-TR-ET Part 1, p.31 (Gani SOPI SPO interview).

⁶⁶⁵ Gani SOPI, 4 April 2022, T.3119; 104551-TR-ET Part 1, p.31 (Gani SOPI SPO interview).⁶⁶⁶ Gani SOPI, 4 April 2022, T.3120.

distance between lower Butovc and Zllash/Zlaš is around 13 kilometres,⁶⁶⁷ which could be covered in less than two hours.⁶⁶⁸

218. In assessing SOPI's evidence, the Panel will also want to consider the witness's bias,⁶⁶⁹ as well as his admission that he had been following the trial,⁶⁷⁰ allowing him to tailor his testimony in an attempt to assist the Accused with his alibi defence.

(ii) Jakup ISMAILI

219. Jakup ISMAILI admitted meeting Salih MUSTAFA in Butovc first at the end of March 1999: "I cannot give you a specific date or hour, but it's from the 27th, 28th, 29th, around these dates."⁶⁷¹ Subsequently he saw him around 7 or 8 April 1999,⁶⁷² and then approximately on 20 April 1999, when they both attempted to enter Prishtinë/Priština.⁶⁷³

220. The dates ISMAILI says he saw the Accused are not inconsistent with the charges in the Indictment or the Prosecution's proof. Further, this witness admitted that it was impossible for him to remember precise dates, and indicated that he had "problems, issues with my memory."⁶⁷⁴ The witness invoked the issue of his poor memory several times during his testimony.⁶⁷⁵

⁶⁶⁷ Gani SOPI, 4 April 2022, T.3081-3082.

⁶⁶⁸ Gani SOPI, 4 April 2022, T. 3082.

⁶⁶⁹ Gani SOPI, 4 April 2022, T.3078, 3128, 3130-3131; 104551-TR-ET Part 1, 12 January 2022, pp.21-22. ⁶⁷⁰ Gani SOPI, 4 April 2022, T.3170.

⁶⁷¹ Jakup ISMAJLI, 29 March 2022, T.2881, 2888, 2911, 2913.

⁶⁷² Jakup ISMAJLI, 29 March 2022, T.2900, 2912-2913.

⁶⁷³ Jakup ISMAJLI, 29 March 2022, T.2912-2913.

⁶⁷⁴ Jakup ISMAJLI, 29 March 2022, T.2888.

⁶⁷⁵ Jakup ISMAJLI, 29 March 2022, T.2888, 2912, 2917, 2923.

221. Jakup ISMAILI acknowledged being a good friend of Salih MUSTAFA's, with whom he had stayed in frequent contact both before and after his arrest.⁶⁷⁶

(iii) Hazir BOROVCI

222. When asked about meeting Salih MUSTAFA in Butovc in 1999, Hazir BOROVCI testified: "I think it was the 2nd or the 3rd."⁶⁷⁷ This witness indicated that he remembered these days as they coincided with 'Small Bajram', or Eid al-Adha, that in 1999 commenced, according to him, on 31 March.⁶⁷⁸ When confronted with the moving nature of this religious holiday, and the fact that it falls on a different date each year, the witness conceded that he was not good at remembering dates of Muslim holidays.⁶⁷⁹ He claimed that being uncertain about the dates, he consulted the Muslim priest who allegedly told him that in 1999 Eid al-Adha was on 31 March 1999.⁶⁸⁰ The fact, however, is that this holiday commenced on 28 March.⁶⁸¹

223. After that first encounter, Hazir BOROVCI said that he met the Accused "maybe three, four, five times. I can't be precise",⁶⁸² and that such meetings lasted "until the 15th, 16th, 17th of April."⁶⁸³ He clarified that he did not see the Accused every day as it was impossible: he was spending time at the observation post, and otherwise was staying in a place distant from where the Accused was accomodated.⁶⁸⁴

⁶⁷⁶ Jakup ISMAJLI, 29 March 2022, T.2923-2925, 2930, 2934. *See also* SPOE00325590-00325606 (Cellbrite Reports of instant messages between Cali (+38344175132) and Jakup ISMAILI (+38343910720)).

⁶⁷⁷ Hazir BOROVCI, 30 March 2022, T.2963, 3038, 3062.

⁶⁷⁸ Hazir BOROVCI, 30 March 2022, T.2963-2964, 3026-3030, 31 March 2021, T.3053, 3059.

⁶⁷⁹ Hazir BOROVCI, 30 March 2022, T.3027.

⁶⁸⁰ Hazir BOROVCI, 30 March 2022, T.3030.

⁶⁸¹ SPOE00325821-00325821 (Table with Eid Al-Adha dates).

⁶⁸² Hazir BOROVCI, 30 March 2022, T.2964, 3039.

⁶⁸³ Hazir BOROVCI, 30 March 2022, T.2966.

⁶⁸⁴ Hazir BOROVCI, 30 March 2022, T.3039, 3044, 3046, 3062-3063.

224. This witness admitted that in April 1999, the humanitarian situation in Butovc was chaotic and severe, and that he was busy standing guard duty in the village and securing aid for the population.⁶⁸⁵ He was also moving around in that period of time.⁶⁸⁶

225. In evaluating the testimony of Hazir BOROVCI, the Panel will also want to consider the witness's bias in favor of the Accused.⁶⁸⁷

(d) Presence of the Accused in RIMANISHTË/BELLOPOJE

(i) Kapllan PARDUZI

226. Kapllan PARDUZI, wounded in the battle of Surdull on 10 April 1999,⁶⁸⁸ attempted to provide the Accused with an alibi for an unspecified day between 10 and 13 April of that year, claiming that the latter escorted him and Nuredin IBISHI to Rimanishtë or Bellopoje, on their way to the KLA hospital in Potok.⁶⁸⁹

227. The evidence of PARDUZI does not undermine the proof offered by the Prosecution. Moreover, his ability to register events during that trip was critically impaired, as he was severely wounded.⁶⁹⁰ Due to his sustained wounds, he was in pain,⁶⁹¹ was continually bleeding,⁶⁹² was constantly going in and out of consciousness,⁶⁹³ and was receiving sedatives and IV drips along the way.⁶⁹⁴ Sheqir

⁶⁸⁵ Hazir BOROVCI, 30 March 2022, T.3034-3035.

⁶⁸⁶ Hazir BOROVCI, 30 March 2022, T.3036-3037.

⁶⁸⁷ Hazir BOROVCI, 30 March 2022, T.3018, 3020-3021, 31 March 2021, T.3054, 3065-3066; SPOE00325261-SPOE00325261-ET (Facebook post from Profile in the name of Brahim MEHMETAJ aka 'Bimi', 18 November 2019); SPOE00325271-SPOE00325271-ET (Comment by Hazir BOROVCI to Facebook post from Profile in the name of Brahim MEHMETAJ aka 'Bimi', 18 November 2019).
⁶⁸⁸ Kapplan PARDUZI, 11 April 2022, T.3427-3428.

⁶⁸⁹ Kapplan PARDUZI, 11 April 2022, T.3430-3431, 3472-3473

⁶⁹⁰ Nuredin IBISHI, 12 April 2022, T.3558, 3568; Kapllan PARDUZI, 11 April 2022, T.3470.

⁶⁹¹ Kapplan PARDUZI, 11 April 2022, T.3484; Nuredin IBISHI, 12 April 2022, T.3583.

⁶⁹² Nuredin IBISHI, 12 April 2022, T.3583; Kapllan PARDUZI, 11 April 2022, T.3470.

⁶⁹³ Kapplan PARDUZI, 11 April 2022, T.3472.

⁶⁹⁴ Kapplan PARDUZI, 11 April 2022, T.3472; Sheqir RRAHIMI, 13 April 2022, T.3667.

RRAHIMI, a person who drove the vehicle in which both wounded were transported, testified that he was told to stop as Kapllan PARDUZI was dying.⁶⁹⁵

228. Speaking about the Accused, Kapllan PARDUZI testified that he saw him only for a brief moment,⁶⁹⁶ but he could not indicate the time,⁶⁹⁷ place,⁶⁹⁸ or the number of times he might have seen him.⁶⁹⁹ He testified that it was his presumption that Salih MUSTAFA was in charge of the transport, but he "couldn't see really with my eyes – own eyes because I was gravely wounded."⁷⁰⁰

229. Further, for security reasons, the trip was taking place mostly at night,⁷⁰¹ and the witness admitted that he was not able to identify anyone else as "it was raining, it was dark."⁷⁰²

230. Finally, the Panel will consider this witness's evidence in light of his statements about the Accused⁷⁰³ and the unfairness of the KSC.⁷⁰⁴

⁶⁹⁵ Sheqir RRAHIMI, 13 April 2022, T.3667.

⁶⁹⁶ Kapplan PARDUZI, 11 April 2022, T.3431.

⁶⁹⁷ Kapplan PARDUZI, 11 April 2022, T.3481.

⁶⁹⁸ The witness first indicated that he saw the Accused either in Rimanishte or Bellopoje (which are about 15 kilometres apart). Then, the witness admitted that he could not tell where exactly he saw the Accused (Kapplan PARDUZI, 11 April 2022, T.3443, 3473-3474, 3476, 3484). Also, in his SPO statement, the witness clearly stated he could not determine the place where he saw the Accused (104544-TR-ET, Parts 2-3, p.16).

⁶⁹⁹ The witness initially claimed seeing the Accused only once during the whole trip, but then changed his version indicating that he could not determine whether he saw him "once, twice, five times, ten times. I was wounded." (Kapplan PARDUZI, 11 April 2022, T.3476).

⁷⁰⁰ Kapplan PARDUZI, 11 April 2022, T.3430-3431.

⁷⁰¹ Nuredin IBISHI, 12 April 2022, T.3564; Kapplan PARDUZI, 11 April 2022, T.3430.

 ⁷⁰² Kapllan PARDUZI, 11 April 2022, T.3431, 3443. *See also* Sheqir RRAHIMI, 13 April 2022, T.3667, 3677.
 ⁷⁰³ Kapllan PARDUZI, 11 April 2022, T.3505-3506.

⁷⁰⁴ Kapllan PARDUZI, 11 April 2022, T.3506.

(ii) Nuredin IBISHI

231. Nuredin IBISHI, who travelled with Kapllan PARDUZI on the same trailer, and whose injuries were lighter,⁷⁰⁵ does not mention any encounter with Salih MUSTAFA, claiming instead that it was Latif GASHI who was in charge of that transport.⁷⁰⁶ He indicated that he could not see what was happening outside as "the trailer was covered with a tarpaulin due to weather conditions. It was raining all the time."⁷⁰⁷ Both he, and Kapllan PARDUZI, were wounded in the stomach and had to lie during the transportation.⁷⁰⁸

232. The evidence of Nuredin IBISHI casts additional, serious doubts on the ability of Kapllan PARDUZI to see people outside, including the Accused.

(iii) Sheqir RRAHIMI

233. Sheqir RRAHIMI drove the vehicle in which the wounded Nuredin IBISHI and Kapllan PARDUZI were transported. He testified that at some point during the trip, he met two people driving the tractor, and heard one of them calling another "Cali".⁷⁰⁹ This witness did not know Salih MUSTAFA at that time,⁷¹⁰ and acknowledged that 23 years after that encounter, he was unable to determine whether the person called Cali was actually the Accused.⁷¹¹

⁷⁰⁵ Nuredin IBISHI, 12 April 2022, T.3579.

⁷⁰⁶ Nuredin IBISHI, 12 April 2022, T.3562, 3573-3577; DSM00460-00475, p.8 (Defence statement of Nuredin IBISHI); SPOE00123560-00123574, p.12 (Records on the witness hearing of Nuredin IBISHI before investigating judge, 27 August 2002).

⁷⁰⁷ Nuredin IBISHI, 12 April 2022, T.3559, 3562-3563, 3583. *See also* Kapplan PARDUZI, 11 April 2022, T.3484.

⁷⁰⁸ Nuredin IBISHI, 12 April 2022, T.3582; Kapplan PARDUZI, 11 April 2022, T.3471; *see also* Sheqir RRAHIMI, 13 April 2022, T.3664.

⁷⁰⁹ Sheqir RRAHIMI, 13 April 2022, T.3671, 3678.

⁷¹⁰ Sheqir RRAHIMI, 13 April 2022, T.3672, 3676.

⁷¹¹ Sheqir RRAHIMI, 13 April 2022, T.3672.

2. Refutation of the Prosecution case

(a) Presence of detainees at the ZDC during the Indictment period

234. Muhamet AJETI aka 'Shyti' and Selatin KRASNIQI were specifically put forward to attempt to demonstrate that, during the Indictment period, no detainees were held at the ZDC. Their testimony was not credible and does not refute the overwhelming evidence of a detention center at the ZDC.

(i) Selatin KRASNIQI

235. Selatin KRASNIQI, member of the BIA unit,⁷¹² is the son of the owners of the ZDC.⁷¹³ In April 1999, he allegedly arrived at the compound, "if I'm not mistaken", on the 1st of that month,⁷¹⁴ left three or four days later for Prishtinë/Priština where he stayed several hours,⁷¹⁵ after which he returned to Zllash/Zlaš and remained there.⁷¹⁶ This witness testified that during his time in Zllash/Zlaš, he stayed in the ZDC most of the time,⁷¹⁷ and that he was sleeping there.⁷¹⁸

236. This witness testified that he was not aware of any detainees kept at the ZDC: "as far as I know, there have never been detained people in this building"⁷¹⁹, "I say it in full belief, that there wasn't any, and that I haven't seen any such people".⁷²⁰ He did not hear about anyone being detained in that location, either.⁷²¹ Selatin KRASNIQI

⁷¹² Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3954-3955.

⁷¹³ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3866-3867, 3877-3878.

⁷¹⁴ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3871.

⁷¹⁵ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3871, 3909.

⁷¹⁶ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3905-3906, 3908.

⁷¹⁷ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3909.

⁷¹⁸ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3909.

⁷¹⁹ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3909.

⁷²⁰ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3910-3911.

⁷²¹ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3912.

also claimed that at ZDC there were no guards "as long as I was there".⁷²² He concluded that there had never been a detention centre in the whole village.⁷²³

237. Selatin KRASNIQI's testimony can be summarized as a futile, clumsy, and internally inconsistent attempt to erase the existence of detentions at the ZDC. As noted above, during his first Defence interview dated 23 February 2021, while drawing the detailed sketch of the compound he allegedly knew very well, he "forgot" to draw and mark the entire building where the detainees were held, ⁷²⁴ even though it was rather a big and important structure within the compound. The witness indicated that he "does not remember" how such an omission happened.⁷²⁵ Discussing the relevance of the building for the case, the witness claimed, "I didn't even have an idea about the importance it had for you as a Prosecutor. For me it had no importance at all."⁷²⁶

238. When the Prosecution case was put to the witness, he doubled down on his assertions, reiterating that no one was detained in Zllash/Zlaš.⁷²⁷ He admitted, however, that people, including himself, were questioned at the ZDC in the period after NATO commenced its strikes.⁷²⁸ Later, apparently realizing the gravity of what he had stated, the witnesses changed the description of the questioning to "conversation".⁷²⁹

239. Selatin KRASNIQI was asked a number of times about who was in charge of the ZDC. In his answers, he mentioned a variety of names,⁷³⁰ but remarkably never

⁷²² Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3890.

⁷²³ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3912.

⁷²⁴ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3928-3935; DSM00017, DSM00025, DSM00035.

⁷²⁵ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3930-3931.

⁷²⁶ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3934.

⁷²⁷ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3948.

⁷²⁸ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3924, 3950-3951.

⁷²⁹ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3950-3953.

⁷³⁰ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3912, 3988, 3994.

mentioned Salih MUSTAFA amongst those in command. This is despite knowing that the latter was the BIA commander, his commander. Asked whether he is friends with the Accused, Selatin KRASNIQI stated: "we are all friends and will remain friends until we die and after death."⁷³¹

240. He further tried to 'sanitize the scene', when he attempted to remove from Zllash/Zlaš his close acquaintance⁷³² and co-fighter in BIA,⁷³³ Muhamet AJETI aka 'Shyti',⁷³⁴ who himself admitted being present in Zllash/Zlaš.⁷³⁵

241. Selatin KRASNIQI was in the past convicted for the intentional crime of fraud.⁷³⁶

(ii) Muhamet AJETI

242. Muhamet AJETI aka 'Shyti' says that he went to Zllash/Zlaš shortly after NATO commenced its bombing campaign, around 30-31 March 1999.⁷³⁷ In April of that year, he admitted staying in the village only intermittently: a few hours after he arrived in Zllash/Zlaš, he went to Kecekolle where he stayed with his family for two-three days;⁷³⁸ he would also spend most of the nights in Kecekolle, as there was no space for him to sleep in Zllash/Zlaš;⁷³⁹ he also went for one day to Krileve or Gllogovice.⁷⁴⁰ The witness left the village around 16 April 1999 when the Serbian

⁷³¹ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3974.

⁷³² Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4134, Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3965.

⁷³³ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4086; Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3954-3955.

⁷³⁴ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3965-3967.

⁷³⁵ See paras.242-243 below.

⁷³⁶ The appeal in this case is pending. In a separate case, Selatin KRASNIQI was also convicted for unlawful possession of weapons. *See* Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3998-4000.

⁷³⁷ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4057-4059.

⁷³⁸ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4059, 4063, 4133.

⁷³⁹ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4063, 4134, 4169.

⁷⁴⁰ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4134.

offensive in Viti of Marec village commenced,⁷⁴¹ and returned around 20 April 1999 to assist with the evacuation of the wounded.⁷⁴² Muhamet AJETI aka 'Shyti' claims that, in Zllash/Zlaš, he stayed at the ZDC.⁷⁴³

243. This witness denied having seen or heard about any detainees kept in the ZDC.⁷⁴⁴ He also testified that he had not seen any guards at the compound.⁷⁴⁵ However, in his evidence, he distanced himself from the specific locations where the alleged crimes occurred. He did not remember sleeping in the building of the compound used, according to the Victims, as the detention and interrogation site.⁷⁴⁶ He also admitted that he never visited the basement of the house, where at least some detainees were held, and that he only stayed outside in the yard.⁷⁴⁷ He was also not sure which rooms in that house were occupied by soldiers and civilians.⁷⁴⁸ Confronted with the evidence from the Accused, who admitted that people were actually detained in the ZDC,⁷⁴⁹ Muhamet AJETI aka 'Shyti' conceded: "Of course, Salih MUSTAFA knows better."⁷⁵⁰

244. In addition, Muhamet AJETI aka 'Shyti' claims that when he was in Zllash/Zlaš in April 1999, he did not see the Accused there, despite the Accused's admission that he was present in the ZDC on several occasions during this period.⁷⁵¹ By AJETI's own admission, he was a BIA member⁷⁵² and the Accused was his

⁷⁴¹ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4063-4064.

⁷⁴² Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4074.

⁷⁴³ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4064, 4072-4073, 4075, 4139; DSM00615-00632, p.15 and 17 (Defence witness statement of Muhamet AJETI, 20 February 2022).

⁷⁴⁴ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4076.

⁷⁴⁵ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4076.

⁷⁴⁶ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4073.

⁷⁴⁷ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4152.

⁷⁴⁸ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4074.

⁷⁴⁹ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4153-4154.

⁷⁵⁰ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4155.

⁷⁵¹ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4084,4144-4146.

⁷⁵² Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4086, 4096.

commander⁷⁵³ whom he deeply admired.⁷⁵⁴ He certainly would have been aware of the Accused's presence in the ZDC.

245. Further, the Panel will need to assess this witness's testimony in light of his motivations and bias. He was identified as the BIA guard nicknamed 'Shyti'⁷⁵⁵, [REDACTED] on 1 April 1999.⁷⁵⁶ Further, there is evidence regarding Muhamet AJETI aka 'Shyti''s ties to the Accused⁷⁵⁷ and one of his key co-perpetrators, Brahim MEHMETAJ aka 'Bimi'.⁷⁵⁸

(iii) Other witnesses

246. Some other witnesses were asked by the Defence about their knowledge of detainees at the ZDC in April 1999, including KLA commanders Fatmir SOPI, Sejdi VESELI, and Fatmir HUMOLLI, as well as two KLA medical personnel present in Zllash/Zlaš in April 1999, Teuta HADRI and Ibadete CANOLLI-KACIU. Whereas all five denied having any knowledge in this regard,⁷⁵⁹ the analysis of their evidence indicates that they do not possess any basis to testify to the presence or non-presence of the detained persons.

⁷⁵³ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4086, 4096, 4125.

⁷⁵⁴ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4125-4126; SPOE00325825-SPOE00325825-ET (Facebook post from profile of Muhamet AJETI, 11 June 2021).

⁷⁵⁵ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022. T.4114, 4116; 4119; SPOE00325853-00325864.

⁷⁵⁶ See para.84 above.

⁷³⁷ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022,T. 4096-4097, 4118-4125; Facebook post from profile of Muhamet AJETI, 11 June 2021, SPOE00325825-SPOE00325825-ET. See also Call logs from Salih MUSTAFA's telephone, SPOE00325853-00325864; Cellebrite records from forensic image of the seized phone of Salih MUSTAFA. The attached records relate to contacts/chat with phone number used by Muhamet AJETI, SPOE00325866-SPOE00325876-ET.

⁷⁵⁸ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022,T. 4099-4102, 4132-4133; Facebook post from profile of Muhamet AJETI, 3 March 2019, SPOE00325835-00325835; 4104 Facebook post from profile of Muhamet AJETI, 11 June 2021, SPOE00325826-SPOE00325826-ET; Facebook post from profile of Muhamet AJETI, 27 January 2021, SPOE00325827-00325827-ET.

⁷⁵⁹ Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2107, 2114, and 19 January 2022, T.2161; Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2223-2224; Fatmir HUMOLLI, 2 February 2022, T.2425-2426; Teuta HADRI, 11 May 2022, T.4209; Ibadete CANOLLI-KACIU, 12 May 2022, T.4333.

247. By his own admission, in March/April 1999, Fatmir SOPI was continuously on the move, was engaged in fighting, and does not remember whether he was in the ZDC in that period,⁷⁶⁰ but does not think he was there in April 1999.⁷⁶¹

248. Sejdi VESELI, for his part, never visited the ZDC,⁷⁶² and no one ever relayed to him any information about the ZDC.⁷⁶³ This witness indicated that when in Zllash/Zlaš, he minded his own business.⁷⁶⁴

249. Fatmir HUMOLLI never visited any locations within the ZDC other than the one where the wounded were staying.⁷⁶⁵ When he met his family there, they were staying outside in the yard and he did not enter any buildings.⁷⁶⁶

250. Teuta HADRI arrived in Zllash/Zlaš towards the end of the Indictment period, on 16 April,⁷⁶⁷ and remained there for three days, until the evacuation of the village around 18 April 1999.⁷⁶⁸ The witness was unfamiliar with the area as she had never been there before.⁷⁶⁹

251. In the course of her stay at ZDC, she was extremely busy, being solely focused on her medical work.⁷⁷⁰ She stayed mainly in her assigned room,⁷⁷¹ rarely got out in the yard,⁷⁷² and did not visit any other buildings at ZDC.⁷⁷³ She indicated that she

⁷⁶⁰ Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2020, T. 2094, and 19 January 2022, T.2160.

⁷⁶¹ Fatmir SOPI, 19 January 2020, T. 2159.

⁷⁶² Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2197, 2233.

⁷⁶³ Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2236.

⁷⁶⁴ Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2233.

⁷⁶⁵ Fatmir HUMOLLI, 1 February 2022, T.2368, 2370; 100954-TR-ET, Part 3, p.7.

⁷⁶⁶ Fatmir HUMOLLI, 2 February 2022, T.2405, 2409.

⁷⁶⁷ Teuta HADRI, 11 May 2022, T.4191, 4255.

⁷⁶⁸ Teuta HADRI, 11 May 2022, T.4212, 4255.

⁷⁶⁹ Teuta HADRI, 11 May 2022, T.4234-4235.

⁷⁷⁰ Teuta HADRI, 11 May 2022, T.4192-4193, 4206, 4235, 4237-4238, 4273-4274.

⁷⁷¹ Teuta HADRI, 11 May 2022, T.4196, 4202, 4252, 4274.

⁷⁷² Teuta HADRI, 11 May 2022, T.4206.

⁷⁷³ Teuta HADRI, 11 May 2022, T.4204-4205, 4236, 4272-4273.

could only see the nearby area of the ZDC from the inside of her room.⁷⁷⁴ Asked about other buildings in the premises of the ZDC, this witness testified: "I don't remember. I think there was a granary as well. I don't really remember. There were three or four houses there in the yard, and I don't remember anything else but those three or four houses."⁷⁷⁵

252. Ibadete CANOLLI-KACIU, a BIA member,⁷⁷⁶ arrived in Zllash/Zlaš on 16 April 1999⁷⁷⁷ where she stayed until 21 April of that year.⁷⁷⁸ She had not been there before and never went back there again.⁷⁷⁹ Due to the passage of time, she was not able to provide the description of the place where she stayed.⁷⁸⁰ When shown photographs of the buildings within the ZDC, she said she did not remember whether she had seen them.⁷⁸¹ She testified that she did not pay attention to them.⁷⁸² She only remembered a particular well, and the tree depicted on one of the photos.⁷⁸³

253. By her own admission, she stayed mostly inside, and did not move much in the yard.⁷⁸⁴ For the two first days, 16 and 17 April 1999, she was entirely indoors, dealing with medication.⁷⁸⁵ The following day she left her room only once, to fetch some food from the nearby kitchen.⁷⁸⁶ That kitchen however, does not feature on any of the photographs of the ZDC shown to her in court.⁷⁸⁷ The witness did not visit any

⁷⁷⁴ Teuta HADRI, 11 May 2022, T.4204, 4235.

⁷⁷⁵ Teuta HADRI, 11 May 2022, T.4205.

⁷⁷⁶ Ibadete CANOLLI-KACIU, 12 May 2022, T.4339-4341.

⁷⁷⁷ Ibadete CANOLLI-KACIU, 12 May 2022, T.4322.

⁷⁷⁸ Ibadete CANOLLI-KACIU, 12 May 2022, T.4325, 4328, 4377.

⁷⁷⁹ Ibadete CANOLLI-KACIU, 12 May 2022, T.4377.

⁷⁸⁰ Ibadete CANOLLI-KACIU, 12 May 2022, T.4324-4326.

⁷⁸¹ Ibadete CANOLLI-KACIU, 12 May 2022, T.4325-4326.

⁷⁸² Ibadete CANOLLI-KACIU, 12 May 2022, T.4381.

⁷⁸³ Ibadete CANOLLI-KACIU, 12 May 2022, T.4327.

⁷⁸⁴ Ibadete CANOLLI-KACIU, 12 May 2022, T.4326.

⁷⁸⁵ Ibadete CANOLLI-KACIU, 12 May 2022, T.4378

⁷⁸⁶ Ibadete CANOLLI-KACIU, 12 May 2022, T.4378-4379.

⁷⁸⁷ Ibadete CANOLLI-KACIU, 12 May 2022, T.4379.

other buildings within the compound.⁷⁸⁸ While in Zllash/Zlaš she had a great deal of medical work, and her focus was mainly on the wounded.⁷⁸⁹

(b) Whether he Accused was in charge of the ZDC

254. The Defence attempted to demonstrate that the Accused was not in charge of the ZDC, claiming instead that it was Rrahman DINI,⁷⁹⁰ Isa KASTRATI,⁷⁹¹ Brigade 153, or other soldiers of the KLA Karadak OZ.

255. The Defence's attempts to specifically put Rrahman DINI in charge of the ZDC, do not withstand closer scrutiny. This member of Brigade 153⁷⁹² was admittedly in Zllash/Zlaš in March/April 1999, but one of his superiors, Fatmir SOPI, does not recall him having any particular task,⁷⁹³ or having any authority to discipline people.⁷⁹⁴

256. Apart from general assertions of Defence witness Selatin KRASNIQI,⁷⁹⁵ there are no indications that Rahman DINI was in any commanding position over the ZDC. But even if he formally was, which is not in evidence, he could not exercise any effective control over that location or over soldiers stationed therein as he was in a particularly dire physical condition.⁷⁹⁶ His state was so bad, that 'at one point he was even unable to act.'⁷⁹⁷ He had issues with his breathing, heart, and lungs, and he could not walk.⁷⁹⁸ In March/April 1999 his condition was very poor, he was unable to have

⁷⁸⁸ Ibadete CANOLLI-KACIU, 12 May 2022, T.4381.

⁷⁸⁹ Ibadete CANOLLI-KACIU, 12 May 2022, T.4379, 4381.

⁷⁹⁰ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3912, 3951.

⁷⁹¹ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3912-3913, 3995.

⁷⁹² In Brigade 153, Rrahman DINI was responsible for civilian-military relations and at some point, also for morale and politics: Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2038.

⁷⁹³ Fatmier SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2106.

⁷⁹⁴ Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2106.

⁷⁹⁵ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3912, 3951, 3988.

⁷⁹⁶ Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2040; Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2194, 2229.

⁷⁹⁷ Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2040.

⁷⁹⁸ Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2040, 2042-2043; Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2194, 2229.

any active operational role, and he couldn't move without someone assisting him.⁷⁹⁹ Those around him even expected him to die soon.⁸⁰⁰ After the offensive in mid-April 1999, he was hospitalized in Marec, Viti.⁸⁰¹

257. When in Zllash/Zlaš, Rahman DINI would usually stay in the house of Fatmir SOPI, or in the house of Mr SOPI's uncle,⁸⁰² and not in the ZDC. This testimony is consistent with the evidence of Musli HALIMI according to whom Rahman DINI was staying at the 153 Brigade staff location, near the training centre.⁸⁰³

258. Another person indicated by Selatin KRASNIQI as the person who could possibly have been in charge of the ZDC was Isa KASTRATI.⁸⁰⁴ This person, however, was a deputy of the Accused in BIA,⁸⁰⁵ which further solidifies the evidence that Salih MUSTAFA and BIA were controlling the ZDC.

259. As for Brigade 153, contrary to the Defence claims and, as indicated in paragraph 116 of this brief, even if it had headquarters in Zllash/Zlaš, it was neither based nor was in control of the ZDC.

260. The Accused and certain witnesses stated that soldiers from the Karadak OZ were temporarily staying at the ZDC.⁸⁰⁶ Little is known about those soldiers, including the KLA military unit they belonged to, the identity of their commander, or their numbers. Further, with regard to the time of their presence in Zllash/Zlaš, it is not clear whether they were at the ZDC in April 1999.⁸⁰⁷ There is no evidence that Karadak

⁷⁹⁹ Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2194, 2229.

⁸⁰⁰ Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2231, 2259.

⁸⁰¹ Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2040, 2115.

⁸⁰² Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2106.

⁸⁰³ Musli HALIMI, 20 April 2022, T.3728.

⁸⁰⁴ Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3912-3913, 3995.

⁸⁰⁵ 069404-TR-ET Part 7, p.21 (Salih MUSTAFA); Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2713-2714.

⁸⁰⁶ 069404-TR-ET Part 7, p.11 (Salih MUSTAFA); Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2089-2090; Selatin KRASNIQI, 21 April 2022, T.3884, 3886, 3960. *See, however*, Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2195; W04600, 23 September 2021, T.722.

⁸⁰⁷ Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4039, 4159-4160.

soldiers were in any way in charge of the ZDC, in whole or in part. The evidence discussed in the brief only points towards BIA members as those responsible for the crimes charged in the Indictment.

G. Existence of an armed conflict at the times relevant to the charges

261. Throughout the Indictment Period, an armed conflict existed between the KLA and forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ('FRY') and Republic of Serbia, including units of the Yugoslav Army ('VJ'), police and other units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs ('MUP'), and other groups fighting on behalf of the FRY and Serbia (collectively, 'FRY forces').

262. The Trial Panel took judicial notice, pursuant to Rule 157,⁸⁰⁸ of 52 facts establishing the existence of that conflict, its protracted character, and the level of organization of the warring parties. Those facts were reliably adjudicated in trials before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo courts on the basis of a thorough analysis of an extensive body of evidence, including reports of international organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ('OSCE') and Human Rights Watch, reports of the FRY forces and its officials on the status of the hostilities, as well as testimony of KLA members.⁸⁰⁹

263. SPO evidence further supported those adjudicated facts. OSCE/KVM Reports,⁸¹⁰ UNHCR Reports,⁸¹¹ KLA General Staff communiqués,⁸¹² KLA political

 ⁸⁰⁸ Decision on judicial notice of adjudicated facts, KSC-BC-2020-05/F00191, 7 September 2021, para.14.
 ⁸⁰⁹ See e.g. Dorđević TJ, IT-05-87/1-T, paras 1531-1579; Šainović et al. TJ, IT-05-87-T, paras 790-841; Latif Gashi et al. Verdict, C. Nr. 425/2001, pp.4, 11-12.

⁸¹⁰ IT-05-87 P00444 (OSCE Report 1999); IT-05-87 P00680 (OSCE Fusion Working Papers 1999); IT-05-87.1 P01029 (OSCE Memo Daily Bluebook).

⁸¹¹ 074222-074225 (UNHCR Kosovo Crisis); 074226-074231 (Update UNHCR Kosovo Crisis).

⁸¹² U003-8552-U003-8690, pp.113-115 (KLA/UCK Communiques); SPOE00055399-SPOE00055399-ET (KLA Communique no.79).

declarations,⁸¹³ and mobilisation orders/decisions⁸¹⁴ demonstrate that between the end of February and late April 1999, the conflict between FRY forces and the KLA was in full force, with an increase in the number of units fielded by the former, and a high frequency of armed clashes between the two warring factions.

264. In February 1999, an international peace conference was organised in Rambouillet, France.⁸¹⁵ In late February and early March 1999, FRY forces launched a series of further offensives. The peace talks collapsed in mid-March 1999.

265. On 24 March 1999, NATO forces began air strikes against targets in Kosovo and Serbia and Montenegro, and the FRY declared a state of war.⁸¹⁶ In ordering an attack on 15 April against the KLA in the Bajgora region, the FRY's Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija noted that since the beginning of April 1999, there had been an increase in KLA attacks.⁸¹⁷ At the same time, large-scale operations were conducted by FRY forces in Kosovo.

266. Fighting took place throughout Kosovo during the Indictment period,⁸¹⁸ including between Serbian forces and the KLA.⁸¹⁹ The KLA was fully engaged and the

⁸¹³ U003-8552-U003-8690, p.112 (KLA/UCK Communiques); SPOE00054441-SPOE00054442-ET (Book State Informative Agency).

⁸¹⁴ SPOE00054517-SPOE00054518-ET (Book excerpt State Informative Agency); SPOE00054519-SPOE00054522-ET (Book excerpt State Informative Agency). *See also* SPOE40000793-SPOE40000793-ET Revised (KLA Communique no.48).

⁸¹⁵ See e.g. SPOE00055752-SPOE00055752-ET (Skender ZHITIA's book).

⁸¹⁶ See e.g. SPOE00061241-00061243 (OSCE KVM Report 24 March 1999).

⁸¹⁷ See e.g. IT-05-87 P01975-E, p.1. (Joint Command KiM Order no.455-151).

⁸¹⁸ See e.g SPOE00061241-00061243, p.3 (OSCE KVM Report 24 March 1999); SPOE00061248-00061251, p.2 (OSCE KVM Report 27-28 March 1999); SITF00011677-00011685, pp.2-3 (OSCE Monthly report re UNSC Res. 1160).

⁸¹⁹ See e.g. SITF00011677-00011685, p.4 (OSCE Monthly report re UNSC Res 1160).

KLA General Staff called for a general mobilization.⁸²⁰ The conflict resulted in many casualties.⁸²¹

1. The KLA

267. Throughout the Indictment period, the KLA was an organised armed group with a sufficient degree of organisation to control territory and to plan and carry out synchronised armed attacks and other offensive and defensive military operations.

268. The KLA was headed by a General Staff, was organised into Operational Zones, and issued political declarations and communiqués setting out policy and actions.⁸²² At all relevant times, the KLA had an official commander, political representatives, an official spokesperson, and various written rules and regulations.⁸²³

269. Each of the Operational Zones into which the KLA was organised had a command structure.⁸²⁴ The KLA General Staff issued orders and tasks to the KLA

⁸²⁰ See e.g. SPOE00061244-00061247, p.3 (OSCE KVM Report 25 March 1999); SPOE00054517-SPOE00054518-ET (Book excerpt State Informative Agency); SPOE00054519-SPOE00054522-ET (Book excerpt State Informative Agency).

⁸²¹ See e.g. SPOE00061241-00061243, p.3. (OSCE KVM Report 24 March 1999).

⁸²² See e.g. 043802-043802-ET Revised (KLA Communique no.53); 043803-043803-ET Revised ("Zëri i Kosovës" magazine, no.38 containing KLA Communique no.54); 043848-043848-ET (KLA Communique no.48); U003-8552-U003-8690 (KLA Communiques 20 May-18 Aug); SPOE00238093-00238093 (Map of Kosovo under UNMIK admin).

⁸²³ See U003-8552-U003-8690 (KLA Communiques 20 May-18 Aug); 043848-043848-ET (KLA Communique no.48); IT-05-87 P02449-E (KLA Provisional Regulation for Organization of Army's Internal Life); SITF00068883-00068899 (KLA General HQ, Reg on Discipline); U000-5395-U000-5395-ET (KLA General Rules and Tasks issued by Head of Military Police); U002-2800-U002-2822-ET (Special Warefare booklet, KLA signed by LlapO). *See also* SPOE00055736-SPOE00055742-ET, p.1. (Skender ZHITIA's book).

⁸²⁴ See e.g. SPOE00119363-00119367 (Rrustem MUSTAFA's instructions to KLA Llap Zone).

Operational Zones.⁸²⁵ The KLA Operational Zones reported to the KLA General Staff.⁸²⁶

(a) The Llap Operational Zone

270. The Llap Operational Zone ('Llap OZ') covered the geographical area that encompassed Prishtinë/Priština and Podujevo in the northeast of Kosovo,⁸²⁷ including the village of Zllash/Zlaš where the crimes charged in the Indictment took place. On the orders of the KLA General Staff, the headquarters of the Llap OZ had taken measures to recruit, train, and deploy new soldiers, as well as to structure, expand and consolidate command structures for the Zone.⁸²⁸

271. Throughout the Indictment period, Rrustem Mustafa (aka 'Remi') was the Commander of the Llap OZ, Kadri Kastrati (aka 'Daja') was the Deputy Commander of the Llap OZ, Nuredin Ibishi (aka 'Leka') was the Chief of Staff of the Llap OZ, and Latif Gashi (aka 'Lata') was the head of intelligence (G2) within the Llap OZ Command Staff.⁸²⁹

272. The chain of command in the Llap OZ followed the rules set out in the KLA General Headquarters Regulations on Discipline, and in the KLA Regulations for the

⁸²⁵ See e.g. SPOE00119161-SPOE00119161-ET (KLA General Staff Order No6-3/33-03); IT-05-87.1 P00437_E (KLA General Staff Order no.99-111/11). See also 069404-TR-ET Part 1 RED, pp.21-23 (Salih MUSTAFA).

⁸²⁶ See e.g. IT-05-87.1 P00446.E (KLA General Staff report).

⁸²⁷ SPOE00238090-00238090 (Map of Pristina); SPOE00238092-00238092 (Map of Kosovo Region). *See also* SPOE00055705-SPOE00055708-ET, p.4 (Skender ZHITIA's book); SPOE00208166-00208166 (Map of Kosovo by Toena); SPOE00238093-00238093 (Map of Kosovo under UNMIK admin); SPOE00238094-00238094 (Map of the Pristina area).

⁸²⁸ See SPOE00055705-SPOE00055708-ET, p.1 (Skender ZHITIA's book); SPOE00055799-SPOE00055868-ET, pp.1-10 (Skender ZHITIA's book).

⁸²⁹ See Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2075, 2035; 7000669-7000676 RED, p.3; 7000593-7000609 RED, p.4; 069474-TR-ET Part 1 RED, p.14; Fatmir HUMOLLI, 2 Feburary 2022, T.2417. *See also* SPOE00055705-SPOE00055708-ET, p.1 (Skender ZHITIA's book).

Organisation of the Army's Internal Life.⁸³⁰ Within brigades, written instructions existed demanding that the military orders issued by Brigade Commanders be executed without deviation.⁸³¹

273. Overall, there was a clear structure for communication and command and control within the Llap OZ,⁸³² and there were regular lines of ordering and reporting between the General Staff and the Llap OZ.⁸³³

274. Between at least October 1998 and April 1999, the KLA ran additional detention sites other than the Zllash/Zlaš Detention Compound in the Llap OZ.⁸³⁴ The Panel has taken judical notice of these facts.⁸³⁵

275. There were three Brigades in the Llap OZ: 151, 152 and 153.⁸³⁶ The Commander of KLA Brigade 153, which operated in the area of Zllash/Zlaš, was Adem SHEHU.⁸³⁷

⁸³⁰ IT-05-87 P02449-E (KLA Provisional Regulations for the Organization of the Army's Internal Life); SITF00068883-00068899 (KLA General HQ Regulations on Discipline); SPOE00119363-00119367 (Rrustem MUSTAFA's instructions to the KLA Llap Zone); U000-4224-U000-4224-ET (KLA Order Llap Zone no.01/17).

⁸³¹ See e.g. U000-4204-U000-4204-ET (KLA Order 153 Brigade re duties/orders).

⁸³² SPOE00119363-00119367 (Rrustem MUSTAFA's instructions to the KLA Llap Zone). *See also* SPOE000555799-SPOE00055868-ET, pp.51-53 (Skender ZHITIA's book).

⁸³³ See e.g. SPOE00119161-SPOE00119161-ET (KLA Staff Order no.6-3/33-03 on rules of engagement); IT-05-87.1 P00446.E (KLA General Staff report); IT-05-87.1 P00437_Ea (KLA General Staff Order no.99-111/11).

⁸³⁴ Nuredin IBISHI, 12 April 2022, T.3623-3625. *See also* SITF00242602-SITF00242602-ET (KLA Decision Llap Zone no.004/1998); SITF00242603-SITF00242603-ET (KLA Decision Llap Zone no.003/1998).

⁸³⁵ Decision on judicial notice of adjudicated facts, KSC-BC-2020-05/F00191, 7 September 2021, para.14.
⁸³⁶ See e.g. Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2113 ; 069474-TR-ET Part 1 RED, pp.14-15.

⁸³⁷ Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2037; 069474-TR-ET Part 2, p.1; Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2191; 069889-TR-ET Part 1, p.18; 069889-TR-ET Part 2 RED, p.2. *See also* SITF00427788-00427788 (KLA 154 Brigade Organigram); SITF00427789-00427789 (KLA 153 Brigade Staff Chart); U000-4204-U000-4204-ET (KLA Order 153 Brigade re duties/orders); U000-4319-U000-4321-ET (Memo by A.SHEHU regarding implementation of Orders in 153 Brigade); U001-0399-U001-0400-ET (KLA Llap 153 Brigade combat order).

276. KLA Brigade 153 (aka 'Hyzri Talla') comprised the units that were in area of Gollak/Goljak.⁸³⁸ Its headquarters was based in the village of Zllash/Zlaš,⁸³⁹ where the Brigade also had a training centre in the local school building.⁸⁴⁰ Sejdi VESELI was the Deputy Commander of the Brigade, Agron XHEMAJLI was the chief of the Information Service, and Fatmir SOPI was initially the Commander of Civilian Protection.⁸⁴¹ Fatmir SOPI was appointed Deputy Commander of Brigade 153 after the April 1999 offensive.⁸⁴²

277. During the Indictment period, KLA 153 Brigade was operational, as shown by combat orders and other documents issued by the Brigade Command.⁸⁴³

278. FRY forces carried out offensives against the KLA in April 1999,⁸⁴⁴ including one that took place between approximately 16 and 22 April 1999, in the area of

⁸⁴² Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2036; 7000593-7000609 RED, p.5.

⁸³⁸ See W01679, 4 October 2021, T.864; Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2044 ; 069474-TR-ET Part 1 RED, p.12; SPOE00055799-SPOE00055868-ET, p.50 (Skender ZHITIA's book).

 ⁸³⁹ Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2102; 069474-TR-ET Part 1 RED, p.25. *See also* SPOE00055870-SPOE00055988-ET, p.43 (Skender ZHITIA's book); Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2650-2651.
 ⁸⁴⁰ Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2044; 069474-TR-ET Part 1 RED, p.23; 069474-TR-ET Part 2, p.5; Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2195; 069889-TR-ET Part 1, pp.21-22; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.864; SPOE00128386-00128420 RED2, p.27 (Photo book of location sites Zllash/Zlaš). *See also* SPOE00213459-00213487 (Content of folder WCIS/Zllash/Zlaš, with photos).

⁸⁴¹ Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2036; 7000593-7000609 RED, p.5; 069474-TR-ET Part 1 RED, pp.24-25; 069474-TR-ET Part 2, p.8; Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2211, 2214-2215; 069889-TR-ET Part 1, p.17; U000-4204-U000-4204-ET (KLA order 153 Brigade re duties/orders); U001-0399-U001-0400-ET (KLA Llap 153 Brigade Protocol no.153-004 combat order). *See also* SPOE00055870-SPOE00055988-ET, p.42 (Book excerpt Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves - Zona Operative e Llapit by Zhitia).

 ⁸⁴³ See e.g. U001-0399-U001-0400-ET (KLA Llap 153 Brigade Protocol no.153-004); U000-9175-U000-9175-ET (KLA 153 Brigade Llap Arrest Order); U000-4319-U000-4321-ET (Memo by A.SHEHU regarding implementation of Orders in 153 Brigade); U000-4205-U000-4206-ET (KLA Order no.08-153-004).
 ⁸⁴⁴ IT-05-87 P01975-E (Joint Command KiM Order no.455-151); IT-05-87 P01977-E (Joint Command KiM Order no.455-160).

Gollak/Goljak.⁸⁴⁵ When that offensive started on or about 16 April 1999, BIA soldiers were involved in the fight against Serbian forces.⁸⁴⁶

279. During the Indictment period, BIA soldiers had a base in Zllash/Zlaš.⁸⁴⁷ The Accused commanded BIA and also led the BIA intelligence sector and information gathering, which also included gathering information on Albanians who were believed to be assisting/working with the FRY forces.⁸⁴⁸ Soldiers from the BIA unit used the base in Zllash/Zlaš to monitor the movements of FRY forces.⁸⁴⁹

280. All acts and omissions charged as war crimes in the Indictment took place in the context of, and were associated with, the armed conflict between the KLA and FRY forces. The crimes were committed at a KLA base and/or during KLA activities. As shown in Section IV below, the Victims were persons taking no active part in hostilities. The Accused and other perpetrators of the alleged crimes were aware of the factual circumstances establishing the existence of the armed conflict and the status of the victims. In fact, they were members of the BIA unit, which throughout the period relevant to the Indictment, was engaged in armed conflict with the FRY forces.⁸⁵⁰

281. The Accused and the other perpetrators involved in the charged crimes exploited the conditions created by the armed conflict to arrest, detain, interrogate, and mistreat persons at the ZDC. The majority of the Victims/witnesses have stated that, during interrogations, they were accused of not supporting the KLA, of having

⁸⁴⁵ IT-05-87.1 P01384.E (Joint Command KiM Order no.455-147); IT-05-87.1 D00633.E, p.3 (FRY Supreme Command combat report op. no.26). *See also* Fatmir SOPI, 18 January 2022, T.2077-2078; 069474-TR-ET Part 3 RED, pp.7, 12-14.

⁸⁴⁶ 069404-TR-ET Part 7, p.14 (Salih MUSTAFA).

⁸⁴⁷ Sejdi VESELI, 25 January 2022, T.2195; Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2653.

⁸⁴⁸ See supra, Section III.E.1.

⁸⁴⁹ See supra, Section III.A.; Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2621-2622.

⁸⁵⁰ 069404-TR-ET Part 6 RED, pp.7-10; Part 7, pp.14-15; and Part 8, pp.8-12 (Salih MUSTAFA).

cooperated with FRY forces, or of being spies.⁸⁵¹ There is no evidence that they were actually spies or assisted the Serbian forces in any way.

2. Protected status of the Victims

282. During the time of their arrest, detention and mistreatment, and in the case of of [REDACTED] also of his murder, W01679, W03593, W03594, W04669, [REDACTED] were all civilians and not taking part in the hostilities.⁸⁵²

IV. ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND EVIDENCE PROVING THE ELEMENTS

283. As discussed above, the evidence adduced at trial establishes that, between about 1 and 19 April 1999, the Accused and certain other KLA members arbitrarily deprived at least seven civilians, including W01679, W03593, [REDACTED], W03594, W04669, [REDACTED] of their liberty without due process of law at the KLA ZDC. While in detention, these Victims were subjected to cruel treatment and torture, and one of them, [REDACTED], was murdered on or shortly after 19 April 1999.

⁸⁵¹ *See e.g.* W03593, 20 September 2021, T.409-410, and 22 September 2021, T.575; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.875, and 5 October 2021, T.981; 7000687-7000691 RED3, p.1; W04674, 14 December 2021, T.2018; W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1444; W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1032, 1075, and 13 October 2021, T.1169.

⁸⁵² W01679, 4 October 2021, T.862; 060698-TR-ET Part 1 Revised RED3, p.9; 060698-TR-ET Part 2 Revised RED3, pp.13, 31-33; W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1032, 1075; 061016-TR-ET Part 1 RED1, pp.6, 8; W03593, 22 September 2021, T.575; W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1390; 082023-TR-ET Part 1 RED1, p.6; W04391, 22 November 2021, T.1732; 060723-TR-ET Part 1 Revised RED3, pp.7-8; W04390, 24 November 2021, T.1865; 060680-TR-ET Part 1 Revised RED3, pp.21-22; W04676, 17 November 2021, T.1668-1669; 076539-TR-ET Part 3 RED1, p.10.

A. COUNT 1 - ARBITRARY DETENTION

284. There is ample evidence supporting a conviction beyond reasonable doubt that, between approximately 1 and 19 April 1999, the Accused and other KLA members arbitrarily deprived at least seven civilians of their liberty without due process of law or basic procedural safeguards at the KLA ZDC. The Victims were arrested and detained without legal basis, and had no opportunity to challenge their detention.

1. Deprivation of liberty

285. W01679⁸⁵³ was arrested at the Zllash/Zlaš school by armed members of the KLA's BIA/Skifterat unit who took the witness to the ZDC upon orders of their commander.⁸⁵⁴ W01679 was not shown any documents that justified his arrest, but was told he had to go with the soldiers.⁸⁵⁵ W01679 was detained for 18 days⁸⁵⁶ and was released together with W03594 and [REDACTED].⁸⁵⁷

286. W03593⁸⁵⁸ was arrested at the beginning of April 1999 in [REDACTED] by armed KLA military police.⁸⁵⁹ He was given no other explanation than: "We are going to Zllash to talk".⁸⁶⁰ His detention lasted 18 days,⁸⁶¹ when he was freed with other detainees, including W03594.⁸⁶²

⁸⁵³ See also Section III.A.1. above.

⁸⁵⁴ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.865-867.

⁸⁵⁵ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.866.

⁸⁵⁶ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.883.

⁸⁵⁷ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.905.

⁸⁵⁸ See also Section III.A.2. above.

⁸⁵⁹ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.395-400, and 21 September 2021, T.556.

⁸⁶⁰ W03593, 21 September 2021, T.557, and 20 September 2021, T.397.

⁸⁶¹ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.394-395, 418.

⁸⁶² W03593, 21 September 2021, T.552-553.

287. W04669⁸⁶³ was arrested in April 1999 at a KLA-manned checkpoint in [REDACTED] and, without knowing where he was being driven, was taken to the ZDC.⁸⁶⁴ W04669 was detained for about a week,⁸⁶⁵ and was released at the beginning of the Serbian offensive in mid-April 1999.⁸⁶⁶

288. W03594⁸⁶⁷ was arrested on 4 April 1999 in [REDACTED] by three KLA soldiers⁸⁶⁸ and was taken to the ZDC without explanation.⁸⁶⁹ He was detained there until 19 April 1999, when he was finally released together with W03593, W01679, and [REDACTED].⁸⁷⁰

289. [REDACTED]⁸⁷¹ was already in detention at the ZDC when W01679 was taken there,⁸⁷² and was released together with W01679 on or about 19 April 1999.⁸⁷³

290. [REDACTED],⁸⁷⁴ known to the other detainees as [REDACTED], was also detained in the ZDC,⁸⁷⁵ and was not released with the others on 19 April 1999.⁸⁷⁶

291. [REDACTED]⁸⁷⁷ was arrested on 1 April 1999 in [REDACTED], and taken to the ZDC by three KLA soldiers including [REDACTED].⁸⁷⁸ This victim was detained

⁸⁶³ See also Section III.A.3. above.

⁸⁶⁴ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1410-1415, and 11 November 2021, T.1518-1519, 1534, 1536.

⁸⁶⁵ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1449.

⁸⁶⁶ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1457-1459.

⁸⁶⁷ See also Section III.A.2. above.

⁸⁶⁸ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1035-1036, 1038-1039.

⁸⁶⁹ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1037, 1039.

⁸⁷⁰ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1040; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.905; W03594, 13 October 2021, T.1144.

⁸⁷¹ See also Section III.A.5. above.

⁸⁷² W01679, 4 October 2021, T.889.

⁸⁷³ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.905.

⁸⁷⁴ See also Section III.A.5. above.

⁸⁷⁵ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.889, 900; W03593, 20 September 2021, T.444-451.

⁸⁷⁶ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.484; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.905-906; W03594, 13 October 2021, T.1145.

⁸⁷⁷ See also Section III.D. above.

⁸⁷⁸ See Section III.D. *above*, para.83.

until at least 19 April 1999 when W01679, W03594, [REDACTED] and W03593, were released.⁸⁷⁹ The soldiers did not say why they were not releasing [REDACTED].⁸⁸⁰

2. Absence of due process guarantees

292. The deprivation of liberty of all the Victims took place in the absence of due process guarantees. None of the detainees were shown any legal paper authorising their arrest.⁸⁸¹ When released, BIA soldiers did not give the detainees any release documents, or explain the reasons for the end of their detention.⁸⁸²

293. During interrogations, some detainees were accused of being collaborators, friends of the Serbs, spies, or thieves.⁸⁸³ According to W04669, possible reasons for his detention and mistreatment were, among other, [REDACTED].⁸⁸⁴ W03594, too, believed his [REDACTED] to be the possible reasons for his arrest.⁸⁸⁵ At no point during their detention were any of the detainees brought before a judge or other competent authority, provided with access to a lawyer, or otherwise permitted to challenge the lawfulness of their detention.

294. The detainees were not allowed to have contact with anyone from outside the ZDC, including family members.⁸⁸⁶ [REDACTED].⁸⁸⁷

⁸⁷⁹ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.484-485, and 22 September 2021, T.613; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.905-906; W03594, 13 October 2021, T.1145. *See also* Section III.C. *above*.

⁸⁸⁰ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.485-486; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.905-906.

⁸⁸¹ See e.g. W03593, 20 September 2021, T.397; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.866; W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1456.

⁸⁸² See e.g. W03593, 20 September 2021, T.485; W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1456; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.904.

⁸⁸³ See e.g. W03593, 20 September 2021, T.410; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.892-893, 895, 896.

⁸⁸⁴ W04669, [REDACTED].

⁸⁸⁵ W03594, [REDACTED].

⁸⁸⁶ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.480-481; W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1467-1648; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.903; W03594, 13 October 2021, T.1133-1134.

⁸⁸⁷ See e.g. [REDACTED]; W04648, SPOE00128061-00128064 RED1, p.3; SPOE00128158-00128162 RED1, p.1; [REDACTED].

B. COUNT 2 - CRUEL TREATMENT

295. The evidence adduced at trial establishes beyond all reasonable doubt that, between approximately 1 and 19 April 1999, the Accused and certain other KLA members subjected at least the seven aforementioned people⁸⁸⁸ to cruel treatment, by establishing and maintaining inhumane conditions at the KLA ZDC, and by inflicting beatings and other forms of maltreatment, including serious mental and physical harm.

1. Detention conditions

296. The evidence adduced at trial proves beyond reasonable doubt the inhumane conditions of detention at the ZDC.⁸⁸⁹

2. Infliction of serious mental or physical suffering and attacks on the prisoners' dignity

297. The evidence described in Section III above, and further described below, details the mistreatments, including those directly inflicted by the Accused, suffered by W01679,⁸⁹⁰ W03593,⁸⁹¹ W04669,⁸⁹² W03594,⁸⁹³ [REDACTED],⁸⁹⁴ [REDACTED].⁸⁹⁵

298. The detainees were beaten and maltreated in various ways almost every day by BIA soldiers including those known as Brahim MEHMETAJ aka 'Bimi', Fatmir, Afrim, Kujtim QERIMI aka 'Dardan', Ilmi VELA, Nazif MUSLIU aka 'Tabuti', Bujar,

⁸⁸⁸ See above Section IV.A.1. above, paras.296-302.

⁸⁸⁹ See Section III.B. above.

⁸⁹⁰ See Section III.A.1. and III.B. above.

⁸⁹¹ See Section III.A.2. and III.B. above.

⁸⁹² See Section III.A.3. and III.B. above.

⁸⁹³ See Section III.A.4. and III.B. above.

⁸⁹⁴ See Section III.B. and III.D. above.

⁸⁹⁵ See Section III.A.5. and III.B. above.

and Avni.⁸⁹⁶ The Accused himself took part in and oversaw the mistreatment.⁸⁹⁷ The detainees were also psychologically abused, including by soldiers entering the stable and displaying to them the severely injured body of [REDACTED].⁸⁹⁸

299. W01679 still has a scar [REDACTED] where he received burnings during his detention, and still has injuries in several places [REDACTED].⁸⁹⁹ After his release, W01679 [REDACTED] which was the result of the beatings received.⁹⁰⁰ He testified that: "To this day, I can't sleep properly and I don't feel calm. Even if you think of the nightmares I have, when I think of those voices, and I have those flashbacks, in addition to the consequences, physical consequences that I have to this day."⁹⁰¹

300. While held at the ZDC, W03593 felt lost, scared and could not sleep, hearing screams of people being mistreated upstairs.⁹⁰² He was so scared that every time the guards entered the barn, he approached W03594, seeking his protection.⁹⁰³ As a result of the beatings, W03593's [REDACTED].⁹⁰⁴ He also had to [REDACTED].⁹⁰⁵ [REDACTED].⁹⁰⁶ W03593 is currently unable to work,⁹⁰⁷ and has sleeping problems.⁹⁰⁸ To this day, he feels so traumatised that he is uncomfortable to mention the name, or even the nickname, of the Accused.⁹⁰⁹

⁸⁹⁶ See Section III.B. above.

⁸⁹⁷ See e.g. W01679, 4 October 2021, T.869, 872-873; W03593, 20 September 2021, T.412, 420-421, 429, 432, 437-438, and 22 September 2021, T.584.

⁸⁹⁸ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1441.

⁸⁹⁹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.929.

⁹⁰⁰ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.929-930.

⁹⁰¹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.930.

⁹⁰² W03593, 20 September 2021, T.476, 481.

⁹⁰³ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1079.

⁹⁰⁴ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.425-426, and 21 September 2021, T.523-524, 538.

⁹⁰⁵ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.409, and 21 September 2021, T.523-524, 528-529, 541.

⁹⁰⁶ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.409, and 21 September 2021, T.523-524, 526, 538-540.

⁹⁰⁷ W03593, 21 September 2021, T.524, 542.

⁹⁰⁸ W03593, 21 September 2021, T.541.

⁹⁰⁹ W03593, 21 September 2021, T.520-522, 531.

301. W04669's [REDACTED] as a result of the beating that he received.⁹¹⁰ By witnessing [REDACTED]'s injuries, W04669 felt he was "at a critical situation" and "could have the same chance as he."⁹¹¹ W04669 was afraid and unsure of the reason for being kept there.⁹¹²

302. W03594 felt that he was treated like an animal and not like a human being. He considered the whole experience humiliating and spiritually devastating, and feared for his life.⁹¹³ He felt half-dead and half-alive.⁹¹⁴

C. COUNT 3 - TORTURE

303. All of the evidence indicated above under Count 2 also relates to, and supports, the charges in Count 3. The Accused, being in charge of the ZDC, created and maintained inhumane conditions of detention, through beatings and other forms of mistreatment, thereby inflicting on the Victims severe physical and psychological harm. The torture inflicted was aimed at obtaining information, punishing, coercing and intimidating. Detainees were questioned and/or accused of being collaborators, friends of the Serbs, spies, or thieves.

1. Infliction of severe physical and psychological pain

304. The evidence reviewed above under Count 2 proves beyond reasonable doubt the infliction of severe physical and psychological harm on the Victims.⁹¹⁵

⁹¹⁰ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1468-1470.

⁹¹¹ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1441.

⁹¹² W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1441.

⁹¹³ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1066-1067, 1076.

⁹¹⁴ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1086-1087.

⁹¹⁵ See supra Section IV.B. above.

305. For example, throughout his detention, W01679 was subjected to beatings and mistreatments including burnings with candles,⁹¹⁶ electro-shocks,⁹¹⁷ and beatings with wooden sticks and iron rods.⁹¹⁸ The torture with the electricity box was usually done by two subordinates of Salih MUSTAFA: Kujtim QERIMI aka 'Dardan' and Afrim.⁹¹⁹

306. W03593 was severely beaten for the first time shortly after he was brought to Zllash/Zlaš by three to five people,⁹²⁰ including Nazif MUSLIU aka 'Tabut/Tabuti',⁹²¹ who used wood to beat him and kicked him.⁹²² W03593 fainted two or three times.⁹²³ During the beating, W03593 heard the perpetrators saying that they had to kill him as he was a spy and a collaborator with the Serbs.⁹²⁴ At some point, the Accused pushed W03593 against a wall, took out a revolver, pressed it against his head and said that he was going to kill him. The Accused then pulled the trigger but the revolver did not go off.⁹²⁵

307. The most severely and most frequently mistreated detainee was [REDACTED].⁹²⁶ Unlike the other detainees, he was tied up.⁹²⁷ He was burnt with a

⁹¹⁶ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.883-884.

⁹¹⁷ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.883-884.

⁹¹⁸ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.883-884.

⁹¹⁹ W01679, 5 October 2021, T.987. On Kujtim QERIMI aka 'Dardan' and Afrim being subordinates of Salih MUSTAFA, *see* 069404-TR-ET Part 4, pp.3, 26; 069404-TR-ET Part 8, pp.9-13; Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2665-2666, 2706, 2712; Muhamet AJETI, 22 April 2022, T.4103-4104.

⁹²⁰ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.407, 409, 414, and 21 September 2021, T.539.

⁹²¹ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.430-431, and 22 September 2021, T.583.

⁹²² W03593, 20 September 2021, T.409.

⁹²³ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.409, 411, and 22 September 2021, T.580.

⁹²⁴ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.409-410, and 23 September 2021, T.689; 061015-TR-ET Part 2 Revised RED3, pp.6-7.

⁹²⁵ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.411-412; 061015-TR-ET Part 2 Revised RED3, pp.8-9.

⁹²⁶ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.405, 445; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.891-892.

⁹²⁷ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.454-455, and 21 September 2021, T.510; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.892; W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1432, 1435, 1441.

hot iron rod,⁹²⁸ cut,⁹²⁹ and electrocuted.⁹³⁰ He was "brutally mistreated".⁹³¹ He was burned and had bruises and marks on his face and body.⁹³² He could not stand up because of the injuries,⁹³³ and could hardly speak.⁹³⁴

2. Aimed at obtaining information, punishing, coercing or intimidating

308. In the course of their mistreatment, detainees were questioned and/or accused of being collaborators, friends of the Serbs, spies or thieves.

309. W01679 was accused of being a spy and beaten because of it by the Accused.⁹³⁵ W03593 was accused of being a Serbian collaborator,⁹³⁶ and was ordered by the Accused to reveal information on the identities of thieves.⁹³⁷ W03594 was detained on account of [REDACTED].⁹³⁸ W04669 was beaten because he was accused of being a spy and a collaborator of the Serbs, [REDACTED].⁹³⁹ [REDACTED] was tortured because he was accused of being a Serbian collaborator,⁹⁴⁰ a spy and a thief.⁹⁴¹ [REDACTED] was accused of being a spy.⁹⁴² The nature of the interrogations and questioning endured by the detainees is further corroborated by the contemporaneous notes contained in the List of Prisoners.⁹⁴³

⁹²⁸ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.454; 061015-TR-ET Part 2 Revised RED3, p.20; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.892; 7000687-7000691 RED3, p.1.

⁹²⁹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.892; 060698-TR-ET Part 2 Revised RED3, p.29.

⁹³⁰ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.892.

⁹³¹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.891-892.

⁹³² W03593, 20 September 2021, T.454, 474; W01679, 4 October 2021, T.892.

⁹³³ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.404.

⁹³⁴ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.404-405.

⁹³⁵ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.875-876; 7000691 RED3, p.1.

⁹³⁶ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.409-410, and 23 September 2021, T.689; *see also* W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1048-149, and 13 October 2021, T.1137.

⁹³⁷ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.419-420.

⁹³⁸ W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1032, 1075, and 13 October 2021, T.1169.

⁹³⁹ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1443-1444, 1446-1448.

⁹⁴⁰ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1438, 1564.

⁹⁴¹ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.892-893; W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1049, and 13 October 2021, T.1137.

⁹⁴² W01679, 4 October 2021, T.895.

⁹⁴³ See para 172.

D. COUNT 4 - MURDER

310. The evidence discussed in Section III.D. above demonstrates beyond all reasonable doubt that, on or shortly after 19 April 1999, following exceptionally harsh detention, mistreatment, and torture, [REDACTED] was killed and subsequently buried next to the ZDC. The circumstances surrounding his detention, mistreatment, torture, and lack of release, coupled with the evidence that [REDACTED], demonstrates that he was not released because it was the intention of Salih MUSTAFA and his subordinates to kill him, and not to set him free like the other detainees. There is no other reasonable explanation that accounts for those events.

V. INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING LIABILITY

A. JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE ('JCE')

311. The evidence adduced at trial establishes beyond all reasonable doubt that Salih MUSTAFA is responsible for the crimes charged in the Indictment as a participant in a joint criminal enterprise. The crimes were committed by Salih MUSTAFA together with a plurality of persons who included members of BIA, which was under his command. Salih MUSTAFA and other JCE members, including Nazif MUSLIU aka 'Tabuti' (or 'Kommandant Tabuti'), Ilmi VELA, Brahim MEHMETAJ aka 'Bimi', Kujtim QERIMI aka 'Dardan', Afrim, and other KLA soldiers, military police, and guards at the ZDC all shared the intent to interrogate and mistreat detainees at the ZDC, and for the crimes of arbitrary detention, cruel treatment, torture, and murder. Alternatively, it was foreseeable to Salih MUSTAFA that the crime of murder might be perpetrated in the execution of the common criminal plan.

KSC-BC-2020-05

31 January 2023

312. All JCE members, including Salih MUSTAFA, significantly contributed to the execution of the common criminal plan through the acts and omissions discussed below in this section.

1. The charged crimes were part of a common criminal purpose shared by a plurality of persons, including Salih MUSTAFA

313. The crimes described above were committed in furtherance of a common criminal plan shared by Salih MUSTAFA and other KLA soldiers, including a number of his direct subordinates in the BIA unit.

314. It was armed members of BIA who, at the end of March or beginning of April 1999, arrested W01679 as he was training at the Zllash/Zlaš school, telling W01679 that their commander wanted to question him, and taking him to Salih MUSTAFA after his arrest.⁹⁴⁴ These soldiers included Brahim MEHMETAJ aka 'Bimi', Salih MUSTAFA's deputy commander in BIA until February 1999⁹⁴⁵ and a close associate of his.⁹⁴⁶ When [REDACTED].⁹⁴⁷

315. W03593, W1679, W3594, and W04669 and the other victims were all detained at the ZDC, as clearly emerged from the witnesses' consistent descriptions and identifications of the buildings where they were detained.⁹⁴⁸ The same buildings, in turn, were identified by defence witnesses as parts of the ZDC,⁹⁴⁹ which, as discussed above were under the control of Salih MUSTAFA and the BIA.⁹⁵⁰

KSC-BC-2020-05

⁹⁴⁴ See supra Section III.A.1. above.

⁹⁴⁵ See supra Section III.E.1(d) and (e) above.

⁹⁴⁶ Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2694, 2697.

⁹⁴⁷ See supra Section III.D. above.

⁹⁴⁸ See supra Section III.E.2(b) above.

⁹⁴⁹ See supra Section III.E.2(b) above.

⁹⁵⁰ See supra Section III.E.1(c) above.

316. Members of BIA who mistreated the detainees included Nazif MUSLIU aka 'Tabuti', Ilmi VELA, Afrim, Kujtim QERIMI aka 'Dardan', Fatmir, and Brahim MEHMETAJ aka 'Bimi', in addition to the Accused himself, who personally took part in mistreatments and interrogations.⁹⁵¹

317. This evidence demonstrates beyond reasonable doubt that the crimes charged in the Indictment were part of a common criminal plan shared by the Accused and the other JCE members, including a number of his BIA subordinates. This plan included the commission of the crimes of arbitrary detention, cruel treatment, torture, and murder. The existence of an explicit agreement is not necessary, as it can be inferred from the unified actions of the JCE members.⁹⁵²

318. Further, a plethora of different facts and circumstances demonstrate the Accused's intent to commit these crimes. The first, most striking evidence of his intent consists of his personal participation in the crimes. BIA members who arrested W01679 brought him before the Accused immediately after his arrest.⁹⁵³ The Accused also personally participated in the interrogation and mistreatment of W01679 and W03593, which he carried out with a number of his subordinates.⁹⁵⁴

319. The Accused's intent is further evidenced by his knowledge and continued participation in the detention and severe mistreatment of the detainees arbitrarily held at the ZDC.⁹⁵⁵ In addition to the knowledge logically stemming from his personal participation described above, the Accused was by his own admission often present

⁹⁵¹ See supra Section III.B. above.

⁹⁵² Vasiljević AJ, IT-98-32-A, para.109; Šainović et al. AJ, IT-05-87-A, paras.611, 654.

⁹⁵³ See supra Section III.A.1. above.

⁹⁵⁴ See supra Sections III.A.1. and III.A.2. above.

⁹⁵⁵ According to established and consistent jurisprudence, criminal intent can be inferred by knowledge that crimes are being committed couples with continued participation in the acts amounting to such crimes, *see e.g. Karemera & Ngirumpatse* AJ, ICTR-98-44-A, para.632; *Kvočka et al.* AJ, IT-98-30/1-A, paras.109-110.

at the ZDC during the Indictment Period.⁹⁵⁶ He was also present at the ZDC when [REDACTED].⁹⁵⁷ It would be unreasonable to conclude that the Victims in this case could be detained, interrogated, and mistreated for over two weeks within the tight confines of the ZDC, by the Accused's subordinates, without the Accused knowing what was happening and approving of it. It bears recalling, in this regard, that the Accused had complete control over the ZDC, which functioned as BIA's base in Zllash/Zlaš.⁹⁵⁸

320. The Accused also possessed the necessary intent for the murder of [REDACTED]. This is evidenced by the severity and frequency of the mistreatment suffered by [REDACTED] at the ZDC, which left clearly visible signs that he had been tortured obvious to anyone who saw him.⁹⁵⁹ W03593, W01679 and W04669 provided chilling details of the consequences that the brutal mistreatment inflicted on [REDACTED] had caused to his health. He was "massacred". He could not stand for the severity of the beatings that he sustained. His body and face were completely black from the beatings.⁹⁶⁰ The last time that W04669 saw [REDACTED], "he was almost dead."⁹⁶¹

321. The Accused's intent in relation to murder is also apparent from the Accused's conduct with other detainees: his use of a gun during the interrogation of W03593,⁹⁶² his order to his subordinates to "finish" W01679,⁹⁶³ and the use of other potentially lethal instruments, such as metal rods and knives, during beatings.⁹⁶⁴

⁹⁵⁶ See supra Section III.E.1(a) above.

⁹⁵⁷ See supra Section III.D. above.

⁹⁵⁸ See supra Section III.E.1(c) and (d) above.

⁹⁵⁹ See supra Section III.D. above.

⁹⁶⁰ See supra Section III.D. above.

⁹⁶¹ W04669, 10 November 2021, T.1434.

⁹⁶² See supra Section III.A.2. above.

⁹⁶³ See supra Section III.A.1. above.

⁹⁶⁴ See supra Section III.D. above.

322. "I was the headquarters", stated the Accused during his interview to stress the high degree of control he had over his men and over the headquarters.⁹⁶⁵ [REDACTED] was singled out for particularly abusive treatment during his entire stay in the ZDC,⁹⁶⁶ which could only have been ordered or approved by the Accused. Similarly, there was a decision not to release [REDACTED] when the other detainees were released. As argued above, this differential treatment, at a time when the Accused and his subordinates in BIA were trying to evacuate Zllash/Zlaš, evidences a decision, which could only have made or approved by the Accused, to murder [REDACTED].⁹⁶⁷ The evidence of the Victims, of the Accused's subordinates, and of the Accused himself demonstrate that the members of BIA followed the orders and directions of the Accused.⁹⁶⁸

323. This evidence, considered in its entirety, demonstrates beyond reasonable doubt the Accused's intent for the murder of [REDACTED].

324. In the alternative, and at the very least, the evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt that it was foreseeable to the Accused that the severe mistreatment continuously inflicted on [REDACTED] could have resulted in his death and that, in spite of this, the Accused willingly took that risk.

^{965 069404-}TR-ET Part 1, p.31.

⁹⁶⁶ See supra Section III.D. above.

⁹⁶⁷ See supra Section III.D. above.

⁹⁶⁸ See e.g. Section III.A.1 for evidence showing that W01679 was arrested by BIA members upon orders of Salih MUSTAFA, and Section III.A.2 for Salih MUSTAFA ordering his subordinates to beat W03593, an order that they followed without hesitation. *See also* e.g. Brahim MEHMETAJ, 23 March 2022, T.2621, 2632, 2666 testifying about Commander Cali giving him and other subordinates tasks that they would carry out; and 069404-TR-ET Part 2, pp.3-4, 8; Records of Witness Hearing with Salih MUSTAFA, 12 March 2003, 7000650-7000660, pp.2-3.

2. Salih MUSTAFA significantly contributed to the common criminal purpose

325. The Accused significantly contributed to the common criminal plan in a variety of ways.

326. As the commander of the BIA unit and the ZDC, he directed, controlled, and ultimately oversaw the crimes committed at the ZDC. For example, when BIA members arrested W01679, they immediately brought him before the Accused.⁹⁶⁹ Once at the ZDC, BIA members told the Accused "Here you are, here's the person",⁹⁷⁰ which demonstrates that W01679's arrest had been ordered, and was controlled and overseen by the Accused himself. After one of the beatings suffered by W03593, the Accused ordered two of his men to bring him back to the stable.⁹⁷¹ As the commander of BIA and the ZDC, the Accused allowed the detention and mistreatment of the detainees to take place and continue until 19 April 1999. He took no measures to prevent the mistreatments, to punish those responsible, or to ensure the humane treatment of the victims.

327. In fact, Salih MUSTAFA personally participated in the beating of W01679 and W03593, and imparted clear orders to his soldiers to beat them. His presence during the beatings, considering his position of command, control, and influence over his subordinates, greatly encouraged his subordinates to beat the detainees both in his presence and when he was not personally present. In this regard, it bears recalling that for responsibility under JCE to arise, the Accused's physical presence at the time of the crimes' commission is not required.⁹⁷² Salih MUSTAFA can be held responsible for

⁹⁶⁹ See supra Section III.A.1. above.

⁹⁷⁰ W01679, 5 October 2021, T.980-981.

⁹⁷¹ See supra Section III.A.2. above.

⁹⁷² Simba AJ, ICTR-01-76-A, para.296.

crimes committed by other physical perpetrators, whether or not they were JCE members, provided that the crimes were part of the common criminal plan.⁹⁷³

328. In conclusion, the evidence reviewed in this brief proves beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused is responsible for the war crimes of arbitrary detention, cruel treatment, torture, and murder as a participant in a joint criminal enterprise. He possessed the intent to commit these crimes and through his conduct he significantly contributed to their commission.

329. With respect to murder, as discussed above, the evidence also demonstrates that, at an absolute minimum, it was foreseeable to the Accused that [REDACTED] would die as a consequence of the mistreatment he received, and that he willingly took this risk.

B. AIDING AND ABETTING

330. Through the same acts and omissions that significantly contributed to the furtherance of the common criminal plan, the Accused also aided and abetted the crimes committed by other members of BIA at the ZDC.

331. His personal participation in the crimes, his orders, his presence as his subordinates beat the Victims, and the accusations he levied against them provided assistance, encouragement and moral support to the physical perpetrators. By way of example, by pulling the trigger of his gun on the forehead of W03593, the Accused undoubtedly encouraged the severe beatings that his subordinates inflicted on the Victims during their detention. By allowing the premises of the ZDC to be used as a place of illegal detention and mistreatment, the Accused provided practical assistance to the commission of these crimes. He was in charge of the men and infrastructure that

⁹⁷³ Šainović et al. AJ, IT-05-87-A, para.1256.

made the commission of the crimes possible, and allowed these crimes to continue for almost twenty days.

332. The practical assistance, encouragement and moral support provided by the Accused to the perpetrators had a substantial effect on the commission of the crimes. As the commander with ultimate authority over BIA and the ZDC, and with knowledge of the crimes being committed at the ZDC, Salih MUSTAFA was aware that his conduct would contribute to their commission.

C. Physical commission

333. The Accused's direct participation in the detention and beatings described above also makes him responsible for the crimes of arbitrary detention, cruel treatment and torture as a physical perpetrator.

D. ORDERING AND INSTIGATING

334. The Accused is responsible for the crimes of arbitrary detention, cruel treatment and torture also through the modes of liability of ordering and instigating.

335. Several examples demonstrate that the crimes committed at the ZDC were ordered by the Accused. As discussed above under Section V(A), the modality of the arrest of W01679 clearly demonstrates that his arrest had been ordered by the Accused. After one of the beatings suffered by W03593, the Accused ordered two of his men to bring him back to the stable.⁹⁷⁴ He ordered his men to "finish" W01679 during one of the beatings.⁹⁷⁵ As the person in charge of the ZDC and of BIA, the Accused modelled the conduct he wanted from his subordinates and was thus the most responsible for the crimes that they committed at the ZDC.

⁹⁷⁴ See supra Section III.A.2. above.

⁹⁷⁵ See supra Section III.A.1. above.

336. The Accused's presence during the beatings and direct participation therein, his orders, his words towards the detainees, and his behavior in front of his subordinates also make him responsible as an instigator. For instance, he interrogated W01679 in front of his subordinates and accused him of being a spy.⁹⁷⁶ He pulled the trigger on the forehead of W03593 in front of his subordinates, again modelling the behavior he wanted them to follow.⁹⁷⁷ He stood present as his subordinates savagely beat the Victims during interrogation. This behaviour had a substantial contribution on the commission of the crimes against the Victims. The Accused intended for these crimes to be committed or was at least aware of the substantial likelihood that they would be committed in execution of his orders or acts of instigation.

E. SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY

337. In the alternative, the Accused is criminally responsible for the crimes charged in the Indictment because as a superior, with the requisite knowledge, he failed to prevent and/or punish the crimes committed by his subordinates.

338. The physical perpetrators of the crimes were all members of BIA, of which the Accused was the commander both *de jure* and *de facto*.

339. Numerous factors discussed extensively in Section III(E)(1)(d) above demonstrate that as the BIA commander, the Accused had effective control over his subordinates. Firstly, Salih MUSTAFA admitted that he was the only commander of the BIA unit from its very inception on 20 May 1998 until 12-14 June 1999, when the unit was disbanded. He held that position by virtue of his appointment by the Commander of the KLA's Llap OZ.⁹⁷⁸

KSC-BC-2020-05

31 January 2023

⁹⁷⁶ See supra Section III.A.1. above.

⁹⁷⁷ See supra Section III.A.2. above.

⁹⁷⁸ See supra Section III.E.1(d). above.

340. As stated by the Accused himself and confirmed by several witnesses, he had the ability to issue orders to his BIA subordinates, and these orders were followed. The Accused also received reports from his subordinates.⁹⁷⁹

341. Significantly, the Accused had disciplinary powers over his subordinates, which he exercised also by virtue of KLA regulations that he received from the Llap OZ and distributed to his BIA members. The Accused himself admitted that he exercised disciplinary powers over BIA members, including by demobilising soldiers who had disobeyed orders or committed other disciplinary violations.⁹⁸⁰ This demonstrates the Accused's material ability to prevent offenses and punish the offender, which is an important indicator of effective control.⁹⁸¹

342. The Accused also had knowledge, as discussed above under Section V(A), that his subordinates were committing crimes against those detained at the ZDC. His presence as detainees were brought to the ZDC, and during their beatings, establishes his knowledge of those crimes. His presence while crimes were committed, the visible marks and effects on the detainees, the screams that could be heard during interrogations and mistreatments, and his general presence at the ZDC as the commander in charge of the compound establish that the Accused also had reason to know that his subordinates would commit the charged crimes in his absence.

343. Despite knowing or having reason to know that his subordinates would commit crimes, and despite his effective control and disciplinary powers over them, the Accused failed to take necessary and reasonable measure to prevent those crimes,

⁹⁸⁰ See e.g. 069404-TR-ET Part 5, p.22.

⁹⁷⁹ See supra Section III.E.1(d) *above*. While not necessary to establish effective control, the following of orders issued by a superior, as well as the reporting to the superior, amount to *indicia* of effective control, *see Nyiramasuhuko et al.* AJ, ICTR-98-42-A, paras.1003, 2568, 2570.

⁹⁸¹ Popović et al. AJ, IT-05-88-A, paras.1857-1860.

or to punish his subordinates for their commission. In fact, Salih MUSTAFA failed to take any measures at all.

VI. SENTENCING

344. In the circumstances of this case, the Panel should impose a lengthy term of imprisonment on the Accused, reflecting the gravity of the crimes he committed and their severe consequences on the Victms, the role of the Accused in the crimes, the importance of general deterrence, the presence of multiple aggravating factors, and the lack of mitigating factors.

345. In addition to imprisonment, the Panel should also order the Accused to make restitution or pay compensation to the Victims in this case, pursuant to Article 44(6).

A. APPLICABLE SENTENCING RANGES

346. The Specialist Chambers may impose upon a convicted person imprisonment up to a maximum term of life-long imprisonment.⁹⁸² The Trial Panel is vested with broad discretion in determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed on the Accused due to its obligation to individualise the penalty to the circumstances of the Accused and the gravity of the crimes, having regard to the entirety of the case.⁹⁸³ While the Panel can take guidance from the relevant case-law of other courts, every case adjudicated before a national or international court is unique and specific. Comparison with other cases, such as war crimes cases tried by Kosovo courts, is of limited value given that each case has its own specific circumstances and that considerations linked to the gravity of the crimes, and aggravating and mitigating

⁹⁸² Article 44(1).

⁹⁸³ See e.g. Brdanin AJ, IT-99-36-A, para.500; Momir Nikolić JSA, IT-02-60/1-A, para.8; Krstić AJ, IT-98-33-A, paras 242, 248; Semanza AJ, ICTR-97-20-A, para.394.

factors, may dictate different results.⁹⁸⁴ The decision concerning the length of sentence ultimately turns on the circumstances of the particular case.⁹⁸⁵

347. Pursuant to Rule 163(4), the Trial Panel shall determine a sentence in respect of each charge in the indictment under which an accused has been convicted and shall impose a single sentence reflecting the totality of the criminal conduct of the accused. The single sentence shall not be less than the highest individual sentence determined in respect of each charge.⁹⁸⁶ In imposing a sentence of imprisonment, the Panel shall deduct the time, if any, during which the Accused was detained.⁹⁸⁷

348. Pursuant to Article 44(2), the punishment imposed on persons adjudged guilty of international crimes under the Law shall also take into account: *a*. the sentencing range for the crime provided under Kosovo Law at the time of the commission, and *b*. any subsequent more lenient sentencing range for the crime provided in Kosovo Law, as well as the relevant provisions of the legal instruments referred to in paragraph c.⁹⁸⁸

349. The Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ('CCSFRY') of 1 July 1977⁹⁸⁹ was in force at the time of the commission of the charged crimes.⁹⁹⁰ On a purely temporal scope, the Criminal Law of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo of 28 June 1977⁹⁹¹ was also applicable at the time of the charged

⁹⁸⁴ See Delalić et al. AJ, IT-96-21-A, para.717, 757; Semanza AJ, ICTR-97-20-A, para.394; Lubanga AJS, ICC-01/04-01/06-3122, para.76; Al Mahdi SJ, ICC-01/12-01/15-171, para.107; Taylor TJ, SCSL-03-01-A, para. 705.

⁹⁸⁵ See Krstić AJ, IT-98-33-A, para.248; Semanza AJ, ICTR-97-20-A, para.394; Taylor TJ, SCSL-03-01-A, para.705; Bemba et al. Sentencing Decision, ICC-01/05-01/13-2123-Corr, para.36.

⁹⁸⁶ Rule 163(4).

⁹⁸⁷ Rule 163(6).

⁹⁸⁸ Article 44(2).

⁹⁸⁹ Official Gazette SFRY No. 44 of 8 October 1976.

⁹⁹⁰ Article 15(1).

⁹⁹¹ Criminal Law of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo of 28 June 1977, PS No.011-25/77 ("1977 KCL").

crimes, however that Code did not provide for crimes under international law and merely included provisions regarding "ordinary/general crime".⁹⁹² Therefore, the CCSFRY constitutes *lex specialis* in this instance.

350. Article 142 of the CCSFRY ("War Crimes against the civilian population") - which addressed, *inter alia*, war crimes of killings, torture, inhuman treatment and illegal arrests and detention - provided for punishment of either imprisonment for not less than five years or the death penalty.⁹⁹³ Article 38(1) and (2) of the CCSFRY additionally provided that the punishment of imprisonment may not be greater than 15 years,⁹⁹⁴ but that a term of 20 years may be imposed for criminal acts eligible for the death penalty.⁹⁹⁵ All subsequent relevant laws or codes adopted in Kosovo have provided for equal or more severe sentencing ranges, with higher minimum penalties, and up to life imprisonment.⁹⁹⁶

351. The Accused has been charged on the basis of multiple modes of liability.⁹⁹⁷ This does not impact the sentencing range under the CCSFRY as the provisions in the

 ⁹⁹² See e.g. 1977 KCL Art.30 "Murder"; Art.38 "Serious bodily injury"; Art.48 "Endangering the safety".
 ⁹⁹³ See Art.142 CCSFRY.

⁹⁹⁴ Art.38(1) CCSFRY.

⁹⁹⁵ Art.38(2) CCSFRY.

⁹⁹⁶ *Cf.* Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo (PCCK), introduced under UNMIK Regulation No. 2003/25 in July 2003, entered into force on 6 April 2004: Articles 118 and ff. provided for punishments regarding war crimes. The sentencing range encompassed imprisonment of at least five years or long-term imprisonment for "unlawful confinement", and imprisonment of at least ten years or long-term imprisonment for "willful killing", "torture" and "inhuman treatment". The same sentencing range applies for command responsibility pursuant to Article 129 PCCK; Kosovo Criminal Code of 20 April 2012, Law No. 04/L-082, where war crimes are provided for in Articles 150 and ff. For Article 150, the sentencing range encompasses imprisonment of at least ten years or life imprisonment for "willful killing", "torture" and imprisonment of at least fifteen years or life long imprisonment for "willful killing", "torture" and "inhuman treatment". The same sentencing range applies for command responsibility pursuant to Article 161. The same sentencing range applies for command responsibility pursuant to Article 161. The same sentencing ranges apply with regards to the Kosovo Criminal Code as amended 23 November 2018 (Law No. 05/L074): *see* Articles 144 and 145. ⁹⁹⁷ *See* Section V.

code concerning such modes stipulate that the perpetrator shall be punished as prescribed for the underlying criminal offense.⁹⁹⁸

352. While the Specialist Chambers should "take into account"⁹⁹⁹ the applicable ranges provided for in the CCSFRY, by the plain language of the Law itself, it is not bound by them. This is also consistent with, for example, the framework at the ICTY where, when assessing recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia, the ICTY repeatedly found that such practice "may be used for guidance, but it is not binding."¹⁰⁰⁰

353. Moreover, in taking into account the sentencing ranges applicable under Kosovo law at the time of the offences, the Panel will consider that, at that time, war crimes were punished with very harsh penalties, including the death penalty. The fact that the death penalty was prescribed by Article 142 of the CCSFRY for "War Crimes against the civilian population" made offenders aware of the potential imposition of very harsh penalties for crimes of the nature of those under the jurisdiction of the KSC. Once the death penalty was abolished, Kosovo laws in fact provided for a maximum term of life imprisonment for war crimes.

354. The Accused was therefore aware, or should have been aware – both from the sentencing provisions of the CCSFRY (which, as noted above, provided for a potential sentence of death) and prior sentencing practice for international crimes - that such crimes were subject to severe punishment. For example, in *Delalić*, the ICTY Appeals Chamber found that, "there can be no doubt that the accused must have been aware

⁹⁹⁸ See CCSFRY Articles 22, 24, 26, 30. This means that the applicable punishment is the one prescribed by Art.142. Exceptionally, for aiding and abetting, the punishment "may also be reduced", though a reduction is not required under the law (Art.24(1) CCSFRY).

⁹⁹⁹ Article 44(2).

¹⁰⁰⁰ See e.g. Limaj et al.TJ, IT-03-66-T, para.734; *Haradinaj et al.* TJ, IT-04-84-T, para.497; *Tadić* SJ, IT-94-1-T bis-R117, paras.11-12; *Delalić et al.* AJ, IT-96-21-A, paras.813-816; see also *Serushago* AJ, ICTR-98-39-A, para.30.

of the fact that the crimes for which they were indicted are the most serious violations of international humanitarian law, punishable by the most severe penalties."¹⁰⁰¹ Lengthy sentences (including ones in excess of 20 years) were imposed for example in *Stakić*,¹⁰⁰² *Krstić*,¹⁰⁰³ *Blaskić*,¹⁰⁰⁴ and *Galić*.¹⁰⁰⁵

355. In conclusion, therefore, in terms of applicable sentencing ranges, it would be open to the Panel to impose a sentence of imprisonment up to a maximum term of life.

B. The gravity of the crimes and the role of the Accused require a severe sentence

1. The Accused's Crimes were Brutal and Devastating for the Victims

356. The gravity of the crimes and its consequences are fundamental factors in guiding the imposition of punishment by the Specialist Chambers.¹⁰⁰⁶ Gravity does not refer only to a crime's objective gravity, but also to the particular circumstances surrounding the case and the form and degree of the Accused's participation in the

¹⁰⁰¹Delalić et al. AJ, IT-96-21-A, para.817.

¹⁰⁰² *Stakić* AJ, IT-97-24-A (sentenced to life imprisonment, then turned into 40 on appeal). In issuing a sentence of life imprisonment, the *Stakić* Trial Chamber noted that the death penalty could no longer be imposed in the states of the former Yugoslavia and had been replaced by the maximum penalty of life imprisonment (except where a lower maximum was specified). This means, "if the SFRY CC were applied today, the maximum penalty would be life imprisonment" (*Stakić* TJ, IT-97-24-T, para.889). ¹⁰⁰³ *Krstić* AJ, IT-98-33-A (sentenced to 35 years imprisonment). The Appeals Chamber emphasized that

as long as the sentencing practice in the former Yugoslavia was taken into consideration there was no need to further justify deviation (*Krstić* AJ, IT-98-33-A, para.261), and that the ICTY was not prevented from imposing a greater or lesser sentence than would have been imposed under the legal regime of the Former Yugoslavia (*Krstić* AJ, IT-98-33-A, para.261).

¹⁰⁰⁴ Blaskić AJ, IT-95-14-A (sentenced to 45 years imprisonment; reduced to 9 years on appeal because the conviction of various counts were reversed). The Appeals Chamber emphasizes that the ICTY was able to impose a sentence in excess of that which would be applicable under relevant law in the former Yugoslavia, without violating the principle of *nulla poena sine lege* because "an accused must have been aware that the crimes for which he is indicted are the most serious violations of international humanitarian law, punishable by the most severe of penalties." *Blaskić* AJ, IT-95-14-A, para.681. ¹⁰⁰⁵ *Galić* AJ, IT-98-29-A (sentenced to life imprisonment).

¹⁰⁰⁶ *Cf* Art.44(5) of the Law.

crimes.¹⁰⁰⁷ As such, this factor must always be assessed in view of the particular circumstances of each case.¹⁰⁰⁸ The consequences of the Accused's actions, including the potential and actual personal and psychological consequences for the Victims of the crimes, is another relevant factor in assessing gravity.¹⁰⁰⁹

357. The crimes proven in this case were indisputably brutal. The Victims were apprehended without warning and taken to an unfamiliar and isolated location.¹⁰¹⁰ They were held together in a dark, damp, and crowded cowshed in degrading conditions.¹⁰¹¹ W03594 testified that he "felt as if I were an animal and no longer a human being."¹⁰¹² The beatings that were inflicted were unpredictable and extraordinarily violent.¹⁰¹³ The Victims were randomly attacked in the cowshed or pulled upstairs for lengthy sessions of interrogation and beatings, struck repeatedly with fists and weapons.¹⁰¹⁴ At times the Victims were beaten so severely they were rendered unconscious.¹⁰¹⁵

358. When they weren't being beaten, the Victims were in a state of extreme fear. They did not know why they were being held, where they were being held, how long they would be held, what would happen to them. At any moment, the door to the cowshed could open and the beatings begin. The evidence is that the Victims would

¹⁰⁰⁷ See e.g. Nshogoza, AJ, ICTR-07-91-A, para.98.

¹⁰⁰⁸ See e.g. Bemba et al. Sentencing Decision, ICC-01/05-01/13-2123-Corr, para.23; Ayyash SJ, STL-11-01/T/TC, para.24; Gucati and Haradinaj, TJ, KSC-BC-2020-07, para.951.

¹⁰⁰⁹ See e.g. Nshogoza TJ, ICTR-07-91-T, para.219; Bemba et al. Second Sentencing Decision, ICC-01/05-01/13-2312, paras.76-79, 93-96, 111-114; Margetic TJ, IT-95-14-R77.6, para.86.

¹⁰¹⁰ See supra Section IV.A.

¹⁰¹¹ See supra Section III.A and B.

¹⁰¹² W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1066.

¹⁰¹³ See supra Section III.B.

¹⁰¹⁴ See supra Section III.A. and B.

¹⁰¹⁵ See e.g. W01679, 4 October 2021, T.870, 882; W03593, 20 September 2021, T.409, 411..

literally cower when the guards entered, terrified of what could happen next.¹⁰¹⁶ It is difficult to fully imagine the brutality of those days and nights in the cowshed.

359. The circumstances of the Victims' detention and mistreatment were also extremely humiliating and isolating. Several of the Victims sought to join the KLA, or support its cause, but were targeted by the Accused and his subordinates and labeled as collaborators or spies, without any basis or possibility to defend themselves or refute the accusations.¹⁰¹⁷ By their arrests, they were separated from their families and communities; branded as 'collaborators' they were also deemed enemies of the KLA and pariahs in their communities, a designation that isolated them both during their detentions and long afterwards.¹⁰¹⁸

360. Thus even after their release, the Victims had to hide, in shame, what had happened to them, forced to live as survivors without any community or support. When [REDACTED], [REDACTED] pretended not to recognize him and said: "You better go. I don't want anyone to hear us speak about this."¹⁰¹⁹ [REDACTED] shared a fear that others may overhear and put them at risk of blackmail or prejudice.¹⁰²⁰ [REDACTED] testified that [REDACTED], but [REDACTED] felt "it is not the right time" because "all the institutions are held by those people."¹⁰²¹ The climate of intimidation continued to place witnesses in fear of testifying.¹⁰²² In this respect, the Victims in this case were vulnerable *when targeted* – by their isolation, status, and, in many cases, young age – and they were rendered *even more vulnerable* by the false accusations made against them and the treatment they received.

¹⁰¹⁶ See eg. W03594, 12 October 2021, T.1079.

¹⁰¹⁷ See supra Section III.A.

¹⁰¹⁸ See supra Section III.A.

¹⁰¹⁹ [REDACTED].

¹⁰²⁰ [REDACTED].

^{1021 [}REDACTED].

¹⁰²² See Section III.A.4. (para.65).

361. As a result, crimes committed by the Accused resulted in far-reaching physical and psychological consequences for the Victims and their family members. [REDACTED].¹⁰²³ [REDACTED]. W01679 has nightmares and flashbacks of the terrible things that happened over 20 years ago,¹⁰²⁴ including the cruelty of hot iron burns and electrocution.¹⁰²⁵

362. W03593 had [REDACTED].¹⁰²⁶ W03593 is currently unable to work, and has sleeping problems.¹⁰²⁷ To this day, he is still severely traumatised.¹⁰²⁸

363. Similarly, [REDACTED],¹⁰²⁹ testifying that he still carries the fear instilled within him in Zllash/Zlaš.¹⁰³⁰ In the words of W04669, the fear will remain "up until the perpetrators of those crimes are put before justice and up until they are convinced of their illegal actions."¹⁰³¹

364. [REDACTED].¹⁰³² They [REDACTED] witnessed the inflicted wounds resulting in his death.¹⁰³³ W04648 spent years seeking answers about his son's death, [REDACTED].¹⁰³⁴ [REDACTED], W04648 was unable to witness [REDACTED].¹⁰³⁵ The pain and suffering caused by the murder of [REDACTED].

¹⁰²³ See [REDACTED].

¹⁰²⁴ W01679, 5 October 2021, T.939.

¹⁰²⁵ W01679, 5 October 2021, T.985; and 4 October 2021, T.884.

¹⁰²⁶ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.425-426; and 21 September 2021, T.523-524, 526-529, 538-540.

¹⁰²⁷ W03593, 21 September 2021, T.524, 541-542.

¹⁰²⁸ See e.g. W03593, 21 September 2021, T.520-522, 531.

¹⁰²⁹ See [REDACTED].

¹⁰³⁰ W04669, 11 November 2021, T.1506.

¹⁰³¹ W04669, 11 November 2021, T.1506.

¹⁰³² See Section III.D.

¹⁰³³ See Section III.D.

¹⁰³⁴ See Section III.D; SPOE00128344-00128345; SPOE00128158-00128162 RED1; SPOE00128061-00128064 RED1; SPOE00128333-00128343 RED1.

¹⁰³⁵ 077825-077825 (W04648 Death certificate).

2. The Accused's participation in the crimes was direct, deliberate, and unequivocal

365. Among the factors relevant to the assessment of the Accused's participation in the crimes are the specific role of the Accused in the commission thereof,¹⁰³⁶ the deliberate way in which the crimes were undertaken,¹⁰³⁷ and the systematicity of the Accused's actions.¹⁰³⁸

366. In this case, the Accused both directed the crimes and participated in them. He caused harm to the Victims by ordering others to detain and abuse them, resulting in at least one victim's death,¹⁰³⁹ and by using his own hands and weapons to abuse and mistreat them.¹⁰⁴⁰ His sentence should reflect his dual roles as commander and participant.

367. As set out above,¹⁰⁴¹ the Accused is responsible for the crimes through his role as the commander of BIA and the ZDC.¹⁰⁴² The evidence shows that he ordered and instigated the crimes, aided and abetted them, and was aware they were being committed and did nothing to prevent or punish them. On several occasions, he witnessed the mistreatment of Victims and encouraged his subordinates to continue. When in the immediate presence of W01679's beating, the Accused commanded his subordinates to "finish him."¹⁰⁴³

¹⁰³⁶ *Nzabonimpa et al.* TJ, MICT-18-116-T, para.399.

¹⁰³⁷ 2011 Šešelj Contempt TJ, IT-03-67-R77.3, para.78.

¹⁰³⁸ Bemba et al., Second Sentencing Decision, ICC-01/05-01/13-2312, paras 76-79, 93-96, 111-114; Akhbar Beirut SJ, STL-14-06/S/CJ, para.17. See also, Nshogoza TJ, ICTR-07-91-T, para.222; Senessie SJ, SCSL-2011-01-T, paras 18, 22.

¹⁰³⁹ See Section III.D.

¹⁰⁴⁰ See Section V.C.

¹⁰⁴¹ See generally, Section V.

¹⁰⁴² See Section III.E(1)(c).

¹⁰⁴³ W01679, 4 October 2021, T.869, and T.981.

368. The Accused also actively participated in the crimes. He interrogated and beat W03593 in the presence of his subordinates, modelling for his subordinates the type of conduct he desired.¹⁰⁴⁴ After W03593 was beaten, the Accused placed a revolver against the middle of his forehead and pulled the trigger.¹⁰⁴⁵ In so doing, he displayed for his subordinates an utter disregard for human dignity, a desire to instill terror, and even a readiness to kill.¹⁰⁴⁶ The Accused's direct participation in the crimes both adds to his culpability and helped ensure that his orders as a commander would be fully carried out by his subordinates. A severe sentence is warranted in this case because of the different ways that the Accused participated in the crimes and ensured that they would be committed with extreme brutality.

C. DETERRENCE REQUIRES A SEVERE SENTENCE IN THIS CASE

369. The recognized purposes of sentencing include deterrence as a main goal. The establishment of the KSC recognized the importance of bringing to justice the perpetrators of international crimes, even decades after the events. The sentence imposed in this case should recognize the seriousness of the crimes committed and be sufficiently severe to deter others in the future from committing such crimes.¹⁰⁴⁷ As set forth above, a significant sentence is warranted because of the gravity of the crimes and the Accused's role in those crimes. Such a sentence will also send a message to future potential perpetrators that their crimes will be investigated and severely punished. In this way, the process of sentencing also serves to reassure the general public, surviving victims, their relatives, and witnesses, that the legal system is

¹⁰⁴⁴ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.411-412.

¹⁰⁴⁵ W03593, 20 September 2021, T.411-412.

¹⁰⁴⁶ 041888-041889.

¹⁰⁴⁷ *Todorović* SJ, IT-95-9/1-S, para.30; *Aleksovski* AJ, IT-95-14/1-A, para.185; *Delalić et al.* AJ, IT-96-21-A, para.803.

implemented and enforced, and it conveys the message that "globally accepted laws and rules have to be obeyed by everybody."¹⁰⁴⁸

370. Deterrence also requires a severe sentence because of the particular circumstances of this case. The crimes proven in this case – targeting individuals as alleged collaborators and enemies of the KLA – are by their nature extraordinarily difficult to investigate and prove. This challenge has been accentuated by the ongoing climate of intimidation and fear for witnesses in Kosovo, which was at issue throughout this case. An additional justification for the establishment of the KSC was the recognition that many prior investigations and prosecutions had been defeated by these very forces. In light of the recognized challenges in bringing these cases in Kosovo, it is particularly important for deterrent purposes that convictions result in an appropriately severe sentence.

D. THERE ARE MULTIPLE ADDITIONAL AGGRAVATING FACTORS

371. Pursuant to Article 44(5) and Rule 163(1)(b), in determining the Accused's sentence, the Panel shall take into account, as appropriate, aggravating circumstances where applicable. The Trial Panel has wide discretion in determining what constitutes aggravating circumstances, which need to be proven beyond reasonable doubt, and the weight to be accorded thereto.¹⁰⁴⁹

372. While not exhaustive, Rule 163(1)(b) provides for aggravating circumstances such as: (i) relevant prior criminal convictions; (ii) abuse of power or official capacity; (iii) commission of/participation in a crime where the victim is particularly vulnerable or defenceless; and (iv) commission of a crime with particular cruelty or where there were multiple victims. Three (ii., iii., and iv.) of the four outlined aggravating

¹⁰⁴⁸ See Brdanin TJ, IT-99-36-T, para.1091; Dragan Nikolić SJ, IT-94-2-S, para.139.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Nshogoza TJ, ICTR-07-91-T, para.220; Delalići et al. AJ, IT-96-21-A, para.777; Brdanin TJ, IT-99-36-T, para.1096.

circumstances have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt in this case, as well as additional aggravating factors as listed below.

1. The Accused abused his power or official capacity to committ the crimes

373. The Accused abused his power as the Commander of BIA.¹⁰⁵⁰ In his interview with the SPO, he bragged about his authority over BIA, declaring that he was the "headquarters."¹⁰⁵¹ After serving as a commander in the KLA, the Accused continued to occupy positions of responsibility after the conflict, up until his arrest in this case, in the intelligence services of Kosovo. His superior position and central role in the creation of a system of illegal detentions, beatings and torture at the ZDC, together with his continued approval and endorsement of the same acts during the Indictment period, should be considered a highly aggravating circumstance.¹⁰⁵²

2. The Victims were particularly vulnerable or defenceless and caused them to experience fear and intimidation

374. As set forth in detail above, the Victims of the Accused's crimes were vulnerable and defenceless, and rendered even more vulnerable as a result of the crimes. They were all civilians, caught in the events of the war, some of them young, and abruptly taken into detention with no explanation and no possibility to defend themselves.¹⁰⁵³ The Victims were given no process to appeal their detention or make complaints about their mistreatment.¹⁰⁵⁴

¹⁰⁵⁰ See generally Section V.

¹⁰⁵¹ 069404-TR-ET Part 1, p.31.

¹⁰⁵² The abuse of power or official capacity is an aggravating circumstance specifically referred to in Rule 163(1)(b)(ii). *See also* Basic Court of Pristina, P. No. 448.2012, 7 June 2013 (*Latif Gashi et al.*), paras.111, 113; *Gucati and Haradinaj* TJ, KSC-BC-2020-07, para.948 and jurisprudence cited in footnote n.1957.

¹⁰⁵³ See Section III.A.

¹⁰⁵⁴ See Section IV.A.

375. The Victims were particularly defenceless as they routinely witnessed the beatings endured by one another.¹⁰⁵⁵ The Victims testified to a general state of fear and inability to escape the compound.¹⁰⁵⁶ The infliction of personal pain, degrading conditions, and loss of dignity resulted in a vulnerable and defenceless state for the Victims. Labeled as 'collaborators', they were further prevented from seeking justice after they were released.¹⁰⁵⁷ As a consequence and as described above, the crimes committed against the Victims had long-lasting consequences, both physical and psychological.¹⁰⁵⁸

3. The crimes were committed with particular cruelty and against multiple victims

376. The crimes were perpetrated against multiple victims and some of the crimes were particularly cruel. As detailed above, the Accused and other KLA members arbitrarily deprived at least seven civilians of their liberty without due process of law at the KLA ZDC, mistreated them, and tortured them.¹⁰⁵⁹

377. The brutality of the crimes has been evidenced above. The use of hot irons or bars and electrocution speaks to the brutality of the mistreatments and torture, and the firing of a gun against W03593's forehead denotes deliberate cruelty.¹⁰⁶⁰

378. All of these circumstances should be taken into consideration as aggravating factors.

¹⁰⁵⁵ See Section IV.B.

¹⁰⁵⁶ See Section IV.A.

¹⁰⁵⁷ See Section III.A. and B.

¹⁰⁵⁸ See Section VI.B.

¹⁰⁵⁹ W01679, W03593, and [REDACTED]. See Sections III.A. and IV.

¹⁰⁶⁰ See e.g. W03593, 20 September 2021, T.411-412. See also Sections III.A. and IV.

E. THERE ARE NO MITIGATING FACTORS

379. The Panel has wide discretion in determining what constitutes mitigating circumstances, which must be established on a balance of probabilities, and the weight to be accorded thereto.¹⁰⁶¹

380. Pursuant to Rule 163(1)(a) of the Rules, mitigating circumstances may include the convicted person's conduct after the act, including any efforts to compensate the victims, voluntary surrender, and any cooperation with the Specialist Prosecutor or the Specialist Chambers. In this case, there are no circumstances which could mitigate the sentence to be imposed on the Accused.

381. At no point in the many years since the crimes occurred has the Accused expressed remorse, or indicated an intention to take accountability for his action. On the contrary, the Accused publicly bragged about commiting violence at a press conference organized around June 1999 in Prishtinë/Priština.¹⁰⁶² Subsequently, hearing about the possibility of an investigation specifically into events at the ZDC, the Accused vowed to prevent any case from proceeding.¹⁰⁶³

382. The Accused expressed no remorse or indication of sympathy, compassion, or sorrow for the Victims. Regardless of whether he declared himself innocent or guilty, never once did he address, if nothing else at least out of respect, the Victims in this case: Kosovo-Albanian civilians who suffered severe crimes committed by fellow Kosovars. The Accused offered no condolences for the harm suffered by the Victims and their families, and never acknowledged the pain and suffering that the Victims in this case have endured.

KSC-BC-2020-05

¹⁰⁶¹ See e.g. Simba AJ, ICTR-01-76-A, para.328; Brdanin TJ, IT-99-36-T, para.1117.

^{1062 041888-041889.}

¹⁰⁶³ See Section III(E)(4)(b) above.

383. Any possible submissions as to the good character of the Accused should not be given any substantial weight, given the gravity of the crimes he has committed.

F. REQUESTED SENTENCE

384. Having considered the applicable sentencing ranges and the factors set out above (in particular the gravity of the crimes and Accused's conduct, the numerous aggravating circumstances, the lack of any mitigating circumstances, the crucial importance of geneal deterrence), and given that pursuant to Rule 163(4) the Panel must first determine a sentence in respect of each charge in the Indictment, the SPO requests the Panel to impose the following sentences on the Accused:

- a. Count 1: 10 years' imprisonment;
- b. Count 2: 20 years' imprisonment;
- c. Count 3: 25 years' imprisonment;
- d. Count 4: 33 years' imprisonment.

385. Rule 163(4) requires the Panel to impose a single sentence reflecting the totality of the criminal conduct of the Accused, which shall not be less than the highest individual sentence determined in respect of each charge. It remains open to the Panel to sentence the Accused to the terms of imprisonment set out in relation to Counts 1-4 cumulatively, or to a higher sentence of imprisonment than that set out in relation to any specific Count.

386. In order to reflect the totality of the criminal conduct of the Accused, the SPO requests to impose on the Accused a single sentence of 35 years' imprisonment.

31 January 2023

VII. CLASSIFICATION

387. The present submission is filed confidentially in order to protect confidential material such as trial transcripts, confidential exhibits and testimony heard in private session. A public redacted version will be filed.

VIII. RELIEF SOUGHT

388. For the foregoing reasons, the Accused should be convicted of all counts in the Indictment and sentenced to 35 years of imprisonment for his crimes.

Word count: 38.595